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  INTRODUCTION   
On January 23, 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the in-
stallation and use of a Global Positioning System (GPS) device 
constitutes a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.1
In United States v. Jones, the government obtained a war-
rant granting law enforcement officers ten days to install a 
GPS tracking device in a car owned by the wife of a suspected 
 What might appear to be a victory for privacy advocates, 
however, was rooted in a concept of law that is obsolete in the 
face of new and emerging tracking technologies.  
 
 1. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).  
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drug dealer.2 On the eleventh day, agents actually installed the 
device—not in Washington, D.C., as required by the warrant, 
but in Maryland.3 For the next twenty-eight days, the Govern-
ment tracked the vehicle, later using the information to indict 
the car owner’s husband, Antoine Jones, on drug trafficking 
conspiracy charges.4 Four members of the Court joined Justice 
Antonin Scalia in relying not on whether agents had violated 
Jones’s reasonable expectation of privacy—the test commonly 
applied to the use of electronic surveillance—but on the ancient 
common law of trespass.5
Justice Scalia explained, “It is important to be clear about 
what occurred in this case: The Government physically occu-
pied private property for the purpose of obtaining infor-
mation.”
  
6 Such an intrusion “would have been considered a 
‘search’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment when it 
was adopted.”7
True. But the Bill of Rights came into effect on December 
15, 1791. Two hundred and twenty years later, focusing on the 
physical placement of the GPS device ignores the growing body 
of tracking technologies that make no contact with the individ-
ual. Remote identification is the law enforcement tool of the fu-
ture. GPS is only an interim step. 
 
Consider facial recognition technology (FRT). Complex al-
gorithms measure the size, angle, and distance between fea-
tures, enabling identification based on facial characteristics.8
 
 2. Id. at 948–49. 
 
Paired with video, this technology allows governments to ob-
serve and record actions in public space and to recall this in-
formation for any number of reasons. Such remote tracking is 
not the equivalent of placing a tail on a suspect. It requires no 
suspicion of any individual; it functions as warrantless mass 
surveillance. It is inexpensive. It has perfect recall. And it gen-
erates terabytes of new knowledge. As the court below noted in 
United States v. Maynard,  
 3. Id. at 948. 
 4. Id. 
 5. See id. The five justices did not address whether the search was rea-
sonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Sotomayor 
filed a concurring opinion, as did Justice Alito, who was joined by Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, and Kagan.  
 6. Id. at 946 (2012). 
 7. Id. 
 8. See Face Recognition—Technology Overview, EX-SIGHT.COM, http:// 
www.ex-sight.com/technology.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2012). 
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A person who knows all of another’s travels can deduce whether he is 
a weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an un-
faithful husband, an outpatient receiving medical treatment, an asso-
ciate of particular individuals or political groups—and not just one 
such fact about a person, but all such facts.9
This level of intrusiveness suggests something different in 
kind, not degree, from what has come before. It is quickly be-
coming more common.  
 
Patents alone demonstrate that the technology has come of 
age.10 Between 1970 and 1995, the U.S. Patent Office granted 
fewer than 10 patents involving facial recognition.11 From 1995 
to 2000, it issued 20 such patents.12 Between 2001 and 2011, 
the number leapt to 633.13
These patents are increasingly focused on, and applicable 
to, law enforcement and national security, where applications 
range from confirming targets for elimination and pairing pho-
tographs and data from different databases, to monitoring indi-
viduals as they move through public space. Between 1970 and 
1995, none of the patents specifically focused on law enforce-
ment or national security. Of the patents issued between 1995 
and 2000, less than half were directed at such uses. But follow-
ing 9/11, three major facial recognition patent clusters with di-
rect law enforcement and national security applications 
emerged: digital video (80 patents), image surveillance (35) and 
biometric identification data (136). (See Figure 1).
  
14
 
 
 
 
 
 9. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 562 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d 
sub nom. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 10. But note the myriad problems that persist with FRT. See, e.g., E-mail 
from C. L. Wilson, Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., to Travis L. Farris, Janet 
M. Boodro, Roy Weise, Tom Hopper & John Atkins (Dec. 2, 2003, 08:29 EST), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/US_VISIT_NIST-DHS_ 
Coordinated_Doc.pdf (noting low probability of verification in outdoor illumi-
nation).  
 11. The timing and frequency of patents was ascertained by the author by 
conducting structured searches of restricted time intervals in a patent search 
engine. See PRIORIP, http://www.prior-ip.com (last visited Sept. 18, 2012) 
(website no longer available). 
 12. See supra note 11. 
 13. The number of FRT patents issued per year is as follows: 1995 (2); 
1996 (2); 1997 (0); 1998 (7); 1999 (3); 2000 (6); 2001 (4); 2002 (12); 2003 (30); 
2004 (17); 2005 (10); 2006 (57); 2007 (57); 2008 (90); 2009 (100); 2010 (167); 
2011 (89). See supra note 11. 
 14. See supra note 11. 
  
2012] REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION 411 
 
Figure 1 
Facial Recognition Patents 1995–2011 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Total and in three key clusters: digital video, image surveil-
lance, and biometric data. 
 
Further examination demonstrates a growing government 
market in this area.15
 
 15. See, e.g., Distributed Stand-off ID Verification Compatible with Multi-
ple Face Recognition Systems, U.S. Patent No. 7,817,013 (filed Dec. 1, 2005) 
(issued Oct. 19, 2010) (describing the technology as “providing stand-off bio-
metric verification of a driver of a vehicle while the vehicle is moving and/or a 
person on foot at a control gate” and assigned to Honeywell International Inc.); 
Distributed Stand-off Verification and Face Recognition Systems, U.S. Patent 
No. 7,843,313 (filed Dec. 1, 2005) (issued Nov. 30, 2010) (providing same capa-
bility as U.S. Patent 7,817,013, filed on same day, and also assigned to Hon-
eywell International Inc.); Identification of an Object in Media and of Related 
Media Objects, U.S. Patent No. 7,787,697 (filed June 9, 2006) (issued Aug. 31, 
2010) (pairing of audio and visual biometric identification in a mobile device; 
and assigned to Sony Ericsson Mobile Commission AB); Mobile Self-Contained 
Networked Checkpoint, U.S. Patent No. 7,789,258 (filed May 7, 2007) (issued 
Sept. 7, 2010) (providing a portable checkpoint system that allows for facial 
recognition and assigned to the U.S. as represented by the Secretary of the 
Navy); Real-Time Facial Recognition and Verification Systems, U.S. Patent 
No. 7,130,454 (filed Mar. 15, 2002) (issued Oct. 31, 2006) (providing a “system 
and method for acquiring, processing, and comparing an image with a stored 
image to determine if a match exists,” using pre-stored color values, such as 
flesh tone; assigned to Viisage Technology, Inc.); Security System Control for 
Monitoring Vehicular Compartments, U.S. Patent No. 7,768,380 (filed Oct. 29, 
2007) (issued Aug. 3, 2010) (providing a security system for monitoring vehicu-
lar compartments by scanning and using facial recognition to identify the 
driver and passengers; assigned to Automotive Technologies International, 
Inc). A similar picture emerges when looking at the specific companies in-
volved. VideoIQ, Inc., for example, obtained a patent for local verification sys-
tems and security monitoring technologies. U.S. Patent No. 7,504,942 (filed 
Feb. 6, 2006) (issued Mar. 17, 2009). The company’s customers range from 
 Major defense contractors such as Lock-
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heed Martin and Honeywell International, together with myri-
ad startups dedicated to FRT and video technologies, have 
swiftly moved into related technologies. Simultaneously, gov-
ernment agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency 
(CIA), the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Air 
Force Research Laboratory (DARPA), and the National Geospa-
tial-Intelligence Agency, have invested in advanced technolo-
gies that range from behavior recognition, motion pattern 
learning, and anomaly detection, to object recognition and 
tracking.16
Government forays into biometric identification abound. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), for example, is cur-
rently developing what it calls Next Generation Identification 
(NGI).
 
17
 
commercial and educational interests to municipalities, transportation and 
government, including the Department of Homeland Security. Customers, 
VIDEOIQ, http://www.videoiq.com/customers.php (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).  
 One of its components, the Interstate Photo System, 
 16. See, e.g., Biography of Anthony Hoogs: Senior Director of Computer 
Vision, KITWARE, http://www.kitware.com/company/team/hoogs.html (last vis-
ited Nov. 2, 2012) (listing Dr. Hoogs as the principal investigator in various 
DARPA projects). Dr. Hoogs has researched extensively in the field of bio-
metric identification. See, e.g., Kobus Barnard et al., Evaluation of Localized 
Semantics: Data, Methodology, and Experiments, 77 INT’L J. COMPUTER VI-
SION 199, 216 (2008) (acknowledging financial support from Lockheed Martin); 
Zhaohui Sun & Anthony Hoogs, Image Comparison by Compound Disjoint In-
formation with Applications to Perceptual Visual Quality Assessment, Image 
Registration and Tracking, 88 INT’L J. COMPUTER VISION 461, 461 (2010) (list-
ing GE Global research as Dr. Hoogs’s institutional affiliation); Michael T. 
Chan et al., Event Recognition with Fragmented Object Tracks, 18 INT’L CONF. 
PATTERN RECOGNITION (2006) (noting support from Lockheed Martin); Mi-
chael T. Chan et al., Joint Recognition of Complex Events and Track Matching 
2006 IEEE COMPUTER SOC. CONF. COMPUTER VISION PATTERN RECOGNITION 
PROC. 1615, 1615–22 (2006) (same); Naresh P. Cuntoor et al., Track Initializa-
tion in Low Frame Rate and Low Resolution Videos, 20 INT’L CONF. PATTERN 
RECOGNITION PROC. 3640, 3640–44 (2010); Anthony Hoogs et al., Detecting 
Semantic Group Activities Using Relational Clustering, 2008 IEEE WORKSHOP 
MOTION VIDEO COMPUTING PROC. 1, 1–8 (sponsored by Lockheed Martin), 
available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber= 
4544062; Anthony Hoogs & Roderic Collins, Object Boundary Detection in Im-
ages Using a Semantic Ontology, 2006 CONF. COMPUTER VISION PATTERN 
RECOGNITION WORKSHOP PROC., available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/ 
stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=arnumber=164054; Anthony Hoogs & A.G. Amitha 
Perera, Video Activity Recognition in the Real World (National Conference on 
Artificial Intelligence) 23 AAAI CONF. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE PROC. 1551, 
1551 (2008) (noting applications for technology in observing “stealing, fighting, 
exchanging, packages, and covert surveillance”), available at http://www 
.aaaipress.org/Papers/AAAI/2008/AAAI08-260.pdf. 
 17. See Fingerprints & Other Biometrics: Next Generation Identification, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_ 
biometrics/ngi (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
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allows law enforcement to submit still images or video surveil-
lance feeds obtained from any public or private source.18 The 
system is designed to store this data and, using FRT, to identi-
fy individuals, pairing images with biographic information.19 
NGI also uses biographic information to search its Repository 
for Individuals of Special Concern (RISC).20 This database con-
sists of records of “known or appropriately suspected terror-
ists,” as well as “other persons of special interest” (a category 
that remains undefined).21 NGI further includes a Rap Back 
Service, where employers can collect employees’ biometric data 
and give it to the FBI, which will then notify them of any crim-
inal, and, in some cases, civil activities.22
The FBI is not alone. In 2004, the Department of Defense’s 
(DoD) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS), de-
signed to work with the FBI’s biometric database, became op-
 This means that eve-
rything from criminal convictions to parking tickets to attend-
ance at political rallies, captured on film, could be reported. 
 
 18. See Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifi-
cation (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
(2008), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/interstate-photo 
-system [hereinafter Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation 
Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS)], (stating that photos may 
be obtained from security cameras, friends, and family). But see What Facial 
Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before 
the Sub comm. on Privacy, Tech. & the Law of the S. Judiciary Comm., 105th 
Cong. 3 (2012) (statement of Jerome M. Pender, Deputy Dir. Crim. Just. Info. 
Servs. Div., FBI), available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-7-
18PenderTestimony.pdf (“Only criminal mug shots are used to populate the 
national repository.”). 
 19. See Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifi-
cation (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18. 
 20. What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy and Civil Lib-
erties, supra note 18, at 2. 
 21. Fingerprints & Other Biometrics: Repository for Individuals of Special 
Concern (RISC), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ 
cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi/repository-for-individuals-of-special-concern 
-risc (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 22. See 5 Things You Should Know About the FBIs Massive New Bio-
metric Database (Alternet), UNCOVER THE TRUTH (Jan. 10, 2012), http:// 
uncoverthetruth.org/press/5-things-you-should-know-about-the-fbis-massive 
-new-biometric-database-alternet; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
ELECTRONIC BIOMETRIC TRANSMISSION SPECIFICATION (EBTS) 60 (2007), 
available at https://www.fbibiospecs.org/docs/EBTSv8.0_20070924.pdf (noting 
that the service will allow authorized agencies to enroll and receive notifica-
tions about individual criminal activity and possibly civil activity if not legally 
prohibited). 
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erational.23 By 2009, DoD’s database had evolved into the Next 
Generation ABIS, a system that combines fingerprint, palm 
print, facial recognition, and iris analysis with biographic and 
encounter transactions.24 It stores, retrieves, and searches data 
collected from “persons of national security interest.”25 DoD has 
complemented this initiative with a Biometrically-Enabled 
Watchlist.26 The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and 
the State Department also maintain biometric databases and 
watchlists.27 Memoranda of understanding between the agen-
cies focus on how to make these systems interoperable.28
Despite the explosion of federal initiatives in this area, 
Congress has been virtually silent on the many current and po-
tential uses of FRT and related technologies.
 
29
 
 23. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, THE NATIONAL BIOMETRICS CHALLENGE 
6 (2011), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics 
Challenge2011_protected.pdf. 
 No laws directly 
address facial recognition—much less the pairing of facial 
 24. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT 10 (2009), 
available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/biometric09.pdf. 
 25. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF DEF., ELECTRONIC BIOMETRIC 
TRANSMISSION SPECIFICATION 1 (2009) [hereinafter BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE], 
available at http://www.biometrics.gov/standards/DoD_ABIS_EBTS_v2.0.pdf. 
 26. See BIOMETRICS IDENTITY MGMT. AGENCY, DOD BIOMETRICS COLLAB-
ORATION FORUM 14 (2011) [hereinafter DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FO-
RUM], available at http://www.biometrics.dod.mil/Files/Documents/2011_ 
Collaborations/ForumReport.pdf. 
 27. See Government Agencies Using US-VISIT, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SE-
CURITY, http://www.dhs.gov/government-agencies-using-US-visit (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2012). 
 28. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, supra note 23, at 8. 
 29. See, e.g., DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, §§ 1001–
1005, 119 Stat. 2960, 3084–86 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.) (creating opt-out system for expunging DNA profiles 
from the national index and authorizing collection of DNA samples from per-
sons arrested or detained under federal law); Justice for All Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-405, §§ 202–203 118 Stat. 2260, 2266–71 (codified as enacted in 
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C., codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C., and codified as repealed in 42 U.S.C. § 10606) (enhanc-
ing provisions for DNA collection and analysis, and providing for post-
conviction DNA testing). But note that in October 2011, Senator John D. 
Rockefeller IV (D-W. Va.), requested that the Federal Trade Commission con-
sider the privacy impact of FRT with a report due February 9, 2012. Brian 
Heaton, Facial Recognition Technology Spurs Privacy Concerns for Feds, 
GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/Facial 
-Recognition-Privacy-Concerns-Feds.html. The report largely recommends in-
dustry self-regulation as opposed to legislative action. See FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: REC-
OMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESS AND POLICYMAKERS i (2012), available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2012/03/120326privacyreport.pdf. 
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recognition with video surveillance—in either the criminal law 
or foreign intelligence realm. Many of the existing limits placed 
on the collection of personally identifiable information do not 
apply. Only a handful of hearings has even questioned the use 
of biometrics in the national security or law enforcement con-
text.30
The absence of a statutory framework is a cause for signifi-
cant concern. Facial recognition represents the first of a series 
of next generation biometrics, such as hand geometry, iris, vas-
cular patterns, hormones, and gait, which, when paired with 
surveillance of public space, give rise to unique and novel ques-
tions of law and policy.
 
31
Hitherto, identification techniques centered on what might 
be called Immediate Biometric Identification (IBI)—or the use 
of biometrics to determine identity at the point of arrest, follow-
ing conviction, or in conjunction with access to secure facilities. 
Fingerprint is the most obvious example of IBI, although more 
recent forays into palm prints fall within this class. DNA tech-
nologies that require individuals to provide saliva, skin, or oth-
er samples for analysis also can be considered as part of IBI. 
Use of technology for IBI, in contrast to RBI, tends to be fo-
cused (1) on a single individual; (2) close-up; (3) in relation ei-
ther to custodial detention or in the context of a specific physi-
cal area related to government activity; (4) in a manner often 
 These constitute what can be consid-
ered Remote Biometric Identification (RBI). That is, they give 
the government the ability to ascertain the identity (1) of mul-
tiple people; (2) at a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent no-
tice and consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going manner. 
As such, RBI technologies present capabilities significantly dif-
ferent from that which the government has held at any point in 
U.S. history.  
 
 30. For a notable exception, see Hearing on Oversight of the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 110th Cong. 92 (2008) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) (“Re-
cent reports suggest that the FBI is engaged in a $1 billion program to create 
a massive biometric database, compiling not just fingerprints, but eye scans, 
palm prints, facial features, and other identifying features of millions of peo-
ple. It is vitally important for the FBI to master emerging and enhanced tech-
nologies in the fight against crime and terrorism. But we must also be cogni-
zant of the impact that such a database can have on the privacy rights and 
civil liberties of Americans.”). 
 31. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS “FOUNDATION DOCU-
MENTS,” 4–6, http://www.biometrics.gov/documents/biofoundationdocs.pdf (last 
visited Nov. 2, 2012) (providing an overview of current and emerging biometric 
technology). 
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involving notice and often consent;32
What we are witnessing, as a result of the expansion from 
IBI to RBI, is a sea change in how we think about individuals 
in public space. Congress has yet to grapple with the conse-
quences.  
 and (5) is a one-time or 
limited occurrence. The types of legal and policy questions 
raised by RBI differ from those accompanying IBI.  
This Article seeks to drive the discussion forward by detail-
ing the recent explosion of federal initiatives in biometric iden-
tification, highlighting gaps in the current statutory framework 
governing RBI, and considering the Court’s jurisprudence in re-
lation to the constitutional questions that arise. Arguing that 
the current statutory and constitutional framing is inadequate 
to address the new conditions that accompany these emerging 
technologies, it calls for immediate and careful congressional 
consideration of RBI. 
Part I begins with a discussion of the evolution of biometric 
technologies and federal programs. Prior to September 11, 
2001, there were relatively few initiatives focused on the collec-
tion and use of biometrics. Immediately following the attacks, 
resources flowed to this area. Initially, most of the attention 
centered on U.S. borders. Over the next decade, the patterns 
shifted. Paralleling the evolution of applications related to 
homeland security came efforts to expand biometrics to gov-
ernment employees. Traditional law enforcement collection of 
fingerprints expanded to include other forms of biometric data. 
Similar systems worked their way into the military infrastruc-
ture, with soldiers using new tools for targeting, identification, 
and surveillance purposes. New technologies began to extend 
horizontally, across federal agencies, as well as vertically, to 
state and local governments. Emphasis is now moving beyond 
merely establishing biometric systems to facilitating infor-
mation sharing between these databases, blurring the line be-
tween investigations and intelligence gathering.  
Part II considers the statutory frameworks that potentially 
apply to the current systems: government acquisition of indi-
vidually identifiable data, criminal warrant requirements, and 
foreign intelligence surveillance. In relation to the first, federal 
 
 32. An important exception here would be the lifting of prints or collection 
of DNA from a crime scene, where neither consent nor notice would be pre-
sent; such a scenario, however, is contemplated in the context of (2)—i.e., a 
limited geographic area related to government activity, in this case the inves-
tigation of a crime. 
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agencies have considerable, largely unchallenged authority to 
collect and analyze personally identifiable information. Con-
gressional restrictions on the exercise of such authorities gen-
erally do not apply to biometric systems. Gaps in the 1974 Pri-
vacy Act and its amendments and the 1990 Computer Matching 
and Privacy Protection Amendments, in conjunction with Pri-
vacy Act exemptions and the 2002 E-Government Act, mini-
mize the extent to which such instruments can be brought to 
bear. The second area turns on Title III of the 1968 Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and Title I of the 1986 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act. Neither statute, how-
ever, directly addresses RBI. The third area, controlled by the 
1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) and its 
amendments, similarly falls short. It is unclear whether bio-
metric surveillance is considered as within the Foreign Intelli-
gence Court’s remit. Even if it is, significant questions exist as 
to whether FISA’s provisions can be met by RBI. In the absence 
of a statutory framework with which to evaluate the current 
federal initiatives and their potential inclusion of facial recog-
nition and video technologies, we are driven back upon consti-
tutional considerations.  
Part III recognizes that RBI sits uneasily in the Court’s 
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, which has yet to squarely 
address the implications of these new technologies. Potentially 
applicable lines of cases depend upon conditions that fail to 
provide meaningful distinctions within RBI.  
Part IV notes that little relief may be found in associated 
constitutional doctrines. The Fifth Amendment’s right against 
self-incrimination, understood as protecting individuals from 
being forced to take action, fails to reach the passive nature of 
ubiquitous surveillance. The First Amendment’s protection of 
speech and assembly present a low bar, even where RBI may be 
directly targeting political rallies. The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ due process protections key in on the accuracy of 
the technology—something that may become less of an issue as 
research advances. 
Part V concludes with the recognition that the types of 
questions posed by this technology may require a new approach 
to the place of privacy in society. Instead of focusing on the 
rights discourse as a framing for personally identifiable infor-
mation, it may be more important to think about privacy in a 
constitutive sense—i.e., as playing a role in social cohesion and 
personal and social development. Simultaneously, ways of iden-
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tifying the technologies thus implicated, and of understanding 
their impact, need to be developed—this, in juxtaposition to the 
unmitigated embrace of new and emerging technologies and the 
assumption that such advances represent something merely 
different in degree, not kind, from what has come before. 
I.  TECHNOLOGICAL LEAP   
For more than a century, U.S. law enforcement agencies 
have employed biometric identification.33 Such technologies ini-
tially took the form of fingerprinting. In the early twentieth 
century, the New York Police Department, the New York State 
Prison System, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons became the 
first to adopt this technique.34 Soon thereafter, the U.S. Army 
found a parallel use in the national security realm.35 In 1907, 
fingerprinting spread to the U.S. Navy and the following year 
to the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC).36
 
 33. In 1892, Sir Francis Galton published his famous treatise, Finger 
Prints, establishing their individuality and permanence and offering the first 
classification system to distinguish between persons. Laura A. Hutchins, Sys-
tems of Friction Ridge Classification, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 5-1, 5-
6 (Alan McRoberts ed., 2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/225325.pdf. Edward Richard Henry followed Galton’s work with his Classi-
fication and Uses of Finger Prints, providing a more easily searchable system 
with straightforward methods of classification and comparison. EDWARD 
RICHARD HENRY, CLASSIFICATION AND USES OF FINGER PRINTS 3–14 (1905) 
(discussing Galton’s work and noting the degree to which fingerprinting had 
become integrated into military and civil functions in India). These studies, 
together with growing interest in the topic, prompted the British Home Office 
to conduct an inquiry into the identification of criminals by measurement and 
fingerprints. History of the Metropolitan Police, METROPOLITAN POLICE, 
http://www.met.police.uk/history/fingerprints.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
By 1901 New Scotland Yard had launched its first Fingerprint Branch, adopt-
ing Henry’s system of classification. Id.  
 The use of fingerprints 
proved labor intensive, requiring numerous people and hours to 
 34. Fingerprints: The First ID, FINDLAW, http://criminal.findlaw.com/ 
crimes/more-criminal-topics/evidence-witnesses/fingerprints-the-first-id.html 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (noting that Scotland Yard used fingerprinting in 
1901 before American agencies began using it in 1903).  
 35. See id. 
 36. Jeffery G. Barnes, History, in THE FINGERPRINT SOURCEBOOK 1-1, 1-
19 (Alan McRoberts ed., 2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ 
nij/225320.pdf; see The History of Fingerprints, ONIN.COM, http://onin.com/ 
fp/fphistory.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). By 1928 the FBI had similarly be-
gun using fingerprint identification. Aviation Security: Challenges in Using 
Biometric Technologies: Testimony Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the H. 
Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, 108th Cong. 17 (2004) (statement of Keith 
A. Rhodes, Chief Technologist, Applied Research & Methods), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04785t.pdf. 
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identify, catalogue, and compare prints stored on paper.37 Start-
ing in the 1960s, the introduction of automated technology for 
comparison and storage altered the landscape—complex anal-
yses could be completed within seconds.38
By the end of the twentieth century, automated fingerprint 
matching had become the norm and new forms of biometric 
identification had begun to emerge.
 Digitization further 
sped the number of records that could be stored and analyzed.  
39 The government launched 
a number of initiatives aimed at taking advantage of the new 
technologies. The National Institute of Standards and Technol-
ogy and the Biometric Consortium (established in 1992) created 
an interagency body to consider and coordinate biometric activ-
ities at the federal level.40 Most of the programs underway em-
phasized fingerprint and DNA as methods of identification, 
with further interest in facial recognition and iris analysis.41 
Accordingly, the FBI established its Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), while the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service (INS) initiated an automated 
biometric identification system called IDENT.42 The FBI also 
created the Combined DNA Index System, known as CODIS, a 
computer database that integrates local, state, and federal 
DNA records of convicted offenders, evidence collected from 
crime scenes, and missing persons.43
 
 37. PETER KOMARINSKI, AUTOMATED FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION SYS-
TEMS 8–10 (2005). 
 
 38. Id. at 10–11; NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS IN GOVERN-
MENT POST-9/11: ADVANCING SCIENCE, ENHANCING OPERATIONS 8 (2008) 
[hereinafter BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11], available at http://www 
.biometrics.gov/Documents/Biometrics%20in%20Government%20Post%209-11 
.pdf (dating research conducted by the FBI and NIST on the automated match-
ing of fingerprints to 1967). 
 39. The first patent granted for automated iris recognition, for instance, 
was issued in 1994. Introduction to Iris Recognition, UNIV. CAMBRIDGE, http:// 
www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/jgd1000/iris_recognition.html (last visited Nov. 2, 
2012). 
 40. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 6. 
 41. See id. at 8. In 1993, the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
launched INSPASS, a system based on hand geometry, used to facilitate swift-
er processing of business travelers registered for the program. Id. In 1995, 
there was a commercial release of iris prototypes. Id. In 1996, INS launched a 
fully automated Port of Entry at Scobey, Montana, relying upon voice verifica-
tion technology. Id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See Laboratory Services: Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), FED. 
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/codis (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2012). 
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Following the attacks of 9/11, renewed interest in biomet-
rics led to an expansion of the existing databases, the institu-
tion of new programs, and the creation of new inter-agency 
agreements to allow for the sharing of biometric data.44 Like 
the civilian institutions, the military vigorously pursued new 
uses of biometric technologies, creating in the process its own 
database known as the Automated Biometric Identification 
System, with further expansion resulting in the creation of 
Next Generation ABIS.45 Federal initiatives reached beyond 
horizontal coordination, to include vertical integration with 
state and local government.46
A. PRE-9/11 FEDERAL DEVELOPMENT OF BIOMETRIC 
TECHNOLOGY AND COLLECTION SYSTEMS 
 
Two federal fingerprint repositories and one DNA database 
predated the September 11, 2001 attacks. A brief discussion of 
each helps to illustrate the changed circumstances that fol-
lowed. 
The first initiative stemmed from research jointly spon-
sored in 1967 by the FBI and the National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology.47 More than a quarter of a century later, 
the FBI began planning development of IAFIS, which became 
operational in 1999.48 IAFIS collected ten-print images, entered 
by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.49 It quick-
ly came to serve as a national repository, allowing officials to 
check new prints against the database, and to correlate the 
prints to individual identity.50
Throughout the 1990s, talks between the FBI and INS as 
to whether the latter could use IAFIS for border security ex-
  
 
 44. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 20, 26. 
 45. See id. at 25. 
 46. See id. at 29 (describing coordination of US-VISIT service amongst 
federal, state, and local agencies). 
 47. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8–9. It 
took more than twenty years for the American National Standards Institute 
(ANSI) to release a national standard. AM. NAT’L STANDARDS INST., AM. NAT’L 
STANDARD FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS—FINGERPRINT IDENTIFICATION—DATA 
FORMAT FOR INFORMATION INTERCHANGE (1986), available at http:// 
biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/standard/archived/ANSI-NIST-ICST_1-1986.pdf. 
 48. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8–9. 
 49. See Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System, FED. BU-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_ 
biometrics/iafis/iafis (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 50. See id. 
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posed schisms in the agencies’ needs.51 INS, which was develop-
ing its own automated biometric system, emphasized the im-
portance of being able to process a high volume of inquiries 
swiftly.52 The movement of large numbers of people and limited 
facilities for holding individuals at points of entry made it diffi-
cult to accommodate delays.53 With its operational mission in 
mind, INS considered two fingerprints sufficient for screening 
those entering and leaving the country.54 The FBI, in contrast, 
with an eye towards criminal prosecution, emphasized the im-
portance of obtaining ten prints.55 The inclusion of such infor-
mation, however, made searches more complex which, corre-
spondingly, took longer.56
To accommodate the special needs presented by the border, 
in 1994, Congress approved INS’s own repository, known as 
IDENT.
 
57 Two years later, Congress authorized further devel-
opment of the integrated entry and exit data system.58 This da-
tabase included photographs and two index finger fingerprints, 
with additional information related to the individual’s criminal 
history.59
Efforts to integrate IAFIS and IDENT’s parallel finger-
print systems repeatedly stalled on the shoals of institutional 
needs and bureaucratic politics. In 1998, for instance, Con-
gressman Alan Mollohan, the ranking member of the House 
Appropriations Subcommittee for Commerce, Justice, State, 
and the Judiciary, wrote to Attorney General Janet Reno, ask-
 
 
 51. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Status of IDENT/IAFIS Integration: Inte-
gration of the Fingerprint System (Dec. 7, 2001), http://www.justice.gov/ 
oig/reports/plus/e0203/finger.htm [hereinafter Status of IDENT/IAFIS]. 
 52. See id.  
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. 
 57. Id. Barriers to integration at the time included different operational 
requirements, insufficient funds for the development of IAFIS projects, and a 
certain stasis that accompanied the independent development of the two re-
positories of data. See generally The Rafael Resendez-Ramirez Case: A Review 
of the INS’s Actions and the Operation of Its IDENT Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System, U.S. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. (Mar. 20, 2000), 
http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0003/index.htm (noting the failure of IDENT 
to identify Resendez as an individual wanted by the FBI). 
 58. See Immigration and Naturalization Service Data Management Im-
provement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215, § 2, 114 Stat. 337, 337–39. 
 59. See Status of IDENT/IAFIS, supra note 51; see also BIOMETRICS IN 
GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8. 
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ing straight out whether the two systems were redundant.60 
The Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Justice Management Divi-
sion insisted that they were not, in the process issuing a report 
considering three options: (1) to retain IDENT in its current 
form, while adapting it to ensure greater integration of crimi-
nal data in the two-print mode; (2) to move IDENT to a ten-
print system and to retain both in parallel; or (3) to scrap 
IDENT and force INS to use IAFIS’s ten-print system.61 (DOJ 
did not consider dismantling its own database, IAFIS, in favor 
of INS’s IDENT.) DOJ’s Justice Management Division, the FBI, 
Border Patrol, and INS agreed that the second option would be 
the best one, which would have required Congress to increase 
funding across the board.62 Congress refused.63 A high profile 
case in 1999 again forced the question of integrating the two 
systems. At issue was the capture of Rafael Resendez-Ramirez, 
a Mexican citizen with an extensive criminal record, wanted in 
connection with several railway murders.64 In June of that 
year, two Border Patrol agents detained him but subsequently 
released him when IDENT failed to include the information 
that he was wanted by the FBI.65 Resendez-Ramirez committed 
four more murders before he surrendered to U.S. authorities 
the following month.66 Congress excoriated the Executive 
Branch for failing to integrate IAFIS and IDENT.67
Even as it developed an extensive fingerprinting system, 
the FBI explored ways to use DNA analysis for criminal inves-
tigations. In the late 1980s the Bureau formed a Technical 
Working Group on DNA Analysis Methods to look more closely 
at this question.
 
68 Sponsored by the FBI Laboratory, the work-
ing group held a series of meetings to address the scientific 
challenges involved in deploying DNA technologies.69
 
 60. Status of IDENT/IAFIS, supra note 
 As the re-
search progressed, in 1994, Congress modified the Omnibus 
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 by adding provi-
51. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., THE FBI 
DNA LABORATORY: A REVIEW OF PROTOCOL AND PRACTICE 15 (2004), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/oig/special/0405/final.pdf. 
 69. See id. 
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sions regulating DNA laboratories and governing the accumu-
lation of DNA records and samples.70 This legislation created 
CODIS, a database run by the FBI to store local, state, and fed-
eral DNA profiles in searchable form.71 Four years later, the 
Crime Identification Technology Act provided for more effective 
interstate criminal justice identification, information, commu-
nications, and forensics.72 The legislation established grants to 
encourage the identification and analysis of DNA.73 By 2000, 
the demand for DNA analysis had outpaced the federal gov-
ernment’s ability to process samples, leading to the passage of 
the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act.74
Outside of fingerprinting and DNA, there were some forays 
into facial recognition. In 1993, for example, the DoD initiated 
the Face Recognition Technology (FERET) program.
  
75 The goal 
was to develop automatic facial recognition systems for securi-
ty, intelligence, and law enforcement purposes.76 By 1996, the 
Army Research Laboratory had moved to real-time video face 
identification within an access control context.77 Four years lat-
er, DoD established its first Biometrics Management Office and 
Biometrics Fusion Center.78
 
 70. DNA Identification Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 210301, 108 
Stat. 2065, 2065–66. 
 That same year DARPA initiated 
 71. Id.; see also Laboratory Services: Combined DNA Index Systems 
(CODIS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/lab/ 
codis (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (providing a description of the mission and 
work of the CODIS Unit). 
 72. Crime Identification Technology Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-251, 
§ 102, 112 Stat. 1870, 1870–71. 
 73. Id. 
 74. DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-546, 
114 Stat. 2726. Note that these initiatives continued post-9/11. See, e.g., Jus-
tice for All Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-405, §§ 203, 411, 118 Stat. 2260, 2269–
71, 2278–84 (enhancing DNA collection and analysis and providing for post-
conviction DNA testing); DNA Fingerprint Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-162, 
§ 1002, 119 Stat. 3084, 3084–85 (creating an opt-out system for expunging 
DNA profiles from the national index and authorizing collection of DNA sam-
ples from persons arrested or detained under federal law). 
 75. Patrick J. Rauss et al., FERET (Face Recognition Technology) Pro-
gram, 2962 PROC. SPIE 253, 253 (1997), available at http://adsabs.harvard 
.edu/abs/1997SPIE.2962..253R. 
 76. Face Recognition Vendor Test, NIST INFO. TECH. LABORATORY, http:// 
www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/frvt-home.cfm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 77. See P. JONATHON PHILLIPS ET AL., FERET (FACE RECOGNITION TECH-
NOLOGY) RECOGNITION ALGORITHM DEVELOPMENT AND TEST RESULTS 9, 33 
(1996), available at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1 
.19.3924. 
 78. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9, 24. 
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the Human Identification at a Distance (HumanID) Program.79 
DARPA reported that the purpose of the program was to pro-
vide early warning support for force protection and homeland 
security against terrorism and crime.80 The goal was to develop 
algorithms for locating and acquiring subjects up to 150 meters 
(500 feet) away, fusing face and gait recognition into a 24/7 
human identification system.81 (This program transferred to the 
Information Awareness Office post-9/11 and formed one com-
ponent of John Poindexter’s Total Information Awareness pro-
gram.)82 At the conclusion of FERET, DoD’s Counterdrug Tech-
nology Development Program Office, DARPA, and the National 
Institute of Justice created a facial recognition vendor test to 
keep abreast of commercial developments in the field.83
In 1995, the INS similarly launched a facial (and voice) 
recognition program, narrowly focused on individuals crossing 
the Mexico-U.S. border at Otay Mesa, California.
 
84 The follow-
ing year Congress extended the so-called SENTRI program (Se-
cure Electronic Network for Travelers Rapid Inspection), to La-
redo, Hidalgo, and El Paso, Texas, as well as Nogales and San 
Louis, Arizona.85
 
 79. Id. at 9, 18. 
 SENTRI rapidly expanded to the northern 
 80. Human ID at a Distance (HumanID), INFO. AWARENESS OFFICE, 
http://infowar.net/tia/www.darpa.mil/iao/HID.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31730, PRIVA-
CY: TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION 
ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION LAWS (2003), available at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL31730.pdf. 
 83. FACIAL RECOGNITION VENDOR TEST 2000, EVALUATION REPORT 12 
(2001), available at http://www.face-rec.org/vendors/FRVT_2000.pdf. There 
have since been four occasions on which similar tests were conducted to evalu-
ate publicly-available products. See Face Recognition Vendor Test, NIST INFO. 
TECH. LABORATORY (JULY 31, 2012), http://www.nist.gov/itl/iad/ig/frvt-home 
.cfm. 
 84. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 8, 23 
(noting use of facial and voice recognition at Otay Mesa, California border 
crossing); see also SENTRI Program Description, CPB.GOV, http://www.cbp 
.gov/xp/cgov/travel/trusted_traveler/sentri/sentri.xml (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) 
[hereinafter SENTRI] (providing a description of the SENTRI program, in-
cluding eligibility criteria). 
 85. Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid In-
spection: Appendix II, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 2000), http://www 
.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0019/app2.htm (providing a timeline of major pro-
ject milestones, including the October 1996 federal regulations allowing collec-
tion of user fees for pilot program). For the current SENTRI enrollment cen-
ters see SENTRI, supra note 84.  
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border.86 The highly visible initiative generated a number of 
awards for the use of innovation and technology in govern-
ment.87
What these and other programs suggest is that, prior to 
9/11, movement within specific biometric areas, such as finger-
print, DNA, and facial recognition, paralleled growing interest 
in biometrics generally. It took the attacks, however, to cata-
pult these programs to special status. Myriad federal, state, 
and local programs followed, in the process significantly blur-
ring the lines between investigations and intelligence gathering 
and giving rise to concern about the use of remote biometric 
identification.  
 
B. POST-9/11 FEDERAL BIOMETRIC AND FACIAL IDENTIFICATION 
PROGRAMS 
Almost immediately following the attacks, Congress made 
it clear that it expected movement in the biometric realm and 
made substantial resources available for the purpose.88
 
 86. See, e.g., Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ 
Rapid Inspection: Memorandum from Robert L. Ashbaugh, Acting Inspector 
Gen., to Doris Meissner, Comm’r, Immigration and Naturalization Serv., U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (June 20, 2000), http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/INS/ 
e0019/exec.htm (listing the Peace Bridge in Buffalo, New York and Ambassa-
dor Bridge in Detroit, Michigan as SENTRI sites). 
 The Ex-
ecutive mirrored the legislature: the White House issued direc-
tives targeting the development of biometric technologies. Al-
most every major department tasked with national security 
and law enforcement initiated some sort of biometric activity. 
The Department of Homeland Security, Department of Justice, 
Department of State, Department of Defense, and Department 
of Health and Human Services each created new biometric pro-
grams.  
 87. See Inspection of the Secure Electronic Network for Travelers’ Rapid 
Inspection: Appendix II, supra note 85 (noting SENTRI was the Vice Presi-
dent’s National Performance Review Hammer Award winner—granted to 
teams of federal employees making significant contributions towards reinvent-
ing government principles—in October 1996, selected for inclusion in the 
Smithsonian Institute’s Permanent Research Collection as part of the Com-
puterworld Smithsonian Awards Program in June 1997, and a semifinalist in 
the Innovations in American Government award program, jointly sponsored 
by the Ford Foundation and Harvard University in October 1998). 
 88. In addition to the statutory initiatives, discussed infra, see Biometric 
Identifiers and the Modern Face of Terror: New Technologies in the Global War 
on Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Tech., Terrorism, and Gov’t 
Info. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 24 (2001) (touting the bene-
fits of facial recognition and downplaying concerns about accuracy). 
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Initially, focus centered on individuals entering and leav-
ing the United States, as well as on those working in secure 
transportation areas.89 Emphasis quickly expanded to other ar-
eas, such as government employee identification, domestic law 
enforcement, intelligence gathering, surveillance, military tar-
geting, and confirmation of the identity of individuals killed as 
part of war.90
Figure 2 
 The nature of the technologies sought expanded 
from IBI to RBI, in the process raising a new set of legal and 
constitutional questions. Figure 2 provides some examples of 
the current systems, programs, and initiatives, discussed in the 
ensuing text. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Border Security 
Prior to 9/11, Congress enacted several statutory provi-
sions requiring the Executive Branch to create a more robust 
 
 89. See, e.g., GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-785T, AVIATION 
SECURITY: CHALLENGES IN USING BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 12–17 (2004), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04785t.pdf. 
 90. Because many of the programs involved more than one identification 
technology in their design and implementation, I adopt an approach in the fol-
lowing section based on the purpose of the programs. At least some of the 
technologies incorporated represent IBI, not RBI; however, the inclusion of 
RBI-type technologies moves the categorization of the programs to the RBI 
realm. 
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entry and exit program for foreign visitors to the United 
States.91 Following the attacks, the matter became more ur-
gent, with increasing focus on the potential role of technology 
in creating a more accurate and efficient system. The immedi-
ate emphasis stemmed from concern that the nineteen hijack-
ers passed directly through airport security on the day of the 
attacks, as well as through immigration screening during their 
previous entry to the United States.92 Eighteen of the nineteen, 
moreover, had been issued U.S. identification documents.93 
Recognizing potential terrorists, though, was like finding a 
needle in a haystack: with more than 300 formal ports of entry, 
some half a billion annual crossings were taking place.94 As for 
documentation, the Department of State processed more than 9 
million visa applications annually, with the DHS considering 
another 50,000 requests for asylum per year, and 30,000 appli-
cations for immigration benefits per day.95
Three points about these programs deserve notice: first, 
each has rapidly expanded its reach, in the process creating the 
largest worldwide repository of images subject to facial recogni-
tion technology; second, emphasis has been placed not just on 
data accumulation, but on information sharing between federal 
agencies; and third, even within border security, the federal 
government has increasingly invested in RBI technologies to 
supplement its IBI capabilities. 
 The question of how 
to address security concerns was complicated by the country’s 
economic and commercial interests. The economy depended up-
on the quick and efficient movement of people and goods across 
the borders. New technologies offered a solution and multiple 
initiatives followed.  
Congress has played a key role in encouraging the Execu-
tive Branch to move into this area. The USA PATRIOT Act, for 
instance, directed the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
State jointly, through the National Institute of Standards 
Technology, to develop and certify a technology standard that 
 
 91. See, e.g., Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 
106-396, § 205, 114 Stat. 1637, 1641–43; Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-215, § 2, 
114 Stat. 337, 337–39. 
 92. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 6.  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 28. 
 95. Id. 
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could be used to verify visa applicants’ identities.96 The object 
was to develop a cross-agency, cross-platform system for shar-
ing law enforcement information and intelligence.97 The legisla-
ture directed that the system be easily accessible to all consular 
officers overseeing visa applications, all federal inspection 
agents at the border, and all law enforcement and intelligence 
officers related to the admission of aliens into the United 
States.98 The legislation went on to discuss biometrics in par-
ticular, requiring the Attorney General, in consultation with 
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Transportation, to 
conduct a study on the feasibility of using biometric identifier 
systems with access to the FBI’s IAFIS at consular offices over-
seas and at U.S. borders.99 In 2002, the Enhanced Border Secu-
rity and Visa Entry Reform Act took the technology a step fur-
ther. The legislation required that all persons applying for 
visas have fingerprints and digital photographs collected dur-
ing the visa application interview.100 The information must be 
cleared through IDENT prior to a visa being granted.101 The 
State Department subsequently initiated a Biometric Visa Pro-
gram, enabling overseas posts to install the necessary hard-
ware and software.102
White House interest in using technology to solve the prob-
lem reflected Congress’s approach.
 
103
 
 96. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 403(c)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 344 
(2001). 
 Homeland Security Presi-
 97. Id. § 403(c)(2), 115 Stat. at 344. 
 98. Id. § 403(c)(3), 115 Stat. at 344. 
 99. Id. § 1008(a), 115 Stat. at 395. The subsequent report, due within 
ninety days, was to be submitted to the Committee on International Relations, 
the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations, and the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate. 
Id. § 1008(b), 115 Stat. at 395. 
 100. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, 
Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 303(b)(2), 116 Stat. 543, 553. 
 101. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-1001, BORDER SECURITY: 
STATE DEPARTMENT ROLL OUT OF BIOMETRIC VISAS ON SCHEDULE, BUT GUID-
ANCE IS LAGGING 1 (2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/244011 
.pdf. 
 102. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9. 
 103. Pursuant to Executive Order 13228, October 8, 2001, the Bush Admin-
istration established two new bureaucratic agencies: the Office of Homeland 
Security (lodged within the Executive Office of the President), and the Home-
land Security Council (HSC), which was chaired by the President. HAROLD C. 
RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS 22840, ORGANIZING FOR HOMELAND SE-
CURITY: THE HOMELAND SECURITY COUNCIL RECONSIDERED 1 (2008) available 
at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/103696.pdf. On October 29, 
2001, the HSC held its first meeting; simultaneously, the President announced 
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dential Directive (HSPD) 6 laid out the framework for develop-
ing a terrorism screening program, requiring that the Attorney 
General, Secretary of State, Secretary of Homeland Security, 
and Director of Central Intelligence submit information to the 
Terrorist Threat Integration Center.104 A consolidated Terrorist 
Screening Center Database would collect and correlate data for 
use in quickly identifying potential threats. HSPD-11 subse-
quently established a more comprehensive approach to terrorist 
screening, even as it specified that the information obtained by 
the center take account of biometric identifiers.105
 
the creation of HSPDs to “record and communicate presidential decisions 
about the homeland security policies of the United States.” Id. at 2. Like the 
equivalent documents for the National Security Council, the first directive out-
lined the organization and operation of the HSC. Id. The second, issued the 
same day, detailed immigration policies, and the third such document, which 
followed nearly five months later, created the Homeland Security Advisory 
System. Id. Over the course of the two administrations, twenty-three HSPDs 
were issued, some of which were classified and some of which were concurrent-
ly issued as National Security Presidential Directives. Id. The unclassified 
documents, published in the Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 
were neither published in the Federal Register nor reproduced in the Public 
Papers of the Presidents of the United States. Id. at n.7; see also HAROLD C. 
RELYEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-611 GOV, PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVES: 
BACKGROUND AND OVERVIEW 6–7 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
crs/98-611.pdf. Upon passage of the Homeland Security Act on November 25, 
2002, a reconstituted HSC, located within the Executive Office of the Presi-
dent, became responsible for providing advice to the President on matters in-
volving homeland security, including overseeing and reviewing federal home-
land security policies. REYLEA, supra, at 3.  
 National Se-
curity Presidential Directive 59/HSPD-24 later squarely ad-
dressed federal coordination of the collection, storage, use, 
analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic 
 104. Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6, Integration and 
Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism, 39 WEEKLY COMP. 
PRES. DOC. 1174 (Sept. 16, 2003) [hereinafter HSPD-6], available at http:// 
www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PPP-2003-book2/pdf/PPP-2003-book2-doc-pg1174.pdf. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directives, initiated in the wake of 9/11, focus 
on matters related to homeland security. See National Security Presidential 
Directives [NSPD], FEDERATION AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/irp/ 
offdocs/nspd/index.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (listing both National Secu-
rity Presidential Directives and Homeland Security Presidential Directives). 
As of the time of writing, twenty-five such documents have issued. Id.  
 105. See Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11: Comprehen-
sive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 
1709 (Aug. 27, 2004), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives. 
gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-7.html; see also Biometrics: A Decade of 
Progress Since 9/11: Maturation of Federal Biometric Activities, FBI BIO-
METRIC CENTER OF EXCELLENCE (2011), http://www.biometriccoe.gov/ 
Resources/Online_Library.htm.  
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and contextual information of “known and suspected terror-
ists.”106
Numerous departmental programs followed the lead set by 
Congress and the White House. In March 2003, for example, 
responsibility for U.S. ports of entry by air, land, or sea trans-
ferred from the former INS to DHS.
 
107 In consultation with the 
Department of State (DOS), DHS established U.S. Visitor and 
Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT), an auto-
mated system aimed at foreign nationals.108 In 2004, the pro-
gram began integrating biometrics from non-citizens collected 
at international ports of entry.109
These programs appear to collect a significant amount of 
information and, through their use of biometric identification, 
generate new knowledge. This runs somewhat counter to agen-
cy claims. DHS asserts, for example, that US-VISIT is not a 
single system or database, saying instead that it “integrates 
and enhances” existing systems and allows for interface with 
other DHS agencies, DOS, and others.
  
110 Nevertheless, the pro-
gram itself collects data directly from travelers.111 Although 
DHS stated at the inception of the program that it did not an-
ticipate that the program would use data mining technology, 
nothing in the original design prevents this from occurring.112
 
 106. Press Release, The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Di-
rective/ HSPD-24: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance Na-
tional Security (June 5, 2008) [hereinafter HSPD-24], available at http://www 
.biometrics.gov/Documents/NSPD59%20HSPD24.pdf. 
 
 107. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-248, BORDER SECURITY: US-
VISIT PROGRAM FACES STRATEGIC, OPERATIONAL, AND TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHALLENGES AT LAND PORTS OF ENTRY 1 (2006) [hereinafter GAO, US-VISIT], 
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07248.pdf. 
 108. Id. US-VISIT is operated by a special program office that reports to 
the DHS Deputy Secretary and is used by U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion, to whom responsibility for U.S. immigration laws governing the admissi-
bility of aliens, cargo, agriculture, and animals has been given. Id. at 1–2. 
 109. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9. 
 110. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UPDATED PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESS-
MENT FOR THE UNITED STATES VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR 
TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PROGRAM: INTERNATIONAL LIVE TEST—PHASE II: 
TESTING OF ICAO-COMPLIANT E-PASSPORTS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES 2 
(2005) [hereinafter PHASE II], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_update_12-22-2005.pdf.  
 111. The information includes name, date of birth, gender, country of citi-
zenship/nationality, passport number, country of issuance, travel document 
type, date of issuance, U.S. destination address, arrival and departure infor-
mation, a digital photograph, digital fingerscans, and, in some cases, unique 
and individually assigned RFID tag numbers. Id. at 3. 
 112. Id. at 7. 
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DHS, moreover, simultaneously noted that the information 
would be shared with other agencies,113 many of which make 
use of data mining technologies. The program, in turn, draws 
on other agencies’ databases and watch lists.114
US-VISIT has steadily expanded over time.
 
115 Initially fo-
cused on entry data, in 2004, the Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act required the collection of biometric exit 
data for all individuals subject to US-VISIT.116 Implementation 
of this requirement has been delayed, principally owing to fea-
sibility and limited resources.117 There has been some effort to 
address the issue through further use of technology: namely, 
embedding radio-frequency identification (RFID) chips in I-94 
Arrival/Departure forms, thus allowing the government to re-
cord individuals departing from the country using RFID read-
ers mounted on posts.118
 
 113. Id. at 10. DHS shares both biometric and biographic information col-
lected by the program with DOS, DOJ/FBI, DoD, and “other agencies at the 
[f]ederal, state, local, foreign, or tribal level who are lawfully engaged in col-
lecting law enforcement information (whether civil or criminal) and national 
security intelligence information.” Id. Note that data mining itself also lacks a 
legal framework. For discussion of this point and a list of national security da-
ta mining programs in this area, see Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: 
The Need for a Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 435 (2008); see 
also Defense of Privacy Act and Privacy in the Hands of the Government: Joint 
Hearing on H.R. 338 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on 
Commercial and Admin. Law and the Subcomm. on the Constitution, 108th 
Cong. 17–24 (2003) (statement of James X. Dempsey, Exec. Dir., Ctr. for De-
mocracy & Tech.) (drawing attention to the absence of effective legislation on 
data mining techniques). 
 The system, which has been erected 
along certain points of entry along the southern border, has 
been less than effective, owing in some measure to the failure 
 114. See GAO, US-VISIT, supra note 107, at 16–17; US-VISIT Biometric 
Requirements to Include Legal Permanent Residents, LAB. IMMIGR. L. (Dec. 18, 
2008), http://www.laborimmigration.com/2008/12/us-visit-biometric-requireme 
nts-to-include-legal-permanent-residents. This includes, inter alia, comparing 
the information from the applicant to data stored in IDENT. Enrollment of 
Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect Biometric Data From Ad-
ditional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly Trafficked Land Bor-
der Ports of Entry, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,473, 77,477–78 (Dec. 19, 2008) (to be codi-
fied at 8 C.F.R. pts. 215, 235). 
 115. For a discussion of the incremental expansion of the program see U.S. 
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE US-
VISIT PROGRAM 4 (2005) [hereinafter DHS, UPDATE FOR US-VISIT], available 
at http://epic.org/privacy/surveillance/spotlight/0905/usv_pia3.pdf. 
 116. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 7208, 118 Stat. 3817, 3817–23. 
 117. GAO, US-VISIT, supra note 107, at 39. 
 118. Id. at 44. 
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of the readers to perceive RFID chips in passing vehicles, and 
the placement of the posts on nearby hillsides—not along the 
sidewalks being used by pedestrians leaving the country.119
The number of individuals whose biometric information 
has been collected by US-VISIT has exponentially increased as 
additional classes of travelers have been added to the program. 
Initially, U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents were ex-
empt from US-VISIT, as were certain non-citizens.
 
120 In 2006, 
DHS expanded the system to include additional classes of al-
iens and to enable the database to receive information not just 
directly from travelers, but also from the U.S. Citizens and 
Immigration Service Image Storage and Retrieval Sys-
tem/Biometric Support System.121 In 2009, DHS further ex-
panded the system, issuing a new rule that extended the pro-
gram to nearly all aliens, including lawful permanent residents 
(with an exception for Canadian citizens seeking short-term 
business or pleasure, or individuals traveling on A and G vi-
sas).122
Between the program’s inception in January 2004 and the 
final rule change of January 2009, the program screened more 
than 130 million aliens when they applied for admission to the 
United States.
  
123
 
 119. Id. at 46–51. 
 DHS claims that the program has been suc-
 120. Privacy Impact Assessment and Privacy Policy Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 
2608, 2614 (Jan. 16, 2004); U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., UNITED STATES 
VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PRO-
GRAM 3 (2006) [hereinafter DHS, VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS], available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_addaliens 
.pdf; DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT INCREMENT 2C PROOF OF CONCEPT 
(2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/usvisit/US-VISIT_ 
2CPOCCONOPSPhase1.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PRO-
GRAM, INCREMENT 2, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 13 (2004) [hereinafter 
DHS, INCREMENT 2], available at http://epic.org/privacy/us-visit/us-visit_ 
pia2.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PROGRAM PRIVACY 
IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE: INTERNATIONAL LIVE TEST 10 (2005), available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_livetest.pdf; 
PHASE II, supra note 110, at 6. 
 121. DHS, VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS, supra note 120, at 2. 
 122. See Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect 
Biometric Data from Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most High-
ly Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, 74 Fed. Reg. 2,837, 2837 (Jan. 16, 
2009) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R.§ 235.1). 
 123. Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect Bi-
ometric Data From Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly 
Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, 73 Fed. Reg. 77,473–74 (Dec. 19, 2008) 
(to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 215, 235). Note that most persons entering the 
United States enter through land ports of entry. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OF-
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cessful, citing adverse action taken against more than 3,800 al-
iens based on information obtained through the US-VISIT bio-
metric screening process.124 DHS, however, defines “adverse ac-
tion” rather broadly—namely, denial of admission, expedited 
removal, general detention, or arrest pursuant to a criminal ar-
rest warrant.125
Efforts to strengthen DHS’s underlying database, IDENT, 
continued post-9/11, prompting the department to issue a new 
Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA).
 It is not clear whether the biometric element of 
the programs has substantially altered security at the border. 
126 Unlike the original INS 
database, which focused on INS’s area of responsibilities, the 
integration of INS into DHS brought with it a correspondingly 
broader application for the information.127 DHS does not just fo-
cus on immigration and naturalization; it is responsible for all 
of homeland security.128 Accordingly, by 2007 IDENT had be-
come “the primary DHS-wide system for the biometric identifi-
cation and verification of individuals encountered in DHS mis-
sion-related processes.”129
 
FICE, GAO-07-499T, HOMELAND SECURITY: US-VISIT HAS NOT FULLY MET 
EXPECTATIONS AND LONGSTANDING PROGRAM MANAGEMENT CHALLENGES 
NEED TO BE ADDRESSED 5 (2007) [hereinafter GAO-07-499T HOMELAND SE-
CURITY], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07499t.pdf. In fiscal year 
2004, for instance, 335.3 million entered via land ports, 75.1 million through 
air ports, and 14.7 million via sea ports. Id. at 7. A greater percentage of al-
iens, however, are processed at air ports of entry. Id. In fiscal year 2004, for 
instance, only 1.4% of those entering through land ports were processed 
through US-VISIT, with 42.2% of those entering through air ports and 38.8% 
of those arriving into sea ports being processed by US-VISIT. Id. 
 This meant that biometric data was 
now paired with biographical and encounter data contributed 
by a wide range of organizations, such as U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, 
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service, Transportation Se-
 124. GAO-07-499T HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 123, at 10. 
 125. Enrollment of Additional Aliens in US-VISIT; Authority to Collect Bi-
ometric Data from Additional Travelers and Expansion to the 50 Most Highly 
Trafficked Land Border Ports of Entry, 73 Fed. Reg. at 77,474.  
 126. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR 
THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT) (2006) [herein-
after DHS, IDENT 2006], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ident_final.pdf. See discussion infra Part II.A.5 
for more detail on the statutory framing for PIAs. 
 127. See DHS, IDENT 2006, supra note 126, at 2. 
 128. Id. 
 129. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE 
FOR THE ENUMERATION SERVICES OF THE AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICA-
TION SYSTEM (IDENT) 2 (2007), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_enumeration.pdf. 
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curity Administration, and the U.S. Coast Guard, as well as or-
ganizations outside of DHS, such as the State Department, 
DOJ, FBI, DoD, “and other governmental organizations that 
collaborate with DHS in pursuing DHS national security, law 
enforcement, immigration, intelligence, and other DHS mis-
sion-related functions.”130 DHS, in turn, began sharing the in-
formation with federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or interna-
tional government agencies, as well as contractors.131
The new PIA noted that for DHS’s security purposes spe-
cial conditions would henceforth apply—notice, for instance, 
may not be provided to the individual prior to the collection of 
information in either a national security or law enforcement 
context.
  
132
  Whether an individual has a right to consent to a particular use of 
their data depends on the purpose of the collection . . . . [I]n most cas-
es, because of the DHS national security, law enforcement, immigra-
tion, or DHS-mission related purposes for which the information is 
collected, no such right exists.
 In similar fashion, the opportunity or right to decline 
to provide information in such contexts may be nonexistent.  
133
Information collected under IDENT can be retained for up to 
seventy-five years.
 
134
To assist IDENT in its functions, DHS created a biometric 
watch list.
 
135 It also anticipated the creation of new biometrics 
databases that would feed into other systems, such as the 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS).136
 
 130. DHS, IDENT 2006, supra note 
 Ad-
ditionally, DHS initiated a program called Secure Communi-
ties—essentially an immigrant fingerprinting program, in 
which FBI prints from booked offenders are run against IDENT 
126, at 3. 
 131. Such transfers are governed by memoranda of understanding or other 
interagency security agreements. Id. at 9 (outlining contributors); id. at 13 
(discussing contractors). 
 132. Id. at 10. 
 133. Id. at 10–11. 
 134. PHASE II, supra note 110, at 8. 
 135. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., US-VISIT PROGRAM, INCREMENT 
1, PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 4 (2003) [hereinafter DHS, INCREMENT 1], 
available at http://epic.org/privacy/us-visit/us-visit_pia.pdf. Note that the ini-
tial privacy impact assessment was published in the Federal Register of Janu-
ary 4, 2004, but was subsequently amended to correct a technical error (incor-
rect telephone number). See Privacy Impact Assessment and Privacy Policy 
Notice, 69 Fed. Reg. 2,608, 2,611 (Jan. 16, 2004). 
 136. See DHS, INCREMENT 1, supra note 135, at 4. 
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to find out whether they are in the country illegally.137 In 2007, 
the Coast Guard began submitting fingerprints from migrants 
against the FBI’s IAFIS, DHS’s IDENT, and DoD’s ABIS.138
In addition to the above initiatives, following 9/11, the U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), part of DHS, 
integrated biometrics into its immigration benefits system.
 
139 
The Department created what is called the Biometric Storage 
System, with the aim of creating a centralized repository of all 
biometric data captured by USCIS from applicants filing immi-
gration applications.140 Ten-print fingerprint and associated bi-
ographic information for biometric-based background checks on 
those applying or petitioning for immigration benefits are in-
cluded.141 Biographic data includes the Alien Registration 
Number, first and last name, date and country of birth, gender, 
aliases, height, weight, race, class of admission, address, as 
well as other biographic information.142
INS’s initial objections to ten-print capture and analysis 
were soon replaced (in a post-9/11 environment) by a ten-print 
standard. In 2006, the State Department similarly deployed a 
ten-print pilot program.
 
143 By the following year, all State De-
partment visa-issuing points had adopted ten-print collec-
tions.144 Also in 2007, DHS US-VISIT began collecting ten-
prints at all U.S. airports and U.S. Customs and Border Protec-
tion (CBP) ten-prints for full search against the FBI Criminal 
Master File. The same year, USCIS similarly moved to a ten-
print system for its Biometric Storage System.145
Outside of DHS, the Department of State maintains two 
major biometric databases: the Consular Consolidated Data-
base (CCD) and the Automated Biometric Identification Sys-
tem. The former, CCD, is one of the largest Oracle-based data 
 
 
 137. Aliya Sternstein, FBI to Launch Nationwide Facial Recognition Ser-
vice, NEXTGOV, Oct. 7, 2011, http://www.nextgov.com/technology-news/2011/ 
10/fbi-to-launch-nationwide-facial-recognition-service/49908. 
 138. Biometrics: A Decade of Progress Since 9/11, supra note 105.  
 139. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
BIOMETRIC STORAGE SYSTEM 2 (2007) [hereinafter DHS, BIOMETRIC STORAGE 
SYSTEM], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ 
cis_bss.pdf. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 4.  
 143. Biometrics: A Decade of Progress Since 9/11, supra note 105. 
 144. Id. 
 145. DHS, BIOMETRIC STORAGE SYSTEM, supra note 139, at 2. 
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warehouses in the world. As of December 2009, it contained 
over 100 million visa case files and 75 million photographs, 
with some 35,000 cases added per day.146 The CCD provides a 
gateway to IDENT (discussed supra Part I.A.) and 
IAFIS/IAFIT (discussed supra Part I.A.), as well as the De-
partment of State Facial Recognition system and the 
NameCheck system.147 It stores biographic and biometric in-
formation about U.S. persons (citizens and lawful permanent 
residents), as well as foreign nationals.148 While some of the in-
formation is provided by applicants, other information (such as 
names, addresses, birth dates, race, identification numbers, 
and country of origin) is obtained via commercial databases or 
public records.149 The data is used to screen applicants, register 
facial images for FRT, and report on particular applicants.150 
The information is shared with a number of external agencies 
and programs, such as US-VISIT, DHS/CBP, Army Intelligence 
and Security Command, the FBI, the Government Printing Of-
fice, the DHS Interagency Border Inspection/Treasury En-
forcement Control System, the DHS Terrorist Screening Cen-
ter, and others.151 Because the CCD is a data warehouse used to 
store and process data collected by other systems and does not 
collect information directly from individuals, it is not required 
to provide notice of the purpose, use, or authority of the collec-
tion of information.152
In June 2011, DOS issued a PIA for its Automated Bio-
metric Identification System, a facial recognition program de-
signed to help the State Department evaluate visa and passport 
applications.
 
153
 
 146. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, CONSULAR CONSOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD) 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) 1 (2010) [hereinafter CONSULAR CONSOL-
IDATED DATABASE (CCD) PIA], available at http://www.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/93772.pdf. 
 The system is designed to recognize several pho-
tos of the same person in different databases on a scale “expo-
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. at 2. 
 149. Id. at 6. 
 150. Id. at 5–6. 
 151. Id. at 14–16. 
 152. Id. at 17. 
 153. Note that ABIS is a commercially available off-the-shelf product de-
veloped by a private company, L-1 Identity Solutions. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (ABIS) PRIVACY IMPACT AS-
SESSMENT 1 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
109132.pdf. 
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nentially larger than those which a human could review.”154 
ABIS incorporates databases relating to visa, passport, 
Watchlist Gallery, and Passport Lookout Tracking System im-
ages, making it, according to the State Department, “the larg-
est facial recognition system deployed in the world.”155
ABIS grew directly from the USA PATRIOT Act and the 
Enhance Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act demands 
positive identification of visa applicants.
 
156 By 2011, the FRT 
system contained records on over 139 million individuals.157 It 
is expected to grow to 210 million person records by 2012, with 
approximately 25 million additional records added annually in 
subsequent years.158 The system was designed to include not 
only face templates, but also demographic data, such as date of 
birth, gender, and place of birth.159 The Department of State 
notes that the retention of the information depends upon the 
specific type of record, with no further details provided.160
Interestingly, the State Department does not actually own 
the system. Instead, it leases it from a private company, which 
means that both government employees and contractors have 
access to the information.
  
161 As with many aspects of the bio-
metrics infrastructure, the government is heavily dependent 
upon non-governmental, for-profit businesses, subject to differ-
ent rules than government agencies. Potential misuse of the 
system, DOS notes, includes not just delays in processing ap-
plications, but blackmail, identity theft or assumption, account 
takeover, physical harm, discrimination, and emotional dis-
tress. Improper use may further lead to financial loss, loss of 
public reputation and public confidence, and civil liability for 
the Department of State.162
2. Authentication 
 
Along with the identification of individuals traveling across 
U.S. borders, the 9/11 attacks spurred new initiatives focused 
 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. The Watchlist Gallery includes photos from the National Counter-
terrorism Center. Id. at 3. 
 156. See id. at 2. 
 157. Id. at 3. 
 158. Id. 
 159. Id. at 2–4, 6. 
 160. Id. at 6. 
 161. See id. at 4–5. 
 162. Id. at 4. 
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on authenticating the identity of transportation workers, gov-
ernment employees, and military personnel with access to se-
cure areas. Most of these initiatives appear to be designed with 
immediate biometric identification in mind; the widespread col-
lection of such data, however, when paired with video technolo-
gies, allows for expansion into the realm of remote biometric 
identification. 
The Federal Aviation Administration, for instance, with 
the support of the Department of Defense, created the Aviation 
Security Biometrics Working Group.163 It had less than two 
months to consider the efficacy of integrating biometric tech-
nologies into the nation’s airport security infrastructure.164 Of 
particular concern was the role the federal government could 
play in advancing technology to ensure the development of new 
and effective systems. Interoperability across agencies would be 
critical.165
Congress kept step with the Executive. The Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, enacted in November 2001, re-
quired federal cooperation with airport operators to strengthen 
access control in secured areas and to consider using biometric 
access control systems to verify identity.
  
166 The following year, 
Congress passed two new laws, incorporating biometric tech-
nology into cross-border functions: the Enhanced Border Secu-
rity and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002167 and the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA).168 The latter stat-
ute embraced the Transportation Worker Identification Cre-
dential (TWIC), requiring that it contain biometric information 
to help regulate unescorted access to all MTSA secure areas.169 
In 2007, TWIC enrollment and issuance began.170
 
 163. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-785T, AVIATION SECURITY: 
CHALLENGES IN USING BIOMETRIC TECHNOLOGIES 12 (2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04785t.pdf; BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT 
POST-9/11, supra note 
 
38, at 7. 
 164. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 7. 
 165. See id. 
 166. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, 
§ 106(a), 115 Stat. 597, 609 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 114). 
 167. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. 
No. 107-173, § 202(a)(4)(B)(i), 116 Stat. 543, 549 (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 8 U.S.C.). 
 168. Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 
§ 102, 116 Stat. 2064, 2073. 
 169. Id.; see also GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-1151T, TRANS-
PORTATION SECURITY: TRANSPORTATION WORKER IDENTIFICATION CREDEN-
TIAL: A STATUS UPDATE 1 (2008), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/ 
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In 2004, HSPD-12 required the development of new stand-
ards to govern identity cards granting access to federal gov-
ernment locations and systems.171 The Federal Information Se-
curity Management Act of 2002 authorized the Chief 
Information Officers Council, in conjunction with the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology, to develop recommen-
dations on information technology standards.172 The Personal 
Identity Verification (PIV) standard for Federal Employees and 
Contractors and the Federal Information Processing Standard 
(FIPS 201) established standards for identity credentials173 and 
required that biometric information be included in the PIV 
card.174 A number of departments subsequently began using bi-
ometrics as part of their identity management systems. In 
2009, the Department of State, for instance, issued a PIA for 
changes to its Identity Management System, a database storing 
the information collected from persons requiring personal ID 
cards.175
 
d081151t.pdf (statement of Stephen M. Lord, Acting Dir., Homeland Sec. & 
Justice Issues). 
 Biometric information was one of a series of categories 
 170. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 10. 
 171. Directive on Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal 
Employees and Contractors: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD 
-12, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1709 (Aug. 27, 2004) [hereinafter HSPD-
12], available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/WCPD-2004-08-30/pdf/WCPD-
2004-08-30-Pg1709.pdf. 
 172. Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-
347, § 101, 116 Stat 2899, 2905–06 (codified as 44 U.S.C. § 3603). Note that in 
2006, Congress passed the Security and Accountability For Every Port Act of 
2006, amending MTSA to direct DHS to, inter alia, implement TWIC at the 
ten highest-risk ports by July 1, 2007. Security and Accountability For Every 
Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347, § 104, 120 Stat. 1884, 1888–91 (2006) 
(codified as 46 U.S.C. 70105(i)(2)(A)). 
 173. CHARLES WILSON ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NAT’L INST. OF 
STANDARDS & TECH., SPECIAL PUBLICATION 800-76-1, INFORMATION SECURITY 
iv (2007), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/nistpubs/800-76-1/ 
SP800-76-1_012407.pdf. This document is considered a companion document 
to FIPS 201. It covers the technical acquisition and specifications for format-
ting PIV biometric credentials, including the procedures and formats for facial 
images. The purpose of adopting clear criteria is to ensure universal interop-
erability and a high level of performance. Further information regarding bio-
metric data suitable for FBI background investigations is included in SP 800-
76. Id. 
 174. NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FIPS 
PUB. 201-1, PERSONAL IDENTITY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES 
AND CONTRACTORS 33 (2006), available at http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/ 
fips201-1/FIPS-201-1-chng1.pdf. 
 175. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, PRIVACY IM-
PACT ASSESSMENT (2009) [hereinafter IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM PRIVA-
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of data that would be collected and potentially shared with oth-
er agencies.176
While many of these systems are designed to address au-
thentication at the point of access, the accumulation of such in-
formation, if then paired with sequential recording (e.g., at 
multiple points of movement) or with video technologies, shifts 
the underlying considerations from IBI to RBI.  
 
3. Investigations and Intelligence Gathering 
Yet another area in which the post-9/11 era witnessed a 
movement into biometric technologies is in the realm of inves-
tigations and intelligence gathering. These initiatives blur the 
line between law enforcement and national security. The feder-
alization of local information impacts the relationship of local 
and state authorities to the federal government. Perhaps most 
importantly, these initiatives move the government into a posi-
tion where it can collect information (1) about multiple people; 
(2) from a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent notice and 
consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going manner—
expanding the use of biometrics from immediate identification 
to RBI. 
Following the attacks, the FBI’s Biometric Center of Excel-
lence quickly became a “hub for developing new and advanced 
biometric capabilities to solve crimes and protect national secu-
rity.”177 Like the expansion of the INS biometric database to in-
corporate the breadth of the DHS mission, the FBI’s enhanced 
national security role swept within it more applications, rang-
ing from investigations to intelligence gathering, for which 
technology offered new opportunities. In addition to an expand-
ing role for the FBI, the new context suggested the need for 
greater vertical and horizontal interoperability. As the FBI ex-
plained, “Criminal, Homeland Security, and Counterterrorism 
missions are converging and creating a need for greater inte-
gration of [law enforcement] and intelligence information 
among all levels of government.”178
 
CY IMPACT ASSESSMENT], available at www.state.gov/documents/organization/ 
122507.pdf. 
 
 176. Id. at 2, 4–5. 
 177. KIMBERLY J. DEL GRECO, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, SEARCH 
ANNIVERSARY: THE NEXT 40 YEARS 10 (2009) [hereinafter SEARCH ANNIVER-
SARY], available at http://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-CJISsearchbrief.pdf. 
 178. Id. at 12. 
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The first step was to expand IAFIS to include both classi-
fied and so-called “sensitive but unclassified” information in ac-
cordance with the Homeland Security Information Sharing 
Act.179 Attorney General Ashcroft issued a memorandum that 
stated that the Department of Justice’s overriding priority is 
the prevention of terrorist activity.180 He ordered the FBI to ex-
pand its collection of counterterrorist information and directed 
the Legal Attaché Offices to obtain biometric information on all 
known or suspected foreign terrorists (KSTs) held by the De-
partment of Defense and other federal agencies, as well as for-
eign entities.181
These changes radically expanded the database. By 2008, 
IAFIS housed “the largest collection of digital representations 
of fingerprint images, features from the digital fingerprint im-
ages, and criminal history information in the world.”
 Biometric and biographic information from the-
se various sources was subsequently folded into IAFIS.  
182 At that 
point, it held information on more than 56.8 million people.183 
By 2009, this number had grown to at least 63.3 million sub-
jects.184 By February 2012, the database covered more than 72.9 
million subjects.185
 
 179. 6 U.S.C. § 481 (2006). 
 According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the 
 180. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General Orders New 
Steps to Share Information Relating to Terrorism with Federal Agencies as 
well as State and Local Government (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http:// 
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2002/April/02_ag_211.htm. 
 181. Privacy Impact Assessment: Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identi-
fication System National Security Enhancements, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/iafis (last visited 
Nov. 2, 2012). 
 182. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifica-
tion (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18. 
 183. Privacy Impact Assessment for the Fingerprint Identification Records 
System (FIRS) Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System 
(IAFIS) Outsourcing for Noncriminal Justice Purposes—Channeling, FED. BU-
REAU OF INVESTIGATION (May 5, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact 
-assessments/firs-iafis. 
 184. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION 
SERVICES DIVISION, NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION 5 (2009) [hereinafter 
NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION], available at http://www.search.org/files/ 
pdf/DELANEY-Spring09.pdf. 
 185. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System: Fact Sheet, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_ 
biometrics/iafis/iafis_facts (last updated Oct. 16, 2012). This massive finger-
print and data repository evolved to serve five functions. Integrated Automated 
Fingerprint Identification System: Five Key Services, FED. BUREAU OF INVES-
TIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis_ 
services (last visited Nov. 2, 2012).  
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U.S. population is estimated to run around 312 million peo-
ple.186
IAFIS is not the only biometric database held by the FBI. 
Even as it expanded IAFIS, the Bureau began developing a new 
version of the database. Known initially as Next-Generation 
IAFIS, the initiative quickly became labeled Next Generation 
Identification. With this shift came an expansion in the use of 
biometric technologies from immediate identification to RBI. It 
also resulted in the incorporation of ever more records. The 
Government Accountability Office, for instance, puts the num-
ber of biometric records in the FBI’s system at approximately 
ninety-four million.
 This means that the Bureau holds fingerprint records on 
almost one-quarter of the U.S. population. Even allowing for a 
number of non-citizens in the database, this represents a signif-
icant percentage of the population. The acquisition of this in-
formation is heavily dependent on state and local police de-
partments. (See discussion infra Part I.B.6). 
187
The problem the Bureau was trying to address in expand-
ing its capabilities was anonymity—a condition that, from the 
Bureau’s perspective, facilitated crime and created a national 
security threat.
 
188 The FBI argued, in particular, that increas-
ingly sophisticated methods of masking identity demanded in-
creasingly sophisticated methods of detecting it.189 The current 
technologies proved insufficient. Behavioral biometrics, pass-
words, PINs, and ID cards easily could be bypassed.190 And fin-
gerprint technology had significant weaknesses: some ten per-
cent of the population had worn, cut, or unrecognizable 
prints.191
 
 186. State & County QuickFacts: USA, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http:// 
quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/00000.html (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 The solution was to move beyond a unimodal bio-
metric identifier (e.g., fingerprints), and towards multimodal 
biometric identifiers, such as FRT, and voice, iris recognition 
technologies.  
 187. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-276, DEFENSE BIOMETRICS: 
DOD CAN BETTER CONFORM TO STANDARDS AND SHARE BIOMETRIC INFOR-
MATION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES 12 (2011), available at http://www.gao.gov/ 
new.items/d11276.pdf. 
 188. See SEARCH ANNIVERSARY, supra note 177. 
 189. Id. at 8. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Multimodal Biometrics, BIOMETRICNEWSPORTAL.COM, http://www 
.biometricnewsportal.com/multimodal-biometrics.asp (last visited Nov. 2, 
2012). 
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The gains from such an approach could be substantial: bi-
ometric data could be used to obtain new information, such as 
tying individuals to places and activities, targeting specific in-
dividuals, and revealing movement patterns.192 The Bureau il-
lustrated the point by noting the potential use of these technol-
ogies to scan individuals at political rallies, connecting persons 
in attendance to two or more events.193 By deploying enhanced 
remote capabilities, the Bureau could not just engage in inves-
tigations of individuals suspected of criminal or other activity, 
but, together with closer ties with the Department of Defense 
and the Department of State, it could perform an intelligence-
gathering function. In 2009, for example, the FBI’s Criminal 
Justice Information Services (CJIS) explained that “[r]apid 
DNA processing technology” would help to “provide on-location 
DNA results for federal, state, and local crime investigations, 
military, and the Intelligence community.”194 NGI would re-
place the IAFIS system, offering “state-of-the-art biometric 
identification services.”195 The project was expected to cost some 
$1 billion.196
It is important to underscore the extent to which NGI rep-
resents a change in how the Bureau uses biometric technolo-
gies. NGI relies in part on remote biometric identification to 
support investigatory and intelligence-gathering functions and 
thus represents something different in kind from what has 
been used before.  
 
NGI itself includes seven components. (See Figure 2). Each 
component is itself substantial and involves associating bio-
metric information with biographic data, providing a fuller pic-
ture of the target in question and allowing for the generation of 
new knowledge about individuals. 
The first NGI program, Advanced Fingerprint Identifica-
tion Technology (AFIT),197
 
 192. SEARCH ANNIVERSARY, supra note 
 replaced IAFIS with an automated 
facial recognition search capability, as well as a broader range 
of data (such as name, address, social security number, tele-
phone number, e-mail address, photograph, or other unique 
177, at 6. 
 193. See id. at 5–7. 
 194. Id. at 9. 
 195. Id. at 10. 
 196. Sternstein, supra note 137. 
 197. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, CJIS ANNUAL REPORT 18 (2011), available at http://www.fbi.gov/about 
-us/cjis/annual-report-2011/annual-report-2011. 
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identifying number, code, or characteristic) which, when com-
bined, indirectly identify an individual (such as a combination 
of gender, race, birth date, geographic indicator, license num-
ber, vehicle identifier including license plate, and other de-
scriptors).198 Under the new program, information can be ob-
tained from federal, state, or local government entities, 
commercial data aggregators, or other private actors.199
AFIT has been given a functionality that previously did not 
exist within IAFIS: rapid fingerprint search of what is called 
the Repository for Individuals of Special Concern. According to 
the FBI, this database will be populated by records of “Known 
and Suspected Terrorists” (echoing HSPD-24)
 
200 as well as “oth-
er persons of special interest.”201 The Bureau does not explain 
what is meant by “Suspected Terrorists,” nor does it publicly 
define individuals of “special interest”—a seemingly unlimited 
category.202 Both fingerprint and facial recognition capabilities 
are included.203 Under development is the system’s relationship 
to something called the International Terrorist File.204
 
 198. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifica-
tion (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 
  
18. 
 199. Id. 
 200. HSPD-24, supra note 106. 
 201. CRIM. JUST. INFO. SERVICES DIV., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION 
NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, (2009) [hereinafter NEXT GENERATION 
IDENTIFICATION, http://www.biometriccoe.gov/_doc/FBI_CJIS_0209_NGI_One 
Pager020409.pdf. A PIA released in July 2012 explains that its purpose is “to 
identify persons who present special risks to the public or law enforcement 
personnel or heightened investigative interest.” Privacy Impact Assessment, 
Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS)/Next Genera-
tion Identification (NGI) Repository for Individuals of Special Concern (RISC), 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact 
-assessments/iafis-ngi-risc (last visited Nov. 2, 2012), [hereinafter RISC PIA]. 
 202. See also CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., FED. BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION, TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS DOCUMENT FOR THE REPOSITORY 
FOR INDIVIDUALS OF SPECIAL CONCERN (RISC) PILOT PROJECT 9 (2010), avail-
able at https://www.fbibiospecs.org/docs/RISC_Pilot_Technical_Specifications_ 
Document_3.0.pdf (declining to define the term “special concern” and instead 
simply stating that the aim of the RISC pilot is “to provide the capability to 
receive and store biographic and fingerprint information associated with indi-
viduals marked as special concern”). The PIA for the program specifically con-
templates further expansion, to include categories such as missing persons or 
protection order subjects that have associated biometrics; in such a case, the 
PIA would be annotated to reflect further additions of categories of records. 
RISC PIA, supra note 201. 
 203. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV., 
supra note 202, at 19–22. 
 204. Id. at 13, 25–26. 
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Domestic as well as foreign agencies provide names and in-
formation for the RISC database.205 For the former, local law 
enforcement serves as the front line of intelligence collection ef-
forts.206 RISC essentially allows police officers to use mobile de-
vices to obtain thousands of fingerprints to then run them 
against the database.207 Within seconds, the officer will receive 
a response—and the agency which first entered the biometric 
information into the database will be informed of a hit.208 Pilot 
state programs have been run by Ohio, Florida, Maryland, 
Georgia, and Texas.209 Government Computer News reported 
that the system began operating in March 2011; by August 
2011, it had begun supporting 18,000 law enforcement agen-
cies.210 In 2011, the Program Manager of the Information Shar-
ing Environment reported to Congress that the database, com-
prised of “the worst of the worst,” had expanded to include 
some 1.2 million fingerprint records.211
The second capability incorporated into NGI is what is 
called a “Rap Back Service.”
 
212 This function provides for pri-
vate and public employers to enroll employees in the program, 
at which point the FBI will collect the employees’ biometric da-
ta.213
 
 205. Id. at 9. 
 The gathering of IBI is paired with RBI: employers will 
 206. RISC PIA, supra note 201 (“This information will have been collected 
and submitted to the FBI by federal, state, local, tribal and some foreign agen-
cies and instrumentalities incident to their lawful mission.”). 
 207. Id. (“The fingerprints will be captured by a mobile fingerprint device 
and transmitted wirelessly to the user agency’s existing criminal justice infra-
structure, then on to the RISC.”). 
 208. Id.; see also Alice Lipowicz, FBI Mobile Fingerprint System Puts Crim-
inals at RISC, GOV’T COMPUTER NEWS, Aug. 26, 2011, http://gcn.com/articles/ 
2011/08/25/fbi-fingerprint-check-system-national-database-mobile.aspx. 
 209. INFO. SHARING ENV’T, ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 70 (2011), 
available at http://www.nctc.gov/itacg/docs/ISE-Annual-Report-to-Congress 
-2011.pdf; see also William M. Kalaf, Arizona Law Enforcement Biometrics 
Identification and Information Sharing Technology Framework 16 (Mar. 2010) 
(unpublished Master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School), available at http:// 
www.hsdl.org/?view&did=27191 (listing Ohio, Florida, Texas, and Minnesota 
as running RISC pilot programs). 
 210. Lipowicz, supra note 208. 
 211. INFO. SHARING ENV’T, supra note 209, at 70. By June 13, 2011, more 
than 75,000 total live queries had been submitted, yielding more than 1,300 
hits. Id. 
 212. Ellen Nakashima, FBI Prepares Vast Database of Biometrics, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 22, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/ 
2007/12/21/AR2007122102544.html (providing a brief overview of the Rap 
Bank Service). 
 213. Id. (“[E]mployers could ask the FBI to keep employees’ fingerprints in 
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subsequently be notified by the Bureau “of criminal and, in lim-
ited cases, civil activity of enrolled individuals that occurs after 
the initial processing and retention of criminal or civil finger-
print transactions.”214 Notably, this includes both criminal and 
civil activities—activities that could relate to otherwise pro-
tected First Amendment activities. It essentially expands the 
biometric data collected by the FBI and creates a reporting-
back mechanism that may take account of everything from at-
tendance at political rallies, to parking violations, to formal 
charges related to serious crimes.215
The third function of NGI relates to Disposition Reporting 
Improvements (DRI). NGI DRI are designed to provide a more 
complete criminal history database. This system appears to in-
corporate the Interstate Identification Index into the FBI Iden-
tification Records.
 
216
A fourth NGI initiative creates a new National Palm Print 
System, which complements the fingerprint system by populat-
ing a parallel database with known and unknown palm 
prints.
 
217 Criminal and noncriminal justice agencies across the 
country will be able to search the database, as well as use la-
tent palm prints to search the data repository.218
An Enhanced IAFIS Repository (EIR) provides the fifth as-
pect of NGI. This capability will create compatibility between 
existing civil and criminal data bases, and ensure that the Bu-
 
 
the database, subject to state privacy laws, so that if [sic] employees are ever 
arrested or charged with a crime, the employers would be notified.”). 
 214. 5 Things You Should Know About the FBI’s Massive New Biometric 
Database (Alternet), UNCOVER THE TRUTH (2012), http://uncoverthetruth.org/ 
category/foia-documents/page/2 (quoting FBI document that describes features 
of the Rap Back Service). 
 215. Id. No PIA is yet available from the FBI in regard to the Rap Back 
Service. 
 216. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMI-
NAL HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 3 (2006), available at http://www 
.justice.gov/olp/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf (“The Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) maintains a criminal history record repository, known as the Interstate 
Identification Index (III or ‘Triple I’) system, that contains records from all 
states and territories, as well as from federal and international criminal jus-
tice agencies.”). 
 217. Next Generation Identification, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, 
http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/ngi (last visited Nov. 
2, 2012). 
 218. Id.  
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reau can conduct what is called single identity management.219 
According to the Bureau, “[t]he EIR will support the search and 
retrieval services for new biometric modalities, to include the 
iris, and provide administrative functions for special population 
files.”220 Precisely what these functions are, or who constitute 
the special population, is not spelled out.221
The sixth NGI program centers on iris recognition. This 
technology will allow the government to search a nationwide 
database of iris scans to quickly identify persons “of interest.”
 
222 
The FBI has made almost no information available about de-
tails of this program—such as the distance at which iris tech-
nologies could work (although private industry reports develop-
ing iris scans at a distance with the assistance of government 
grants, even as commercial systems are now available that 
claim accuracy two or more meters from the target).223
The seventh component, and one of the most important as-
pects of NGI for remote biometric identification, is the Inter-
state Photo System (IPS). This project draws heavily on FRT 
 Nor is 
there any information about how this database will be populat-
ed, by whom, or how the information is to be kept, used, and 
shared. No PIAs have yet issued. 
 
 219. NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 201 (“The EIR capa-
bility will allow compatibility between existing civil and criminal repositories 
as well as new repositories by providing single identity management.”). 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. (mentioning only Rap Back Service features). 
 222. See Matt Bewig, FBI Prepares Billion-Dollar Iris Recognition Data-
base, ALLGOV (July 8, 2012), http://www.allgov.com/news/where-is-the-money 
-going/fbi-prepares-billion-dollar-iris-recognition-database?news=844739 
(“[T]he FBI plans to test a nationwide database for searching iris scans to 
more quickly identify persons ‘of interest’ to the government.”). 
 223. See, e.g., Charlie Leocha, New Iris Scanning System Scans 30 Passen-
gers per Minute at a Distance, CONSUMER TRAVELER (Apr. 26, 2010), http:// 
www.consumertraveler.com/today/new-iris-scanning-system-scans-30-passen 
gers-per-minute-at-a-distance (reporting that Sarnoff Corporation won “Best 
New Product Award and Best Biometrics and Identity Solution at the Security 
Industry Association New Product Showcase” for a system allowing remote iris 
scanning and explaining that “[t]his technology was developed under a gov-
ernment grant to create an iris recognition at a distance solution”); Tom 
Olzak, The Future of Iris Scanning, TECH REPUBLIC (July 6, 2010), http:// 
www.techrepublic.com/blog/security/the-future-of-iris-scanning/3978 (citing 
Sarnoff’s Iris On The Move (IOM) scanning system); see also Registered Trav-
eler Programs, AOPTIX TECH., http://www.aoptix.com/identity-solutions/high 
-throughput/applications/registered-traveler-programs (last visited Nov. 2, 
2012) (technology allows remote iris scans at a distance of two meters); HU-
MAN RECOGNITION SYS., http://www.hrsid.com/mflow (last visited Nov. 2, 
2012) (technology allowing for passage through airports). 
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and data mining technologies—and the database on which it is 
built is rapidly growing.224 As of 2009, IAFIS included more 
than 6.75 million photos.225 By February 2012, this number had 
increased to more than 114.5 million photos.226 This number is 
expected to increase substantially.227
Three factors (in addition to the sheer power of new tech-
nologies) are influencing the rapid expansion of this database. 
First, NGI IPS incorporates media obtained not just from law 
enforcement, but from private businesses, social networking 
sites, government agencies, and foreign and international enti-
ties, as well as individuals such as acquaintances, friends, and 
family members.
  
228 This means that data derives from more 
sources. Second, as a structural matter, many of the limits pre-
viously placed on the collection of photos have been eliminat-
ed.229 There are fewer restrictions, for instance, on the number 
of photos that can be submitted, new provisions to allow for 
bulk transfers of photos, new technologies to provide for the in-
corporation of video surveillance feeds, and new ways to submit 
descriptions of personal features.230
 
 224. NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 
 These enhancements, “al-
184, at 19−20. 
 225. Id. at 5.  
 226. Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System: Fact Sheet, 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Oct. 16, 2012), http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/ 
cjis/fingerprints_biometrics/iafis/iafis_facts. 
 227. See NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 184, at 19–20, 30 
(noting the new functionality of allowing for the bulk submission of photos and 
the aim of providing law enforcement with “a large scale facial recognition in-
vestigative tool”). 
 228. The program’s PIA explains that images will be obtained not just from 
law enforcement, but “from other sources (such as security cameras, friends, 
family) . . . . Authorized noncriminal justice agencies and entities will be per-
mitted to submit civil photographs along with civil fingerprint submissions 
that were collected for noncriminal purposes. . . . Selected foreign and interna-
tional agencies may similarly contribute criminal and civil photo submissions 
for retention in the NGI IPS.” Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next 
Generation Identification (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18, 
at § 1.2.1.  
 229. Id. §§ 1.6, 1.7, 2.3.  
 230. See id.; Stan Shyshkin, The FBI’s Biometric Recognition System Is 
Now a Reality, BRICKHOUSE SECURITY (Oct. 12, 2011), http://blog.brickhouse 
security.com/2011/10/12/fbis-biometric-recognition-system. Specifically, en-
hancements include eliminating the restriction of ten photo sets per FBI rec-
ord, allowing the submission of photos with all arrests supported by finger-
prints and/or an FBI number/Universal Control Number (FNU/UCN), 
allowing bulk submission of photos linked with FNUs/UCNs, allowing submis-
sion of photos with civil types of transactions, allowing submission of photos 
other than facial, allowing investigative search of photos using biographical 
criteria, and providing an automated facial recognition search capability. Pri-
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low more photos to be retained in the system[,] . . . allow 
searches using better physical descriptor algorithms and facial 
recognition technology, and . . . allow more direct retrieval of 
such photos by an authorized requestor.”231 Third, a broader 
range of information qualifies for inclusion. That is, the media 
initially submitted may not, at first, provide identification re-
lated to arrest or conviction—instead, it may be merely contex-
tual data that can subsequently be mined for information.232
  IAFIS currently can collect and retain latent fingerprints from as 
yet unidentified individuals associated with criminal activity or oth-
erwise having a lawful investigative or national security interest 
(such as fingerprints lifted from a crime scene). NGI IPS will also add 
an analogous functionality to collect and retain other images (such as 
those obtained from crime scene security cameras). Even though such 
images may not initially suffice to identify the particular individual in 
question, the images may later serve to directly or indirectly identify 
the individual if supplemental identifying information is located.
 
The FBI explains:  
233
The functionality of IPS is broader than the specific example 
provided. It is not just security cameras at the scene of a crime 
contributing data, but information from civil agencies, social 
network sites, private entities, and the like. By populating the 
database in this manner, photos and footage that may not ini-
tially be linked to a particular individual may be maintained in 
a common photo file and later associated with an identified in-
dividual.
 
234 Subjects included in the database may be unaware 
that their image or actions were even recorded—much less then 
fed into the system.235
 
vacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) In-
terstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 
  
18, at §§ 1.4, 1.7; see also Shyshkin, 
supra.  
 231. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifica-
tion (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18. 
 232. See id. 
 233. Id. The system is not to be used for data mining to discern, “previously 
unknown or predictive patterns,” but rather in relation to specific queries. Id. 
 234. See NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 184, at 19; Privacy 
Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identification (NGI) Inter-
state Photo System (IPS), supra note 18 (“Photos which upon submission can-
not be sufficiently linked to a particular identity will be maintained in a com-
mon photo file, though they may later be associated with an identified 
individual’s file if determined to be related.”). 
 235. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifica-
tion (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18 (noting that individu-
als may not be provided direct notice of collection of information incident to 
law enforcement response” to their possible involvement in criminal activi-
ties). 
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The FBI acknowledges that biometric technology, since its 
emergence in the 1960s, had been plagued by inaccuracy and 
technological challenges.236 Recent studies by the National Re-
search Council of the National Academies underscore this con-
cern: “[N]o biometric characteristic, including DNA, is known to 
be capable of reliably correct individualization over the size of 
the world’s population.”237 Combined with problems due to envi-
ronmental factors, injury, illness, data integrity, image quality, 
and the like, systems relying on biometric identification are 
bound to exhibit a high rate of error.238 The question, however, 
is not whether the Bureau will make broader use of biometrics, 
but how soon it can be deployed.239 The FBI is planning for a 
nationwide release of the system to all criminal justice profes-
sionals in 2014.240 The system is being developed by private 
contractors Lockheed Martin and Security Solutions.241
 
 236. See infra notes 
  
822−32. 
 237. COMPUTER SCI. & TELECOMMS. BD., BIOMETRIC RECOGNITION: CHAL-
LENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 30 (Joseph N. Pato & Lynette I. Millett, eds., Na-
tional Research Council of the National Academies 2010), available at http:// 
www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12720&page=R1. 
 238. Id. at 1−14. 
 239. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifica-
tion (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18 (“The FBI thus consid-
ers that incorporation of this technology into IAFIS promises to provide sub-
stantial benefits to law enforcement and national security, but that at the 
same time any facial recognition capability must be carefully assessed and 
tested prior to implementation to ensure that [it] is sufficiently reliable to pro-
vide the desired benefits and minimize erroneous identifications.”). NGI is be-
ing implemented in phases. In January 2012, the system will be used in Mich-
igan, Washington, Florida, and North Carolina. Shyshkin, supra note 230; 
Sternstein, supra note 137. 
 240. Shyshkin, supra note 230. 
 241. D.J. Pangburn, FBI Introduces Next Generation Facial Recognition 
Technology, DEATH & TAXES, Oct. 20, 2011, http://www.deathandtaxesmag 
.com/152857/fbi-introduces-next-generation-facial-recognition-technology; 
Sternstein, supra note 137. Note that privacy advocates have come out strong-
ly against NGI. The Electronic Frontier Foundation argues that it “will result 
in a massive expansion of government data collection for both criminal and 
noncriminal purposes.” Jennifer Lynch, FBI Ramps Up Next Generation ID 
Roll-Out—Will You End Up in the Database?, ELECT. FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 
19, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/fbi-ramps-its-next-generation 
-identification-roll-out-winter-will-your-image-end. Concern turns in part on 
the fact that individuals engaged in a range of otherwise constitutionally-
protected activities could be swept up into the database. Pangburn, supra note 
241. A staff attorney with the Center for Constitutional Rights points out that 
“‘[t]he federal government is using local cops to create a massive surveillance 
system.’” Kerry McQueeney, Face Recognition Software to Be Launched by FBI 
to Help Police Catch Wanted Criminals, DAILY MAILONLINE (Oct. 8, 2011, 8:47 
AM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2046780/Face-recognition-soft 
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NGI is not the Bureau’s only biometric initiative. The FBI’s 
Biometric Center of Excellence (created post-9/11 and housed at 
the Bureau) has various other projects underway. Like DHS 
and the State Department, DOJ is emphasizing the importance 
of information sharing.242 The FBI, for instance, collaborated on 
the Action Plan implementing HSPD-24, which formalized the 
sharing of this information with federal, state, and local enti-
ties.243
4. Military Applications 
 Nevertheless, NGI presents perhaps the clearest exam-
ple of how technologies otherwise employed for immediate bio-
metric identification purposes are now transforming into 
remote biometric identification systems. 
The use of biometrics has quickly moved beyond civilian 
applications like border security, authentication, and law en-
forcement, to the military domain. Even within the military, 
the technologies have evolved to impact a broad range of DoD’s 
mission activities.244 It involves not just what DoD refers to as 
“friendly biometrics” (e.g., identification of soldiers, contractors, 
and other personnel), but also matching biometric data found 
at the scene of attacks, engaging in counter-IED efforts, identi-
fying detainees, providing further information about individu-
als held in custody, confirming targets for both manned and 
unmanned attacks, and confirming the identity of those 
killed.245 Military applications represent one of the most signifi-
cant leaps forward in biometric technologies, with develop-
ments ranging from the deployment of handheld systems to the 
use of widespread biometric enrollment for census taking.246
 
ware-launched-FBI-help-police-catch-wanted-criminals.html#ixzz1dMSAFcUt. 
The Cato Institute further notes that having mug shots from bookings means 
that even nonconvicted people would be in the system. Sternstein, supra note 
 
Many of these initiatives bridge the gap between IBI and RBI, 
suggesting a shift to the latter sphere. 
137. 
 242. SEARCH ANNIVERSARY, supra note 177, at 6. 
 243. Id. 
 244. See BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25. 
 245. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF DEF., ANNUAL REPORT FY09, at 
14, 27, 33 (2009), available at http://www.fas.org/man/eprint/biometric09.pdf. 
 246. Thom Shanker, To Track Militants, U.S. Has System That Never For-
gets a Face, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2011/07/14/world/asia/14identity.html?pagewanted=all (“[T]he govern-
ment can scan through millions of digital files in a matter of seconds, even at 
remote checkpoints, using hand-held devices distributed widely across the se-
curity forces.”). 
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In 2004, DoD’s ABIS, designed to work with the FBI’s 
IAFIS, became operational.247 (Note that DoD and the State 
Department operate separate ABIS systems.) This system was 
the first multimodal fusion database in existence at the federal 
level. By 2009, DoD’s ABIS had evolved into the Next Genera-
tion ABIS (NG-ABIS), a system that now combines fingerprint, 
palm print, FRT, and iris analysis with biographic and encoun-
ter data.248 DoD’s standards have correspondingly evolved away 
from individual transactions and, instead, towards application 
profiles.249
ABIS encompasses an electronic database and a set of 
software applications designed to support the storage, retrieval, 
and search of data collected from “persons of national security 
interest.”
  
250 Exactly what this means, or what limits might ap-
ply, is not entirely clear. At a minimum, information from indi-
viduals seeking access to U.S. installations and bases is fed into 
the repository, as is data obtained by soldiers in the field.251 
Handheld devices collect fingerprint, face, and iris scans.252 
DoD’s Biometrics Fusion Center, upon receiving transmitted 
images from the field, conducts a search of “all appropriate do-
mestic and international databases” and forwards match re-
sults to those inquiring as well as to the intelligence communi-
ty.253 Such repositories include, inter alia, IAFIS and IDENT.254
 
 247. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 
  
38, at 10. The two 
systems share a common interface; additionally, DoD’s Electronic Biometric 
Transmission Specifications are based on the FBI and ANSI standards. BIO-
METRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 1. 
 248. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 1, 6. 
 249. Id. at 6. 
 250. Id. at 1. 
 251. See Memorandum from Gordon R. England, Acting Deputy Sec’y of 
Def. to Sec’ys of the Military Dep’ts, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
Under Sec’ys of Def., Commanders of the Combatant Commands & Dirs. of the 
Def. Agencies 2 (July 15, 2005) [hereinafter DoD Memorandum], available at 
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/dsd050715iraq.pdf. 
 252. See, e.g., BOB CARTER, LOCKHEED MARTIN, DOD BIOMETRICS, DOD 
ABIS: QUALITY EVALUATION OF OPERATIONAL MULTI-MODAL BIOMETRIC DATA 
2 (2006), available at http://biometrics.nist.gov/cs_links/quality/workshopI/ 
proc/carter_dod_abis_multi-modal_quality_for_publication.pdf. Note that the 
collection of this data is not without difficulty: cluttered backgrounds, legacy 
data, non-frontal poses, inconsistent lighting, multiple heads, and low resolu-
tion prove to bedevil face data quality for efficient application of FRT. Id. at 
13. 
 253. DoD Memorandum, supra note 251, at 2. 
 254. See infra Part I.B.5. 
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In addition to the database itself, DoD has now created a 
Biometrically Enabled Watch List (BEWL). The so-called 
BEWL Tiger Team was created in 2010 to consider BEWL 
stakeholders and the appropriate standards.255 The creation of 
such a list echoes that established by DHS.256
In 2006, DoD established Defense Biometrics as its office 
for biometric enterprise management.
 
257 The Biometrics Task 
Force, in turn, became the executing agency.258 At the same 
time, the Defense Science Board launched a Task Force to 
study the use of biometrics in DoD.259 Agencies, working 
through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 
and the National Security Council, began to design govern-
ment-wide biometric systems that would be operable between 
agencies.260 By 2006 DoD had published a Biometrics Concept 
of Operations. Various Combatant Command (COCOM) strate-
gies subsequently evolved, based on this document.261 Military 
branches have further integrated biometrics into their planning 
and strategy documents.262
Military applications of biometric technologies continue to 
evolve. Confirmation of both Osama bin Laden and Muammar 
Gaddafi’s deaths, for instance, came through the use of facial 
recognition technology.
 
263 Increasing interest has been shown in 
DoD’s domestic role along the U.S. border.264
 
 255. DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM, supra note 
 In September 
26, at 22−23. 
 256. Id. at 15 (noting that technologies “[a]llow[] matches against 
watchlists, DoD, FBI, and DHS biometric databases”). 
 257. See Biometrics: A Decade of Progress Since 9/11, supra note 105. 
 258. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 10. 
 259. Id. 
 260. Id. 
 261. DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM, supra note 26, at 27−28 
(describing and identifying strategies involving COCOMs). 
 262. The USMC, for instance, has adopted an Identity Operations (IdOps) 
Strategy 2020, which is focused on coordinating planning and resourcing activ-
ities aimed at institutionalizing and integrating IdOps within the USMC. It 
includes USMC Biometrics and Forensics strategies. DOD BIOMETRICS COL-
LABORATION FORUM, supra note 26, at 11−13, 16, 20.  
 263. Jake Tapper, Facial Recognition Technology Used to Confirm 
Gadhafi’s Death, ABC NEWS, Oct. 20, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/ 
politics/2011/10/facial-recognition-technology-used-to-confirm-gadhafis-death. 
 264. The DoD biometrics community (Biometrics Identity Management 
Agency, Office of the Under Secretary for Policy, and Special Operations 
Command) has partnered with DHS and CBP to consider how biometrics could 
be used along the borders. DOD BIOMETRICS COLLABORATION FORUM, supra 
note 26, at 10−11 (di scussing the poor oversight and implementation of the 
civilian project to secure the U.S. border and noting, “[t]he DoD has broad ex-
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2011, reports surfaced that DoD, in conjunction with Georgia 
Tech Research Institute, had begun testing autonomous aerial 
drones that combined FRT with targeting abilities.265
Considerable resources are being spent on biometrics, re-
flecting the fact that myriad military biometric applications 
present themselves. Between 2007 and 2015, DoD plans to 
spend $3.5 billion on biometrics.
  
266 Institutional arrangements 
are becoming formalized: in 2010, the Biometrics Task Force 
transitioned to the Biometrics Identity Management Agency, a 
centralized DoD hub for biometric data management.267 The 
Secretary of the Army now serves as DoD Executive Agent for 
biometrics.268
5. Interoperability 
 
In addition to the individual biometric programs and data-
bases that integrate RBI technologies are renewed efforts to 
ensure cross-agency access to information. Both the executive 
and legislative branches emphasize the importance of such in-
teroperability. This is significant to the extent that it suggests 
movement towards a sort of supra-national RBI system. Such 
interoperability, moreover, is fueled by multiple sources of 
funding, providing greater resources to generate growth. Sim-
ultaneously, it reflects diffuse accountability. That is to say, no 
one committee is tasked with considering the implications of 
the overall system. A handful of examples illustrate how efforts 
to encourage inter-agency sharing of data are expanding feder-
al capabilities with regard to RBI. 
In 2003, NSTC chartered a subcommittee on biometrics 
with the explicit aim of coordinating the multitude of initiatives 
launched across the federal government.269
 
perience in using biometrics and other sensors to contribute to secure borders, 
Ports of Entry and cities”). 
 Three years later, 
government agencies, “working through the NSTC, [began] the 
process of designing government-wide biometric system in-
 265. John P. Mello, Jr., Facial Recognition: Facebook Photo Matching Just 
the Start, PC WORLD, Sept. 21, 2011, http://www.pcworld.com/article/ 
240363/facial-recognition-facebook-photo-matching-just-the-start.html. 
 266. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-276, DEFENSE BIOMETRICS: 
DOD CAN BETTER CONFORM TO STANDARDS AND SHARE BIOMETRIC INFOR-
MATION WITH FEDERAL AGENCIES (2011) [hereinafter GAO-11-276], available 
at http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317368. 
 267. Id. at 4−5. 
 268. DoD Memorandum, supra note 251, at 3. 
 269. BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 9. 
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teroperability.”270 The following year, agencies, working with 
both the NSTC and the National Counterterrorism Center, ini-
tiated a project to improve biometric coordination with regard 
to known and suspected terrorists.271 This was followed in June 
2008 with HSPD-24, which underscored the importance of 
adopting mutually compatible methods and procedures to col-
lect, store, use, analyze, and share biometric information across 
federal agencies.272 The directive sought to ensure that the ob-
jectives described in previous executive orders and directives 
could be accomplished.273 The policy henceforward would be for 
agencies to use integrated processes and interoperable systems 
to “make available to other agencies all biometric and associat-
ed biographic and contextual information associated with per-
sons for whom there is an articulable and reasonable basis for 
suspicion that they pose a threat to national security.”274 The 
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the At-
torney General, the Director of National Intelligence, and the 
heads of other agencies would henceforward be required to 
“[m]aintain and enhance interoperability among . . . biometric 
and associated biographic systems[] by utilizing common in-
formation technology and data standards, protocols, and inter-
faces.”275 To assist in interoperability for the new and emerging 
biometric fields—and particularly for facial recognition—new 
standards were issued.276
 
 270. Id. at 10. 
 
 271. Id. 
 272. HSPD-24, supra note 106, at 788; see also BIOMETRICS IN GOVERN-
MENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 11. 
 273. HSPD-24, supra note 106, at 788–89.  
 274. Id. at 790. 
 275. Id. 
 276. See BIOMETRICS IN GOVERNMENT POST-9/11, supra note 38, at 10–11. 
For examples of such standards, see SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS, NAT’L SCI. & 
TECH. COUNCIL, BIOMETRICS STANDARDS 2–3 (2006), available at http://www 
.biometrics.gov/Documents/biostandards.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & 
TECH., INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS FOR IN-
FORMATION SYSTEMS—DATA FORMAT FOR THE INTERCHANGE OF FINGERPRINT 
FACIAL, & OTHER BIOMETRIC INFORMATION—PART 1, at 1 (2007), available at 
http://www.nist.gov/itl/ansi/upload/Approved-Std-20070427-2.pdf (adopted to 
include data fields to support best practices application levels for the capture 
of facial images and a new record type for iris data); SUBCOMM. ON BIOMET-
RICS & IDENTITY MGMT., NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL, NSTC POLICY FOR EN-
ABLING THE DEVELOPMENT, ADOPTION AND USE OF BIOMETRIC STANDARDS 3 
(2007), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/Standards/NSTC_Policy_Bio_ 
Standards.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., INFORMATION TECHNOL-
OGY: AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARD FOR INFORMATION SYSTEMS—DATA 
FORMAT FOR THE INTERCHANGE OF FINGERPRINT FACIAL, & OTHER BIOMETRIC 
  
456 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:407 
 
Congress also took steps that underscored the importance 
of interoperability: in 2004, for instance, the Intelligence Re-
form and Terrorism Prevention Act required the President to 
establish an Information Sharing Environment “for the sharing 
of terrorism information in a manner consistent with national 
security and with applicable legal standards relating to privacy 
and civil liberties.”277 It established a Program Manager for the 
Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE) who, in consulta-
tion with the interagency Information Sharing Council, is re-
sponsible for overseeing the implementation and management 
of the Information Sharing Environment (ISE).278 The PM-ISE 
assisted the President in developing and submitting an ISE 
Implementation Plan to Congress.279 This plan focused on five 
areas (intelligence, law enforcement, defense, homeland securi-
ty, and foreign affairs) and called for these communities to be 
granted expedited access to protected terrorism information.280 
“We envision a future,” the Plan, issued in 2006, stated, “that 
represents a trusted partnership among all levels of government 
in the United States, the private sector, and our foreign part-
ners, to detect, prevent, disrupt, preempt, and mitigate the ef-
fects of terrorism against the territory, people, and interests of 
the United States of America.”281 More directly, the plan speci-
fied the importance of ensuring access to personally identifiable 
information (fingerprints, photographs, and biometric indica-
tors) for information discovery and search functions across fed-
eral agencies.282
Not only did Congress pass statutes that reinforced the 
importance of sharing information across federal agencies,
 
283
 
INFORMATION—PART 2: XML VERSION viii (2008), available at http://www 
.nist.gov/itl/ansi/upload/Approved-XML-Std-20080828.pdf (adopted to support 
modern data exchange protocols such as web services). 
 
 277. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 
108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664–70 (to be codified at 6 U.S.C. § 485). 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id.  
 280. INFO. SHARING ENV’T, IMPLEMENTATION PLAN xiii (2006), available at 
http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/ise-impplan-200611_0.pdf. 
 281. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 282. Id. at 45. 
 283. See, e.g., Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, 
Pub. L. No 108-458, § 7402, 118 Stat. 3638, 3850 (increasing the authority of 
the Department of Homeland Security to utilize private sector resources that 
would assist in preventing, or responding to, terrorist acts); Enhanced Border 
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, § 201(a), 
116 Stat. 543, 547 (“Federal law enforcement agencies and the intelligence 
community shall . . . share any information . . . relevant to the admissibility 
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but it repeatedly drew on its public hearings and oversight 
mechanisms to press the executive on the failure of specific 
programs to further integrate.284
With such strong messaging coming both from the White 
House and Congress, agencies have worked to ensure the in-
teroperability of their systems. It is not that there was no pre-
vious effort to do this: more than one year before the 9/11 at-
tacks, for instance, DOJ developed an initial implementation 
plan for interoperability of INS’s IDENT and the FBI’s 
IAFIS.
 
285 But it was not until after the attacks that INS (and its 
successor, DHS), together with DOJ and DOS, made substan-
tial progress.286
The first step in developing interoperability between IAFIS 
and IDENT consisted of deploying approximately 150 IDENT 
and IAFIS workstations to border locations, enabling simulta-
neous fingerprint checks.
  
287 Following this, in 2004, updated 
hardware and software enabled integration of the two data-
bases into a single workstation.288 The FBI then reverse-
engineered IAFIS with the capability to store biographic and 
biometric information from the IDENT apprehension data-
base—at the same time allowing other federal, state, and local 
enforcement agencies to submit fingerprints to IDENT for veri-
fication.289
 
and deportability of aliens . . . .”); Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, § 102(a),(b)(3), 116 Stat. 2135, 2142–43 (creating the position of Sec-
retary of Homeland Security and requiring the Secretary to “take reasonable 
steps to ensure that information systems and databases of the Department [of 
Homeland Security] are compatible with each other and with appropriate da-
tabases of other [federal] Departments”); USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 701, 115 Stat. 272, 374 (2001) (authorizing the establishment of en-
hanced information-sharing systems between federal, state, and local law en-
forcement agencies).  
 Integration of the systems continued. These initia-
tives prompted DHS to issue a PIA for IDENT/IAFIS Interop-
 284. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 108-792, at 714 (2004) (Conf. Rep.) (supporting 
the coordination of law enforcement agencies and allocating funds to various 
coordination programs); H.R. REP. NO. 108-280, at 47 (2003) (Conf. Rep.) (re-
questing a report from the Department of Homeland Security detailing its pri-
or efforts to coordinate and share information with other law enforcement 
agencies). 
 285. See DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY 2 
(2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/foia/US-VISIT_IDENT 
-IAFISReport.pdf. 
 286. Id. at 2–3 (outlining the progress of IDENT/IAFIS interoperability af-
ter 9/11). 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 3. 
 289. Id. 
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erability.290 The Department envisioned a phased approach, in 
which federal, state, and local entities would eventually be 
brought into the information sharing environment.291 By 2008, 
DOS had begun submitting all ten-print checks against IAFIS, 
using IDENT/IAFIS interoperability.292 That same year DHS, 
DOS and the FBI signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU), as IDENT and IAFIS became fully interoperable.293 The 
following year a similar MOU between DoD and the FBI was 
signed, as the Bureau began research on the enhanced capabil-
ity IAFIS/Next Generation Identification.294 In 2005, efforts be-
gan to integrate US-VISIT into the IDENT/IAFIS environ-
ment.295 In 2006, DHS and the FBI adopted an Interim Data 
Sharing Model (iDSM) to provide for interoperability.296
Similar initiatives have now begun to mark DoD’s relation-
ship with DHS with regard to ABIS and IDENT. In 2011, for 
instance, DoD and DHS signed an MOU to establish a policy 
framework for moving forward with interoperability, leading to 
direct connectivity between the two databases.
 
297
DoD’s relationship with DOJ and the FBI is significantly 
more developed—at least with regard to the interoperability of 
ABIS and IAFIS. From the beginning, ABIS was designed to be 
interoperable with the FBI’s IAFIS. In 2005, DoD’s ABIS and 
the FBI’s IAFIS became fully interoperable.
 
298 This paved the 
way for the military to begin exchanging latent prints (e.g., 
from improvised explosive devices found in the field) with 
IAFIS in 2007.299
 
 290. See generally DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 
FOR THE INTERIM DATA SHARING MODEL (IDSM) FOR THE AUTOMATED BIO-
METRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IDENT)/INTEGRATED AUTOMATED FINGER-
PRINT IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (IAFIS) INTEROPERABILITY PROJECT (2006), 
available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_ 
idsm.pdf. 
 These two systems have continued to evolve 
 291. Id. at 2–3, 8–9. 
 292. CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFO. SERVS. DIV. INTEROPERABILITY INITIATIVES 
UNIT, BIOMETRIC INTEROPERABILITY 9 (2011) [hereinafter BIOMETRIC IN-
TEROPERABILITY], available at https://www.fbibiospecs.org/FacialRecogForum/ 
Forum2/_Uploads/facial%20recog%20forum%20110211_1.pdf. 
 293. See id. at 4, 9. 
 294. See id. at 4. 
 295. See id. at 12. 
 296. See id. at 9. 
 297. See id. at 15.  
 298. Id. at 9. 
 299. See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL SUBCOMM. ON BIOMETRICS & IDEN-
TITY MGMT., THE NATIONAL BIOMETRICS CHALLENGE 15–16 (2011), available 
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in tandem. This means that a soldier in the field can collect bi-
ometric information and, through the Biometric Fusion Center, 
run it against the FBI database. Any matches in the results are 
then transmitted back to the soldier and potentially distributed 
to intelligence agencies. The type of information may include 
not just biometric data, but past criminal record, the biometric 
subject’s address, contact information, birth date, death date, 
place of death, citizenship, ethnicity, height, weight, blood type, 
marital status, group membership, encounter data, and other 
physical, social, and civic characteristics.300
The DoD-FBI relationship has continued to evolve. In 
2010, for instance, groundbreaking occurred for the joint 
FBI/DoD Biometric Technology Center.
 This information 
then becomes part of the military database. 
301 By March of 2011, 
DoD had adopted a standard for the collection of biometric in-
formation to facilitate sharing that information with other fed-
eral agencies.302 The standards have been applied in some, but 
not all, of its collection devices.303
6. State and Local Government 
  
Federal forays into this area are now extending to state 
and local government, raising parallel questions about statuto-
ry and constitutional framing, as well as concerns about the ex-
tent to which state and local initiatives are being folded into 
the federal framework.  
Minnesota, for instance, runs CriMNet, which emphasizes 
biometric identification and information sharing.304
 
at http://www.biometrics.gov/Documents/BiometricsChallenge2011_protected 
.pdf.  
 The state 
uses mobile biometric identification devices for officers in the 
field, employs an automated fingerprint identification system 
during booking, and checks targets against the FBI’s Reposito-
 300. BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE, supra note 25, at 16–24. 
 301. See Elizabeth Montalbano, FBI Plans Biometrics Tech Center, 
INFORMATIONWEEK GOV'T (Dec. 5, 2011, 3:40 PM), http://www.information 
week.com/government/information-management/fbi-plans-biometrics-tech 
-center/232200748.  
 302. See BIOMETRIC INTEROPERABILITY, supra note 292, at 2. 
 303. For instance, one handheld device, used primarily by the Army, is re-
sponsible for thirteen percent of the biometric records held by DoD—i.e., ap-
proximately 630,000 records. GAO-11-276, supra note 266. Because this device 
does not conform to the standards, the information contained cannot be 
checked against the FBI’s approximately 94 million records. Id.  
 304. Kalaf, supra note 209, at 19, 25. 
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ry for Individuals of Special Concern.305 Similarly, Wisconsin 
uses an Automated Fingerprint Identification System, as well 
as FAST ID, a mobile biometric identification system.306
Such systems can be found at the local level as well. Los 
Angeles County, California, for example, maintains two sepa-
rate biometric identification systems.
  
307 The Los Angeles Re-
gional Identification System supplies biometric information to 
law enforcement agencies and provides mobile identification 
capabilities to law enforcement officers.308 Los Angeles County’s 
system also has been integrated into the Los Angeles Police 
Department’s centralized repository as well as the Regional 
Terrorism Information and Integration System.309 In Florida, 
the Pinellas County Sheriff’s Office has begun tapping into the 
state’s Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles’ pho-
to archives, allowing officers in the field, equipped with digital 
cameras, to quickly cross-check individuals detained against 
the photo bank.310 The sheriff’s office claims that between the 
launch of the program in 2004 and July 2011, some 700 arrests 
had been generated.311
The spread of biometric technologies to state and local gov-
ernment is driven in part by the availability of new technolo-
gies and by state initiatives. It has also been driven, however, 
by federal efforts to obtain more information. The Maricopa 
County (Arizona) Sheriff’s Office (MCSO) explained to Congress 
how the local collection of information feeds directly into feder-
al initiatives: 
 
  As outlined in the Information Sharing Environment Implementa-
tion Plan state/local centers will become a part of the National Intel-
ligence Program. As such if these centers provide direct support to 
ongoing Federal programs that require funding . . . then the Federal 
government should provide continued funding support. An example of 
this effort is the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office Facial Recognition 
Program. Working in conjunction with the U.S. Department of Justice 
the Facial Recognition Program has been provided with access to the 
 
 305. Id. at 25.  
 306. Id. at 21, 61. 
 307. Id. at 20. 
 308. Id. at 20, 48. 
 309. Id. at 49. 
 310. Glenn Bischoff, Video: Facial Recognition Technology Nabs Criminals 
in Florida, URGENT COMMC’NS. (Oct. 26, 2011, 5:42 PM), http://urgentcomm 
.com/mobile_data/news/pinellas-facial-recognition-20111026. 
 311. Emily Steel, How a New Police Tool for Face Recognition Works, WALL 
ST. J. BLOGS (July 13, 2011, 7:56 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2011/07/13/ 
how-a-new-police-tool-for-face-recognition-works. 
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Federal Joint Automated Booking System and all of the Federal ar-
restee’s photographs. In addition the MCSO is partnering with the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation to support their violent gang and 
criminal investigations through the use of the Facial Recognition Pro-
gram. The MCSO is also working with agencies and fusion centers 
nationwide to establish a facial recognition network that will support 
criminal investigations and the recovery of missing and abducted 
children.312
Federal information, in turn, is then provided to local entities, 
further blurring the federalism divide. The Maricopa County 
Sheriff Department’s Facial Recognition Unit, for instance, is 
building a database to match suspect photos with millions of 
images drawn from dozens of federal agencies.
 
313
 The new technologies available to state and local govern-
ment offer mobile biometric capture across a range of remote 
biometric identification technologies. For example, the Mobile 
Offender Recognition and Information System, known as 
MORIS, incorporates FRT, iris scans, and fingerprinting.
 State and lo-
cal governments are thus both active participants in building 
federal biometric databases as well as consumers of federal ini-
tiatives.  
314 Po-
lice officers equipped with the device can take a picture of a 
person’s face from a distance of two to five feet away, which is 
then analyzed according to 130 distinguishing points.315
 
 312. The Way Forward with Fusion Centers: Challenges and Strategies for 
Change: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intelligence, Information Sharing, 
and Terrorism Risk Assessment of the H. Comm. on Homeland Security, 110th 
Cong. 44 (2007) (statement of Norman Beasley, Coordinator for Counter Ter-
rorism, Maricopa Cnty. Sheriff’s Office) (examining federal challenges and 
strategies to improve homeland security and terrorist threat information shar-
ing among federal, state, and local agencies through the establishment and 
utilization of fusion centers). 
 This 
 313. Id. at 50. Numerous agencies participate in the program “includ[ing]: 
FBI, ATF, U.S. Postal Inspection Service, TSA, ICE, U.S. Border Patrol, Ari-
zona Department of Public Safety, Arizona National Guard, Arizona Depart-
ment of Corrections, Arizona Department of Revenue, U.S. Department of 
State, Arizona Motor Vehicle Department, Arizona Attorney General’s Office, 
Defense Intelligence Agency, Federal Air Marshal Service, Rocky Mountain 
Information Network, Phoenix Police Department, Phoenix Fire Department, 
Glendale Fire Department, Mesa Fire Department, Mesa Police Department, 
Glendale Police Department, Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, Air Force Of-
fice of Special Investigations, U.S. Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, 
Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Scottsdale Police Department, Tempe Po-
lice Department, Arizona Department of Economic Security, Arizona Depart-
ment of Liquor License and Control, and the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security.” Id. 
 314. Steel, supra note 311.  
 315. Id. 
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information can then be compared to existing databases.316 In a 
similar manner, the officer can hold the device five to six inches 
from an individual’s eye for a high-resolution image, or use a 
small metallic rectangle attached to the camera to scan the in-
dividual’s fingerprints.317 In 2010, police officers in Brockton, 
Massachusetts became the first police department to test the 
device, which by July 2011 was ready for deployment—with 
applications for iPhone and Android in the works.318
The funding for many state and local initiatives derives in 
part from federal agencies. Pilot programs, such as NGI, lever-
age investments in research and development to deploy new 
technologies. In some cases, the federal government continues 
to provide services to allow state and local actors to take full 
advantage of the technologies.
 
319 Money also has been made 
available for the purpose of helping local entities to develop 
their own systems. DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Polic-
ing Services, for instance, has issued grants to develop MORIS-
type devices.320
In sum, what the state and local initiatives in this area 
demonstrate is the extent to which such technologies are be-
coming more common. They also show how federal initiatives in 
this area influence the collection of such information, and the 
way in which the line between law enforcement and national 
security is becoming increasingly blurred. The availability of 
resources is also tied to federal initiatives. Yet there are no fed-
eral statutes that address the difficult questions that accompa-
ny broader use of these technologies and the movement to re-
mote biometric identification. 
  
II.  STATUTORY GAP   
Congress has clearly and emphatically given federal agen-
cies the authority to collect, analyze, and share personally iden-
tifiable information (PII). Such limits as have been introduced 
on the exercise of these powers, however—specifically in rela-
tion to (1) protecting PII; (2) obtaining information for use in 
criminal investigations; and (3) collecting foreign intelligence—
 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id.  
 319. Heaton, supra note 29; Aliya Sternstein, Facial Recognition Apps 
Spark Privacy Concerns in Congress, NEXTGOV, Oct. 19, 2011, http://www 
.nextgov.com/nextgov/ng_20111019_1039.php. 
 320. Steel, supra note 311. 
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at best, only weakly apply, and at worst, fail altogether to ad-
dress the types of technologies at work in remote biometric 
identification. 
Within the first category, broad gaps in the 1974 Privacy 
Act, its amendments, and the 1990 Computer Act, paired with 
explicit exemptions in the Privacy Act and the 2002 E-
Government Act, remove most biometric systems—much less 
RBI technologies such as facial recognition—from such re-
strictions.  
The second category, dominated by Title III of the 1968 
Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act and, subsequent-
ly, Title I of the 1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 
says nothing about RBI generally, much less facial recognition 
technology. Moreover, while the latter two statutes address au-
dio recording, they do not address silent video recording. 
The third category, governed by the 1978 Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act and its subsequent amendments, only 
addresses certain types of electronic communications and re-
mains silent on the collection, and construction and use of da-
tabases populated with biometric and tracking technologies. 
Such rules as do apply to electronic surveillance would be al-
most impossible to translate to RBI systems. Targeting, the du-
ration for which orders can be issued, minimization procedures, 
and special certification all depend upon distinguishing be-
tween U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons—a distinction almost 
meaningless in the context of RBI. The specificity otherwise re-
quired by statute, moreover, runs counter to the orientation of 
the technologies involved in this new and emerging area. This 
lack of statutory guidance thus drives us back upon constitu-
tional analysis in considering the programs currently being de-
veloped by the federal government. 
A. PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION 
At the most general level, the Department of Justice,321 
Department of State,322 Department of Homeland Security323
 
 321. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 533, 534 (2006) (recognizing DOJ’s authority to 
acquire, collect, classify, and preserve identification and other records, and to 
exchange them with other federal officials and state and local government en-
tities); see also 50 U.S.C. § 404o (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (supporting the DOJ’s 
responsibility to disseminate terrorism information); Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. 
L. No. 92-544, pmbl., 86 Stat. 1109, 1109 (“Making appropriations for the De-
partments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and related agen-
cies.”). In addition, record-keeping authority has been delegated to the director 
of the FBI. 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.85, 20.1−20.3, 20.20−20.25, 20.30−20.38 (2012); see 
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also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(c) (2006) (immigration and asylum authorities); id. 
§ 1225(b) (2006) (screening and asylum considerations), subsection (b)(1)(D) 
invalidated by United States v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th 
Cir. 2011); id. § 1357(a) (2006) (interrogation of aliens); id. § 1360(a) (2006) 
(establishment of a central index with the names of all aliens admitted or de-
nied admission, their sponsors, and any other relevant information the Attor-
ney General shall require); id. § 1365a(b) (2006) (integrated entry and exit 
system to be implemented by the Attorney General); id. § 1379(1) (2006) (di-
recting the Attorney General and the Secretary of State to develop and certify 
a technology standard, including appropriate biometric identifier standards to 
verify the identity of persons applying for a U.S. visa or seeking to enter the 
United States); 44 U.S.C. §§ 3301−3312 (2006) (exchange of records); see also 
Hammons v. Scott, 423 F. Supp. 625, 628 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (stating that the 
FBI maintains arrest records). 
 322. See 8 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006) (giving the Department of State the author-
ity to collect data in order to grant or deny visa applications); see also id. 
§ 1324 (2006) (providing the authority for seizing property and evidence relat-
ed to bringing in and harboring certain aliens); id. § 1365a (giving the De-
partment of State the authority to maintain a database related to alien entry 
and exit); id. § 1379 (giving the Attorney General and the Secretary of State 
the authority to develop and certify a technology standard to verify the identi-
ty of aliens). More specific authority to collect personally identifiable infor-
mation (PII) is given to the State Department with regard to ABIS, see U.S. 
DEP’T OF STATE, AUTOMATED BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM (ABIS) PRI-
VACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT 3 (2011), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/109132.pdf (relying on the following as legal authori-
ty: “Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) 1952, 8 U.S.C. 1101, as amended[,] 
INA, 8 U.S.C. 1104 (Powers and Duties of the Secretary of State)[,] 22 U.S.C 
2651(a) (Organization of Department of State)[,] INA, 8 U.S.C. 1202(f) (Confi-
dential Nature of Visa Records)[,] Immigration Act of 1990 (P.L. 101-649)[,] 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 
1996[,] Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act, 1997 (P.L. 104-208)[,] Legal 
Immigration Family Equity ‘LIFE’ Act (Part of HR 5548, 2000)[,] USA PA-
TRIOT Act of 2001 (HR 3162) (P. L. 107-56)[,] Enhanced Border Security and 
Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (HR 3525)[,] and Child Status Protection Act 
(HR 1209) 2002”), the Consular Consolidated Database, see CONSULAR CON-
SOLIDATED DATABASE (CCD) PIA, supra note 146, at 3–4 (relying on the fol-
lowing as legal authority: “8 U.S.C. 1401–1503 (2007) Acquisition and Loss of 
U.S. Citizenship or U.S. Nationality; Use of U.S. Passports)[,] 8 U.S.C. 1101–
1503 (Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended)[,] 18 U.S.C. 911, 
1001, 1541–1546 (2007) (Crimes and Criminal Procedure)[,] 22 U.S.C. 211a–
218, 2651a, 2705[,] Executive Order 11295 (August 5, 1966)[,] 31 FR 10603 
(Authority of the Secretary of State in granting and issuing U.S. passports)[,] 
8 U.S.C. 1185 (Travel Control of Citizens)[,] 8 U.S.C. 1104 (Powers and Duties 
of the Secretary of State)[,] 22 U.S.C. 3904 (Functions of the Foreign Service, 
including protection of U.S. citizens in foreign countries under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations and assistance to other agencies)[,] 22 
U.S.C. 1731 (Protection of naturalized U.S. citizens in foreign countries)[,] 22 
U.S.C. 2705 (Preparation of Consular Reports of Birth Abroad)[,] 8 U.S.C. 
1501 (Adjudication of possible loss of nationality)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2671(b)(2)(B) 
(Repatriation loan for destitute U.S. Citizens abroad)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2670(j) (Pro-
vision of emergency medical, dietary and other assistance)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2151n–
1 (Assistance to arrested citizens) (Repealed, but applicable to past records)[,] 
42 U.S.C. 1973ff–1973ff–6 (Overseas absentee voting)[,] 42 U.S.C. 402 (Social 
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Security benefits payments)[,] Sec. 599C of Public Law 101-513, 104 Stat. 
1979, as amended (Claims to benefits by virtue of hostage status)[,] 50 U.S.C. 
App. 453, 454, Presidential Proclamation No. 4771, July 2, 1980 as amended 
by Presidential Proclamation 7275, February 22, 2000 (Selective Service regis-
tration)[,] 22 U.S.C. 5501–5513 (Aviation disaster and security assistance 
abroad; mandatory availability of airline passengers manifest)[,] 22 U.S.C. 
4196; (22 U.S.C. 4195, repealed, but applicable to past records) (Official notifi-
cation of death of U.S. citizens in foreign countries; transmission of inventory 
of effects)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2715b (notification of next of kin of death of U.S. citi-
zens in foreign countries)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4197 (Assistance with disposition of es-
tates of U.S. citizens upon death in a foreign country)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4193, 
4194[,] 22 U.S.C. 4205–4207[,] 46 U.S.C. 10318 (Merchant seamen protection 
and relief)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4193 (Receiving protests or declarations of U.S. citizen 
passengers, merchants in foreign ports)[,] 46 U.S.C. 10701–10705 (Responsi-
bility for deceased seamen and their effects)[,] 22 U.S.C. 2715a (Responsibility 
to inform victims and their families regarding crimes against U.S. citizens 
abroad)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4215, 4221 (Administration of oaths, affidavits, and other 
notarial acts)[,] 28 U.S.C. 1740, 1741 (Authentication of documents)[,] 28 
U.S.C. 1781–1783 (Judicial Assistance to U.S. and foreign courts and liti-
gants)[,] 42 U.S.C. 14901–14954; Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, (Assis-
tance with Intercountry adoptions under the Hague Intercountry Adoption 
Convention, maintenance of related records)[,] 42 U.S.C. 11601–11610, Inter-
national Child Abduction Remedies Act (Assistance to applicants in the loca-
tion and return of children wrongfully removed or retained or for securing ef-
fective exercise of rights of access)[,] 22 U.S.C. 4802 (overseas evacuations)”), 
and the Identity Management System, see IDENTITY MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, 
PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT, supra note 175, at 3 (relying on the following as 
legal authority: “5 U.S.C. 301; Federal Information Security Management Act 
(FISMA)[,] National Defense Authorization Act, Act (Pub. L. 104-106, sec. 
5113)[,] Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 12, Policy for a 
Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors, Au-
gust 27, 2004[,] Federal Property and Administrative Act of 1949, as amend-
ed[,] Executive Order 10450—Security Requirements for Government Em-
ployees[,] Executive Order 10865—Safeguarding Classified Information 
Within Industry[,] Executive Order 12958—Classified National Security In-
formation[,] Executive Order 12968—Access to Classified Information[,] Exec-
utive Order 12829—National Industrial Security Program[,] and 5 CFR 731—
OPM part 731, Suitability”). 
 323. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, 6 U.S.C. § 121(a)–(d) (2006) (cre-
ating an Office of Intelligence and Analysis within DHS and giving it the re-
sponsibility of accessing, receiving, and analyzing law enforcement infor-
mation, intelligence information, and other information from local, state, and 
federal agencies, as well as private sector entities, with an eye towards inte-
grating such information in support of the Department’s responsibilities as 
well as those of the National Counterterrorism Center); id. §§ 141, 121(d)(11)–
(12) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (giving DHS the authority to disseminate infor-
mation to other federal agencies, as well as state and local government—and 
private actors—with the only meaningful restriction being that it be done con-
sistent with the protection of intelligence sources and methods as established 
by the director of National Intelligence, as well as the protection of sensitive 
law enforcement information consistent with guidelines established by the At-
torney General); id. § 121(d)(14) (giving DHS the authority to establish and 
utilize advanced technologies “including data-mining and other advanced ana-
lytical tools, in order to access, receive, and analyze data and information in 
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and Department of Defense324 each have broad authority to col-
lect personally identifiable information on U.S. citizens. To 
DHS, in particular, Congress has provided explicit authority to 
develop new technologies to acquire and store information rele-
vant to any of its law enforcement, border, or national security 
functions.325
 
furtherance of” the Department’s responsibilities “and to disseminate infor-
mation acquired and analyzed by the Department, as appropriate”). 
 Specific biometrics provisions supplement these 
 324. Outside of war, DoD does not appear to have the general authority to 
collect personally identifiable information on U.S. citizens within domestic 
bounds. Cf. 10 U.S.C. § 3013 (2006) (authorizing the DoD to collect infor-
mation only for the Department of the Army). Information-sharing instru-
ments, however, allow it to access information obtained by other federal agen-
cies. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,356, Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism 
Information to Protect Americans, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,599 (Sept. 1, 2004). DoD 
does have primary authority to collect information on active enlisted person-
nel, such as the Total Army Personnel Database Active Enlisted. See DEP’T OF 
DEF., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) FOR THE TOTAL ARMY PERSONNEL 
DATABASE ACTIVE ENLISTED (TAPDB-AE) 3 (2008), available at http://ciog6 
.army.mil/Portals/1/PIA/TAPDB-AE_2010-07-30-101117.pdf (relying on the 
following legal authority: “10 U.S.C. 3013, Secretary of the Army[,] Army Reg-
ulation 600-8-6, Personnel Accounting and Strength Reporting[,] and E.O. 
9397 as amended (SSN)”); see also PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT (PIA) FOR 
THE INSTALLATION ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM—DRUM 3 (2008), available at 
http://ciog6.army.mil/Portals/1/PIA/IACS-DRUM_23JUN2010.pdf (relying on 
the following legal authority: “10 U.S.C. 3013, Secretary of the Army[,] Army 
Regulation 190-13, The Army Physical Security Program and E.O. 9397, as 
amended (SSN)”). Numerous Executive Orders reach the same purpose. See, 
e.g., HSPD-12, supra note 171; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, MEMORANDUM NO. M-05-05, ELECTRONIC SIGNATURES: HOW 
TO MITIGATE THE RISK OF COMMERCIAL MANAGED SERVICES (Dec. 20, 2004), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/ 
fy2005/m05-05.pdf; DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE NO. 1000.25, DOD PERSONNEL 
IDENTITY PROTECTION (PIP) PROGRAM (July 19, 2004), available at http:// 
www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/100025p.pdf. DoD also cites a number 
of Executive Orders in support of its general collection of biometric data. See 
DEP’T OF DEF., MEMORANDUM NO. DTM-05-006, DOD POLICY FOR BIOMETRIC 
INFORMATION FOR ACCESS TO U.S. INSTALLATIONS AND FACILITIES IN IRAQ 
(July 15, 2005), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/ 
pdf/dsd050715iraq.pdf (relying on the legal authority of “HSPD-6 . . . HSPD-11 
. . . [, and] Exec. Order 13,356”). 
 325. See, e.g., 6 U.S.C. § 202(1)–(4) (2006) (giving the Secretary of DHS re-
sponsibility for securing the borders); 8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(1) (2006) (granting 
the Secretary of Homeland Security the administration and enforcement of all 
laws relating to the immigration and naturalization of aliens and U.S. bor-
ders); IDENT System of Records, 72 Fed. Reg. 31,080, 31,081 (June 5, 2007) 
(giving DHS special authority with regard to the borders, as well as biometric 
collection and analysis systems); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) (2006) (screening 
and asylum considerations), subsection (b)(1)(D) invalidated by United States 
v. Barajas-Alvarado, 655 F.3d 1077, 1087 (9th Cir. 2011). As with other de-
partments, myriad other sections of the code underscore the Department’s role 
in this area. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1324(e) (2006) (discussing outreach program 
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broader powers.326 DHS is further empowered to mine such in-
formation and then share it with any federal, state, or local en-
tities, or private actors, deemed necessary.327 Intelligence agen-
cies appear to have similarly broad authority that could be 
applied to PII.328
 
for DHS to work with the State Department and the Attorney General to ad-
dress the issue of U.S. persons bringing in and harboring aliens); id. § 1357(h) 
(2006) (focusing on the protection of juveniles applying to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security for consent for special immigrant status). 
 The limits established, however, all but disap-
pear when confronted by the types of programs under question. 
 326. New legislation in 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to “develop a plan to accelerate the full implementation of an automated bio-
metric entry and exit data system.” Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Act of 
2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 4042(a), 118 Stat. 3638, 3724 (to be codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1365b(c)(1)). Congress demanded that the Secretary submit a report 
detailing the current functionality of the entry and exit data system (including 
a list of ports of entry and other DHS and Department of State locations where 
biometric entry data systems were in use, and a listing of the databases and 
data systems with which the entry and exist data system were interoperable), 
as well as what resources would be required to resolve any deficiencies in the 
current system. Id. § 7206, 118 Stat. at 3818 (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1365b(c)(2)). The statute required that by December 26, 2007, the new bio-
metric program would be up and running, with a phased implementation of a 
registered traveler program to take place soon thereafter. Id.  
The U.S. Coast Guard’s collection of personally identifiable information 
supports its law enforcement and other missions. See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) 
(U.S. Coast Guard Primary Duties); id. § 89 (2006) (U.S. Coast Guard Law En-
forcement); 19 U.S.C. § 482(a) (2006) (search of vehicles and persons). The 
agency, in turn, functions within DHS’s broader grant of authority for the col-
lection and analysis of biometric and other data. See discussion infra Part 
II.A.2. The specific biometric programs discussed above, US-VISIT and 
IDENT, cite overlapping statutory authorities that enable the collection of PII 
for the purposes so stated. For example, the PIAs for US-VISIT list the follow-
ing statutory authority: “the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Public Law 104-208; The Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Data Management Improvement Act of 2000 (DMIA), 
Public Law 106-215; The Visa Waiver Permanent Program Act of 2000 
(VWPPA), Public Law 106-396; The USA PATRIOT Act, Public Law 107-56; 
and The Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act (‘Border Secu-
rity Act’), Public Law 107-173,” and “[t]he Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004, (IRTPA) Public Law 108-458, § 7208.” DHS, UPDATE 
FOR US-VISIT, supra note 115, at 15 n.10; DHS, VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT 
STATUS, supra note 120, at 4 n.3. For IDENT, the statutory authority for 
maintenance of the system turns on the authorities of each agency that con-
tributes to the IDENT database. See Privacy Act; IDENT System of Records, 
72 Fed. Reg. 31,080, 31,081 (June 5, 2007) (listing as statutory authority: “6 
U.S.C. 202, 8 U.S.C. 1103, 1158, 1201, 1225, 1324, 1357, 1360, 1365a, 1365b, 
1379 . . . 1732; [and] 19 U.S.C. 1589a”).  
 327. 6 U.S.C. § 124h (2006).  
 328. Amendments to the 1947 National Security Act instruct the Director 
of National Intelligence to determine the requirements and priorities for, and 
manage and direct the collection, analysis, production, and dissemination of, 
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1. Privacy Act of 1974 and Systems of Records Notice 
The Privacy Act of 1974 is the main legislation governing 
the federal collection, use, and disclosure of personally identifi-
able information.329 The statute falls short, however, of provid-
ing for robust protection of the types of technologies that mark 
the biometrics realm. Reporting requirements, for instance, are 
limited to data associated with specific individuals.330 The act 
only applies to federal entities—not state and local govern-
ments.331 And only U.S. citizens and permanent residents fall 
within the legislation’s requirements.332
 
national intelligence, and intelligence related to national security—understood 
as: 
 
[A]ll intelligence, regardless of the source from which derived and in-
cluding information gathered within or outside the United States, 
that . . . pertains . . . to more than one United States Government 
agency; and that involves—(i) threats to the United States, its people, 
property, or interests; (ii) the development, proliferation, or use of 
weapons of mass destruction; or (iii) any other matter bearing on 
United States national or homeland security.  
50 U.S.C. § 401a(5) (2006). The intelligence community undertaking the collec-
tion, analysis, and dissemination of such information includes the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, CIA, National Security Agency, Defense In-
telligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, National Recon-
naissance Office, other DoD offices conducting reconnaissance, the intelligence 
elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and USMC, FBI, the Drug Enforce-
ment Agency (DEA), the Department of Energy, the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research at the Department of State, the Office of Intelligence and Analy-
sis of the Department of the Treasury, elements of DHS concerned with the 
analysis of intelligence information (including the Coast Guard), and any oth-
er entities designated by the President. Id. § 401a(4). Agencies use infor-
mation-gathering functions to bypass limits that might otherwise apply to 
agencies’ collection of PII. The CIA, for instance, is statutorily prevented from 
assuming any police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers or internal security 
functions. 5 U.S.C. § 403-3(d)(1) (2006). It is not clear, however, precisely what 
the CIA can and cannot do within its broader authorities. See Grant T. Harris, 
Note, The CIA Mandate and the War on Terror, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 529, 
532–33 (2005). Similarly, Executive Order 12,333 of 1981 and Attorney Gen-
eral guidelines restrict the CIA in its collection of information about U.S. citi-
zens: it is only allowed to collect information for an authorized intelligence 
purpose, amongst which international terrorism is included. See Exec. Order 
No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,950 (Dec. 8, 1981). Exactly what consti-
tutes international terrorism, however, is not clear—nor do there appear to be 
any limits on whether the individual about whom the information is sought be 
the target of the investigation, or merely related in some way to an investiga-
tion itself. See id. (failing to define “international terrorism”). 
 329. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 330. Id. § 552a(b). 
 331. See id. § 552a(b) (applying restrictions to an “agency,” not a “non-
federal agency”). 
 332. Id. § 552a(a)(2). 
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Not all data collection qualifies for protection. Instead, no-
tice must only be provided for information contained in a “sys-
tem of records.”333
[A]ny item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual 
that is maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his ed-
ucation, financial transactions, medical history, and criminal or em-
ployment history and that contains his name, or the identifying num-
ber, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to the individual, 
such as a finger or voice print or a photograph . . . .
 The Act defines a “record” as: 
334
A record is thus created where biometric information, such as 
fingerprint, voice, or facial recognition data, is stored and as-
signed to a particular individual.
 
335 A “system of records” is un-
derstood then as “a group of any records . . . from which infor-
mation is retrieved by the name of the individual . . . or other 
identifying particular.”336 So, where the government maintains 
a group of biometric records, from which information is retriev-
able by a marker assigned to an individual in regard to whom 
the information is stored, it is maintaining a system of records 
and is thus, at the outset, subject to the Privacy Act’s provi-
sions.337
On the other hand, if the government maintains a video 
surveillance program in which it stores the biometric infor-
mation of passersby, without correlating such information to 
particular individuals, such a system does not appear to fall 
within the Privacy Act. The linking of data to individuals is es-
sential to the formation of a “record.”
 
338 Nor does the statute 
appear to apply to automated video- or photo-matching sys-
tems, which would merely correlate images, without tying them 
to particular persons. A system of records thus occurs only at 
the point “when agencies use the Privacy Act record as a key to 
retrieve information from these files.”339
 
 333. See id. § 552a(d). 
 Pari passu, the legisla-
 334. Id. § 552a(a)(4). 
 335. Id. 
 336. Id. § 552a(a)(5). 
 337. The fact that the agency has the capability to retrieve individual rec-
ords does not subject it to the provisions of the Privacy Act. Privacy Act Guide-
lines, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,949, 28,952 (July 9, 1975); Privacy Act of 1974, 52 Fed. 
Reg. 12,990, 12,991 (Apr. 20, 1987). Rather, the agency must actually retrieve 
records by an identifying particular. Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 Fed. Reg. at 
28,952; Privacy Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. at 12,991. 
 338. Privacy Act of 1974, 52 Fed. Reg. at 12,991 (“In order to carry out . . . 
call detail programs, agencies will have to link numbers and names so that 
they can determine who is responsible for what call. It is at this point, that the 
telephone number meets the Privacy Act definition of a ‘record.’”). 
 339. Id.  
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tion appears not to apply to programs focused on developing bi-
ometric technology through the widespread accumulation of da-
ta that is not tied to particular individuals. 
Under the statute, each agency maintaining personally 
identifiable databases must publish a system of records notice 
(SORN) in the Federal Register.340 SORNs may be issued in re-
gard to federal government-wide initiatives, as well as depart-
ment-wide programs and sub-department agency initiatives.341 
All federal agencies must adopt and publish minimum stand-
ards with respect to the collection, maintenance, use and dis-
semination of personal information contained in such sys-
tems.342 The legislation restricts the transfer of data absent a 
written request by or with the prior consent of the individual to 
whom the information pertains unless such a request is made 
by another government agency head, so long as the agency 
head makes a written request which maintains the record spec-
ifying the specific portion desired, and the purpose for which 
the record is sought.343
Outside of specified (albeit broad) exemptions, discussed 
below, upon request, the legislation requires each agency that 
maintains a system of records to grant access to the individual 
from whom the information was collected, in order to give the 
target the opportunity to correct any errors in the infor-
mation.
 
344 The agency must then either promptly correct the 
portion of the record considered inaccurate, irrelevant, untime-
ly or incomplete, or promptly inform the individual of its re-
fusal to amend the record and the appeals process to be fol-
lowed.345
 
 340. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(4). 
 
 341. SORNs, for instance, have issued not just from the DHS as a whole, 
but also from DHS’s sub-departments: Customs and Border Protection, Feder-
al Emergency Management Agency, Intelligence and Analysis Unit, Immigra-
tion and Customs Enforcement, the National Protection and Programs Direc-
torate, the Office of Health Affairs, the Office of Inspector General, 
Operations, Science and Technology, the Transportation Security Administra-
tion, Citizenship and Immigration Services Ombudsman, U.S. Citizenship and 
Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Secret Service. See System 
of Records Notices (SORNs), U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., http://www.dhs 
.gov/system-records-notices-sorns (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (listing all general 
federal, departmental, and sub-agency SORNs related to DHS). 
 342. 5 U.S.C § 552a(e)–(f). 
 343. Id. § 552a(b)(7). 
 344. Id. § 552a(d)(1). 
 345. Id. § 552a(d)(2)(B). The statute sets a limit of ten days either to make 
the corrections or to notify the individual that the information will remain un-
touched. Id. § 552a(d)(2)(A). 
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Two important points about this legislation, outside of the 
exemptions, deserve notice. First, the statute does not regulate 
state and local governments or private entities. Thus, any bio-
metric information gathered by state or local governments is ex-
empted from the Act’s requirements.346 The agency using such 
data is only subject to the much weaker expectation of due dili-
gence347 and is under no statutory obligation to inform the indi-
vidual that personally identifiable information has been col-
lected on the target or to correct any errors in the same.348 
IAFIS, for instance, is part of the Fingerprint Identification 
Records System, portions of which are exempt from access and 
amendment under the Privacy Act.349 This database relies in 
part on local law enforcement fingerprint data, which does not 
fall subject to the Privacy Act. Thus, while the FBI’s role in 
maintaining and disseminating the identification records car-
ries the responsibility of undertaking such activities in a re-
sponsible manner,350 any errors in the state collection of bio-
metric data are not subject to the same amendment 
requirements as federally-generated information.351
Second, the Privacy Act applies only to U.S. citizens and 
not to companies, non-resident aliens, or foreigners.
  
352
 
 346. Id. Federal agencies implementing biometric programs cite this excep-
tion—the PIA, for instance, issued by the FBI in regard to the Repository for 
Individuals of Special Concern, specifically notes that “[t]he user agencies that 
contribute the underlying information to the NGI and NCIC [National Crime 
Information Center] likely do not provide any sort of Privacy Act Statements 
or similar actual notice to the individuals from whom or about whom the in-
formation pertains. This is because non-federal contributors are not subject to 
the Privacy Act, federal contributors are usually exempted from the Privacy 
Act’s individual collection notice provisions in connection with criminal law 
enforcement activities, and/or provision of individual notice incident to crimi-
nal law enforcement activities is typically impracticable.” RISC PIA, supra 
note 
 The pur-
pose of this limitation was, in part, to ensure the exclusion of 
economic regulatory activity, as well as intelligence files and 
databases devoted to foreign nationals, “or maintained by the 
201, § 6.1. 
 347. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(6)(C)(i). 
 348. See supra note 344 and accompanying text. 
 349. 28 C.F.R. § 16.96(e), (f) (2010). 
 350. See Tarlton v. Saxbe, 507 F.2d 1116, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Menard v. 
Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1028–29 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
 351. Cf. Shadd v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 721, 724 (W.D. Pa. 1975) 
(suggesting that the FBI may have less of a duty to correct errors resulting 
from state collection of information), aff’d mem. 535 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1976). 
 352. Congress accomplished this limitation through the definition of “indi-
vidual” as “a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for 
permanent residence.” See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(2) (2006). 
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State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency and other 
agencies for the purpose of dealing with nonresident aliens and 
people in other countries.”353
2. Exemptions to the Privacy Act 
 Thus, biometrics systems relating 
to non-citizens entering and leaving the country, living within 
U.S. bounds, or located overseas, fall entirely outside the stat-
ute. 
The Privacy Act contains a number of general and specific 
exceptions, which prove particularly important in the realm of 
RBI. It could be argued that they obliterate any substantive 
impact that the Privacy Act might otherwise have on this rap-
idly-emerging field. 
First, the statute provides a general exemption for records 
maintained by the CIA.354 Although this provision is permis-
sive—not required—it provides for the head of any agency to 
promulgate rules to exempt (with some exceptions) systems of 
records maintained by the intelligence agency.355
The CIA, for instance, is not required to provide individu-
als with access to records.
 Thus, bio-
metric programs launched by the CIA—targeting U.S. citizens 
or non-citizens—could develop outside important aspects of the 
Privacy Act’s protections.  
356
 
 353. S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 75 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6916, 6993. 
 It is not required to establish and 
promulgate procedures whereby an individual can be notified 
(at the individual’s request) if the system of records contains a 
 354. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1). 
 355. Id. The exceptions include: subsection (b) (relating to the conditions of 
disclosure); subsections (c)(1) & (2) (requiring agencies to keep an accurate ac-
counting of the date, nature or purpose of any disclosures of the records and 
the name/address of the person/agency to whom the disclosure is made); and 
subsection (e)(4)(A)–(F) (publication in the Federal Register of the existence 
and nature of the system). Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 93-1416, at 19 (1974), 
reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6931 (“The Committee also wishes to 
stress that this section is not intended to require the C.I.A. and criminal jus-
tice agencies to withhold all their personal records from the individuals to 
whom they pertain. We urge those agencies to keep open whatever files are 
presently open and to make available in the future whatever files can be made 
available without clearly infringing on the ability of the agencies to fulfill their 
missions.”). 
 356. The following sections are included in the CIA’s general exemption 
from the requirements of the Privacy Act: 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3)–(4) (requiring 
an agency to disclose the information made in a request) and 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(d) (requiring each agency maintain records but exempted by the CIA). 
See id. § 552a(j).  
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record pertaining to him; nor must the agency provide proce-
dures on how to gain access to the records or to contest their 
content.357 The CIA is not required to reveal the categories of 
records in the system.358 Nor must it maintain records “with 
such accuracy, relevance, timeliness, and completeness as is 
reasonably necessary to assure fairness.”359 The agency cannot 
be subject to civil remedies for failing to comply with requests 
to obtain information or to amend records; nor may a court or-
der the agency to amend the individual’s record in any way.360 
The courts similarly may not enjoin the CIA from withholding 
records and order the production to the complainant.361
A second general exemption exists for criminal law en-
forcement records.
  
362 The legislation allows law enforcement 
agencies to exempt records relating to the identification of 
criminal offenders and alleged offenders, data compiled for 
criminal investigations, and reports developed at any stage of 
the criminal law process from arrest or indictment through re-
lease from supervision.363
Specific exemptions, located under subsection (k) of the leg-
islation, further reflect the statute’s general aversion to regu-
lating matters related to national security. The head of any 
federal agency may promulgate rules to exempt certain record 
systems where they deal with classified information or the 
 
 
 357. The following sections are similarly included in the general exemp-
tions for the CIA pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j)(1) of the Privacy Act: 
§ 552a(e)(4)(G)–(H) (requiring the agency to notify an individual that a record 
is being kept on him or her upon requires) and § 552a(f) (requiring the agency 
to establish rules to carry out the provisions of the section). See also id. 
§ 552a(e)(8) (reasonable effort to serve notice not required to be provided to 
individuals included in the system of records when any record is made availa-
ble to any person under compulsory legal process when such process becomes a 
matter of public record). 
 358. The CIA’s exemption also includes § 552a(e)(4)(I) (requiring an agency 
to maintain only information about an individual that is relevant to that agen-
cy’s purpose). Id. § 552a(j)(1). 
 359. Id. § 552a(e)(5). 
 360. The CIA’s exemption also includes § 552a(g)(1)–(2) which makes an 
agency liable under civil remedies for failing to comply with information re-
quests or to amend records. Id. § 552a(j)(1). 
 361. Section 552a(g)(3), allowing a court to enjoin an agency from withhold-
ing records, is also included the CIA exemption pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(j)(1). Id. Note, however, that criminal penalties for misuse of the infor-
mation may still apply. See id. 
 362. Id. § 552a(j)(2). 
 363. Id. 
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identity of informers.364 Under such circumstances, the federal 
agency may prevent information about the records from being 
made available to the individual named in the record.365 It is 
not, moreover, required to maintain only such information “as 
is relevant and necessary to accomplish a purpose of the agen-
cy” as required by statute or Executive Order.366 Precisely on 
such grounds, biometric systems have already been exempted 
from the Privacy Act via notices published in the Federal Reg-
ister.367 The statute also allows for a specific exemption for 
“other administrative purposes”—a provision that has already 
been put to use.368
The Department of Homeland Security’s automated bio-
metric identification system, for instance, incorporates infor-
mation pertaining to civil and criminal law, including immigra-
tion, investigations, national security, and intelligence 
activities.
 
369 It also contains unique identifiers and encounter 
history information which is used to place the biometric infor-
mation in context.370 The information is collected by or on be-
half of DHS and its components and may contain personally 
identifiable data collected by domestic or foreign intelligence 
agencies.371 In July 2006, DHS published a notice of proposed 
rulemaking to exempt portions of IDENT from one or more 
provisions in the Privacy Act.372 No responses were received by 
the Department, which made the rule final within a year of its 
initial filing.373
DHS made use of its overlapping authorities to claim mul-
tiple exemptions. The waiver, it claimed, was necessary to pro-
tect national security, immigration, border management, and 
 
 
 364. Id. § 552a(k)(5). 
 365. See id. (exempting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(c)(3), § 552a(d), and 
§ 552a(e)(4)(G)–(I)). Note also that the agency is therefore not required to es-
tablish procedures and rules whereby individuals can be notified as to whether 
such records are being maintained in regard to the individual or the proce-
dures to be followed to gain access to the same. See id. (exempting 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(f)). 
 366. Id. (exempting 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e)(1)). 
 367. See infra notes 371–78, 403–14 and accompanying text. 
 368. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(1)–(12). 
 369. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions, 72 Fed. Reg. 
38,749 (July 16, 2007) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. pt. 5). 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 38,751. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
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law enforcement activities.374 The Department evinced further 
concern that revealing such data would undermine the physical 
safety of informants and officials and lead to the release of clas-
sified information.375 Additionally, DHS stated, “[d]isclosure of 
information to the subject of the inquiry could also permit the 
subject to avoid detection or apprehension.”376 DHS followed 
this notice with a second proposal for rulemaking in July 2011, 
exempting the terrorist screening database from Privacy Act 
requirements because of criminal, civil, and administrative en-
forcement requirements.377 It applies, inter alia, to the US-
VISIT program for inclusion into the DHS Enterprise Biomet-
rics Service.378 Various other exemptions have been invoked for 
programs collecting biometric and other data.379
Later amendments to the Privacy Act have done little to 
increase its traction with regard to biometric collection sys-
tems. In 1988, for instance, Congress amended the Privacy Act 
to address the use of records in automated matching pro-
grams.
 
380 This statute added procedural requirements for agen-
cies to follow regarding computer matching activities.381 It pro-
vided for notice and the opportunity to refute adverse 
information before denial or termination of a benefit.382 The leg-
islation also required that agencies create data protection 
boards to oversee their computer matching activities.383
 
 374. Id. 
 Each 
agency proposing to make significant changes in their records 
systems or matching programs became required to provide ad-
equate notice to the Committee on Government Operations of 
 375. Id. 
 376. Privacy Act of 1974: Implementation of Exemptions; Department of 
Homeland Security/ALL—030 Use of the Terrorist Screening Database Sys-
tem of Records, 76 Fed. Reg. 39,315, 39,316 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 6 
C.F.R. pt. 5). 
 377. Id. at 39,315. 
 378. Id. at 39,316. 
 379. See, e.g., 75 Fed. Reg. 5,487 (Feb. 3, 2010) (to be codified at 6 C.F.R. 
pt. 5) (exempting most of the data incorporated into the Automated Targeting 
System-Passenger from Privacy Act requirements related to access to infor-
mation, opportunities to challenge data, and collection of information). 
 380. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 
100-503, § 5, 102 Stat. 2507, 2512–13 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. 
§ 552a(o)). 
 381. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(o)(1) (2006). 
 382. Id. § 552a(o)(1)(D). 
 383. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OVERVIEW OF THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974, at 3 
(2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/opcl/1974privacyact.pdf; see 5 
U.S.C. § 552a(a)(8)–(13), (e)(12), (o), (p), (q), (r), (u) (2006). 
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the U.S. House of Representatives, the Committee on Govern-
mental Affairs of the Senate, and the Office of Management 
and Budget, in order to facilitate an examination of the impact 
on individual privacy rights.384 Two years later, Congress en-
acted the Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Amend-
ments of 1990.385
3. E-Government Act of 2002  
 The statute clarified due process protections; 
however, the exemptions still apply. 
The E-Government Act of 2002386 ostensibly further en-
hanced protection of personal information. Signed by President 
George W. Bush in December 2002, the legislation entered into 
force in April 2003.387 The statute requires that agencies en-
gaged in collecting personal information issue a PIA prior to 
developing or procuring technologies that collect, maintain, or 
disseminate personally identifiable information from or about 
members of the public.388 While the changes did not address 
continual monitoring of programs underway, their design was 
to provide notice that such programs were being initiated. Any 
major systems changes entailing new privacy risks would re-
quire the publication of new PIAs.389 Examples might include 
converting paper-based fingerprint systems to electronic data-
bases or the use of new technologies to significantly alter how 
information is managed in the system—such as by using new 
relational database technologies or web-based processing to ac-
cess multiple data stores for biometric and other data.390 Simi-
larly, significant merging of government databases would re-
quire a PIA, as would new interagency activities.391 Other 
examples might include an alteration in the character of data 
or when new biometric or video surveillance information—or, 
indeed, contextual data—is added to the system.392
 
 384. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(r) (2006). 
 
 385. Computer Matching and Privacy Protection Amendments of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 7201, 104 Stat. 1388-334, 1388-334–35 (codified as 
amended at 5 U.S.C. 522a(p)). 
 386. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, 116 Stat. 2899. 
 387. Id. 
 388. Id. § 208, 116 Stat. at 2921–23.  
 389. See, e.g., Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir., OMB, to Heads of 
Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies, attachments A, B (Sept. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Bolten 
Memo], available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda_m03-22/#4. 
 390. See id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. Id. 
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PIAs must analyze and describe the information to be col-
lected (e.g., its nature and source), why the information is being 
collected, what its intended use is, with whom the information 
will be shared, what opportunities individuals have to deny or 
grant consent, how the information will be secured, and wheth-
er the initiative satisfies the definition of a system of records 
under the Privacy Act.393 PIAs must then consider the impact of 
the system on individual privacy.394
The statute, however, once again reflected congressional 
aversion to providing public oversight of matters related to na-
tional security. The statute allows for public dissemination of 
the PIA to be suspended for security reasons or to protect clas-
sified (i.e., national security), sensitive (e.g., potentially damag-
ing to a national interest, law enforcement, or free competi-
tion), or private information.
 
395
[O]perated by the Federal Government, the function, operation, or use 
of which—(A) involves intelligence activities; (B) involves cryptologic 
activities related to national security; (C) involves command and con-
trol of military forces; (D) involves equipment that is an integral part 
of a weapon or weapons system; or (E) subject to paragraph (2), is 
critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions.
 Under the legislation, national 
security systems are understood as telecommunications or in-
formation systems: 
396
The head of the agency or a designee may limit notice and re-
porting of tracking activities initiated by the agency which re-
late to authorized law enforcement, national security, and/or 
homeland security purposes.
 
397
4. Oversight and Guidance 
 
In light of the exemptions embedded in the legislation, one 
possible recourse for ensuring that agencies do not overreach 
might be through oversight bodies. Here, the White House Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB) bears the responsibility 
for overseeing implementation of the Privacy Act and the 
PIAs.398
 
 393. Id. 
 The role of this agency, however, has been extremely 
 394. Id. 
 395. E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 208(a)–(b), 116 
Stat. 2899, 2921–22; see also Bolten Memo supra note 389, at attachments A, 
C.  
 396. 40 U.S.C. § 11103(a)(1) (2006). 
 397. Bolten Memo, supra note 389.  
 398. See Guidance on Privacy Act Implications of “Call Detail” Programs, 
52 Fed. Reg. 12,290, 12,290 (Apr. 15, 1987); Guidelines on the Relationship of 
the Debt Collection Act of 1982 to the Privacy Act of 1974, 48 Fed. Reg. 15,556, 
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deferential to agencies exercising their powers of exemption. No 
recourse, moreover, to the courts exists. Executive agencies, in 
turn, have attempted to expand their authorities further by us-
ing exemptions in the Privacy Act to block requests for data 
under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).  
Under guidelines issued in 1975, OMB explained that the 
purpose of the measure was “to assure that personal infor-
mation about individuals collected by Federal agencies is lim-
ited to that which is legally authorized and necessary and is 
maintained in a manner which precludes unwarranted intru-
sions upon individual privacy.”399 The agency nevertheless gave 
enormous deference to the exemptions included in the act, men-
tioning them dozens of times with little or no further com-
ment.400 OMB also further expanded its reach, noting that the 
exemption which provided for notice of disclosure for “routine 
uses” could extend to foreign as well as state and local enti-
ties.401 Records exempted from the Act’s requirements could 
still “be disseminated to other agencies and incorporated into 
their non-exempt records systems” where they would continue 
to be exempt from notice and challenge.402
 
15,556 (Apr. 11, 1983); Office of Mgmt. & Budget: Implementation of the Pri-
vacy Act of 1974, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,741 (Dec. 4, 1975); Heads of Execu-
tive Departments and Establishments: Responsibilities for the Maintenance of 
Records About Individuals by Federal Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,948 
(July 9, 1975); Memorandum from Robert P. Bedell, Deputy Adm’r, Office of 
Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to the Senior Agency Officials for Info. Res. Mgmt., 
7 (May 24, 1985) [hereinafter Bedell Memo] (providing an update of Privacy 
Act Guidance); Bolten Memo, supra note 
  
389; Memorandum from Jacob J. 
Lew, Dir. of the OMB, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Dec. 20, 2000), 
available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/memoranda/m01 
-05.html; Memorandum from Sally Katzen, OMB, to Chief Information Offic-
ers (Nov. 3, 1997) available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/ 
files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/katzen_prwora.pdf; Memorandum from James T. 
Lynn, Dir. OMB, to Heads of Exec. Dep’ts & Agencies (Oct. 3, 1975). 
 399. Responsibilities for the Maintenance of Records About Individuals by 
Federal Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg. 28,948, 28,948 (July 9, 1975). 
 400. See, e.g., id. at 28,950 (listing the exemptions); id. at 28,954 (noting 
that an agency may not rely on a provision in FOIA for “refusing access to a 
record to the individual to whom it pertains, unless such refusal of access is 
authorized by an exemption within the Privacy Act”); id. at 28,956 (requiring 
that information be provided upon inquiry “unless the system has been ex-
empted from this provision pursuant to subsections (j) or (k)”); id. at 28,957 
(discussing denial of access and carving out an exception for the exemptions). 
For examples where OMB directly discussed the sections covering the exemp-
tions see id. at 28,971–73 (noting the exemption of CIA and criminal law en-
forcement records). 
 401. Id. at 28,955. 
 402. Id. at 28,971. 
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OMB noted that while judicial review could be sought for 
specific exemptions, no recourse to the courts could be sought 
for the general exemptions within the Act.403 Even the provision 
of judicial review of exemptions under subsection (k) was sub-
ject to conditions that diminished its effectiveness. For one, it 
was undermined by the initial decision to exempt the system of 
records: it would be difficult to even know about, much less to 
establish standing with regard to, a secret system of records. 
While notice might be required of the existence of the exemp-
tion, such notice could be abbreviated and made rather cryptic 
in its form.404 OMB explained that the only information that 
had to be released was the name of the system, the specific pro-
visions of the Act from which the system was to be exempted, 
and a general explanation of why.405 For another, even where 
the existence of and details about such systems could be estab-
lished, the courts were to narrowly consider “the propriety of 
the exemption which denies him access to his files.”406 That is, 
the courts could only inquire into whether the exemption itself 
could be justified—not the particular case at hand.407 In the 
realm of national security, assumedly, there would be little rea-
son to question whether such an exemption was a legitimate 
exercise of state authority.408
Starting in 1980, the Department of Justice began using 
the exemptions in numerous statutes governing disclosure to 
block requests submitted under the Freedom of Information 
Act.
 
409
 
 403. Id. at 28,969 (noting “that systems of records covered under subsection 
(j) (general exemptions) are permitted to be exempted from” judicial review). 
 In March 1984, OMB conformed its “guidance” on the re-
 404. See Responsibilities for the Maintenance of Records About Individuals 
by Federal Agencies, 40 Fed. Reg. at 28,948, 28,970 (July 9, 1975) (discussing 
subsections (a)(5), definitions, and (e)(4), public notice); see also id. at 28,971 
(noting that a description of the system to be exempted should only be de-
scribed where “possible”). 
 405. Id. at 28,971. 
 406. Id. at 28,969 (quoting S. REP. NO. 93-1183, at 82 (1974)). 
 407. OMB explained that, consistent with the Senate Report,“[i]n deciding 
whether the citizen has a right to see his file or to learn whether the agency 
has a file on him, the court would of necessity have to decide the legitimacy of 
the agency’s reasons for the denial of access, or refusal of an answer.” S. REP. 
NO. 93-1183, at 82 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6916, 6996. 
 408. In 1975, OMB issued further guidance, noting that the procedures for 
denials of requests to amend a record did not need to include a justice or judge; 
instead, any agency official meeting the statutory criteria would suffice. Im-
plementation of the Privacy Act of 1974, 40 Fed. Reg. 56,741, 56,743 (Dec. 4, 
1975). Statutory criteria are laid out in 5 U.S.C. § 2104(a) (2006). 
 409. See, e.g., Doug Letter et al., Business Confidentiality After Chrysler, 
  
480 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:407 
 
lationship between the Privacy Act and FOIA to the Govern-
ment’s litigating position, publishing the change in the Federal 
Register.410 The circuits subsequently split: the Third Circuit 
and the D.C. Circuit rejected the Government’s argument, 
while the Fifth and Seventh largely agreed that the Privacy Act 
should be considered a FOIA (b)(3) statute.411 In 1984, the Su-
preme Court was set to hear argument on the question, but be-
fore it could do so, Congress passed legislation amending the 
Privacy Act to exclude the statute from FOIA (b)(3) considera-
tions.412 OMB subsequently amended its guidance to conform to 
the new statute, erecting a wall between the two pieces of legis-
lation.413 Where requests cited the Privacy Act, they would be 
processed under that legislation alone; where they cited FOIA, 
they would be processed under that statute alone; and where 
they cited both or neither, two analyses would have to follow in 
considering whether to grant the request for information.414
As the digital revolution took hold, the executive branch 
came up with new and innovative ways to avoid the Privacy 
Act. This forced OMB to issue further guidance on the implica-
tions of call detail programs, inter-agency sharing of personal 
data, and the E-Government Act. OMB recognized the particu-
lar challenges posed by new technology, noting in 1987 the 
same problems that biometrics now pose to the applicability of 
the statute: 
 
  Rapid growth in automated data processing and telecommunica-
tions technologies has created new and special problems relating to 
the Federal Government’s creation and maintenance of information 
about individuals. At times, the capabilities of these technologies 
have appeared to run ahead of statutes designed to manage this kind 
of information, particularly the Privacy Act.415
 
FOIA UPDATE (1980), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_updates/ 
Vol_I_2/page4.htm. 
 
 410. Revised Supplemental Guidance on Implementation of the Privacy Act 
of 1974, 49 Fed. Reg. 12,338, 12,338 (Mar. 29, 1984). 
 411. Compare Provenzano v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 717 F.2d 799, 800 (3d 
Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 413 (1984), with Shapiro v. Drug Enforcement 
Agency, 721 F.2d 215, 223 (7th Cir. 1983), vacated, 105 S. Ct. 413 (1984), and 
Painter v. FBI, 615 F.2d 689, 690–91 (5th Cir. 1980), superseded by statute, 
CIA Information Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-477, 98 Stat. 2209 (1984) (codified 
at 5 U.S.C. § 552a), as recognized in Ely v. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
781 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 412. See H.R. Res. 5164, 98th Cong. (1984) (enacted). 
 413. See Bedell Memo, supra note 398. 
 414. Id. at 9. 
 415. Guidance on Privacy Act Implications of “Call Detail” Programs to 
Manage Employees’ Use of the Government’s Telecommunications Systems, 
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OMB has yet to issue specific guidance on the remote biometric 
identification systems that are beginning to proliferate. 
5. Privacy Impact Assessments Issued in Relation to 
Biometric Collection Systems 
Some PIAs have been issued for government biometric pro-
grams. Their chief value appears to be in informing the public 
that new initiatives aimed at gathering personal information 
are underway. They do little to address contrary concerns and 
lack any stringent mechanism to revise the programs. In addi-
tion, they are often so broad as to make the issuance of a PIA 
almost meaningless, in that they allow for significant further 
growth of the programs absent any further public notification.  
Agencies issuing PIAs are under no compulsion to address 
public concerns raised in the course of the PIA process. Already 
this effect can be seen in the biometrics realm. Starting in 
2004, for instance, the Department of Homeland Security be-
gan issuing PIAs for development of its US-VISIT program.416 
US-VISIT soon expanded to become the DHS repository for 
USCIS biometric (fingerprints and photographs) and biographic 
data, with its targets extending to include lawful permanent 
residents, individuals seeking asylum, and other aliens.417 In 
response to a notice of proposed rulemaking that paralleled the 
July 2006 PIA, DHS received a dozen submissions raising pri-
vacy concerns particularly in relation to “mission creep” (i.e., 
concern that US-VISIT was expanding beyond its original pur-
pose in a way that those participating in the program had not 
anticipated); the lack of judicial review for those impacted by 
US-VISIT; privacy during the inspection process; and false 
hits.418
 
52 Fed. Reg. 12,290, 12,291 (Apr. 20, 1987). 
 Responding to claims of mission creep, which appeared 
to be the area of greatest concern, Paul Hasson, the Acting Pri-
 416. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESS-
MENT FOR THE UNITED STATES VISITOR AND IMMIGRANT STATUS INDICATOR 
TECHNOLOGY (US-VISIT) PROGRAM IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE NOTICE OF 
PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE AUTHORITY TO PROCESS ADDITIONAL ALIENS 
IN US-VISIT 3 (2006) [hereinafter US-VISIT PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE 
AUTHORITY TO PROCESS ADDITIONAL ALIENS], available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_usvisit_addaliens.pdf; DHS, UPDATE FOR 
US-VISIT, supra note 115; DHS, INCREMENT 1, supra note 135. 
 417. See US-VISIT PROPOSED RULEMAKING ON THE AUTHORITY TO PRO-
CESS ADDITIONAL ALIENS, supra note 416. Note that the program exempts 
children under the age of fourteen and persons over the age of seventy-nine, 
but includes lawful U.S. permanent residents. Id. at 3. 
 418. Id.  
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vacy Officer, simply noted that DHS has always anticipated ex-
panding the program to cover all aliens entering the United 
States.419
As if to underscore biometric program expansion, in 2006, 
US-VISIT partnered with the United States Coast Guard 
(USCG) to develop new technologies to provide for biometrics 
collection and analysis capability at sea. Its first PIA, issued in 
November 2006, announced the Mona Passage Proof of Con-
cept, to be conducted November 2006 through April 2007.
 
420 The 
program held national security and law enforcement applica-
tions. The aims were to develop biometric capabilities for DHS, 
to provide information necessary to determine what to do in the 
case of undocumented alien interdictions, to deter human 
smuggling, and to help preserve life at sea.421 Handheld devices 
obtained fingerprint and digital images, connecting biometric 
information with biographic data (name, gender, date of birth, 
nationality, departure point, date of departure, destination 
point, and identity of the master of the U.S. vessel in ques-
tion).422 USCG vessels were equipped with stand-alone comput-
ers to correlate IDENT biometric data and associated finger-
print identification numbers with information corresponding to 
KSTs, aggravated felons, previous deportees, and recidivists 
from Caribbean countries.423 DHS updated the PIA in 2007 to 
reflect the new ability to update the biometric databases locat-
ed on the vessels by satellite technologies for analysis against 
the IDENT database.424 In 2008, DHS issued a new PIA to re-
flect the expansion of the program at sea, “along with other re-
mote areas where DHS operates.”425
 
 419. Id. 
 In addition to interdiction 
 420. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” MONA PASSAGE PROOF OF CONCEPT 2 
(2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ 
uscg_monapass.pdf. More than forty percent of the undocumented aliens in-
terdicted by the U.S. Coast Guard since 2004 tried to enter the United States 
illegally through the Mona Passage, located between the Dominican Republic 
and Puerto Rico. Id. at 3. 
 421. Id. at 2. 
 422. Id. at 3–4. 
 423. Id. at 4. The databases would be updated on a regular basis. Id. 
 424. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE 
FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” PROGRAM 2 (2007), available 
at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscg_monapass_ 
update.pdf. 
 425. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT ASSESSMENT FOR THE 
U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” 2 (2008), available at http://www.dhs. 
gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_uscg_biometrics.pdf. 
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of undocumented aliens and human trafficking, the systems 
would be directed toward smuggling, drug interdiction, and 
other illegal activities, thus including the relevant criminal his-
tory as well as other contextual and biographic data.426 Further 
updates were issued in 2011, reflecting technological advances 
in data transfer, storage, and encryption systems.427
The U.S. Coast Guard is not the only entity at DHS to is-
sue a PIA for emerging biometric programs. In July 2011, for 
instance, the Transportation Security Laboratory, which focus-
es on new technologies to detect and mitigate the threat of im-
provised explosive devices, issued a PIA that outlined its in-
tended use of iris and fingerprint recognition technology to 
determine access to the facility.
 
428
DOJ, like DHS, has also issued a limited number of PIAs 
in regard to biometric programs. The first such document ap-
pears to have been released in 2004, noting the proposed devel-
opment of a Biometrics-Reviewer Website/Database.
 
429 The goal 
of the program was to develop a prototype using information 
voluntarily submitted by individuals familiar with biometrics 
and interested in volunteering to serve on agency review pan-
els.430
 
 426. Id. at 2–3. 
 Data to be obtained included name, employment type, 
employer, biometric experience (e.g., years, type (operational, 
research and development, test, and evaluation)), and modality 
 427. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/USCG/PIA-002(C), PRIVACY IM-
PACT ASSESSMENT UPDATE FOR THE U.S. COAST GUARD “BIOMETRICS AT SEA” 2 
(2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ 
uscg_bass_update002c.pdf (describing the program’s replacement of encrypted 
flash drives with the use of USB cables and encrypted hard drives to minimize 
the gap in transferring biometric and biographic data from the system laptop 
to the onboard computer connected to the USCG Data Network Plus). Note 
that LEIDB/Pathfinder, another USCG database, does not contain any photo-
graphs or biometric data. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., PRIVACY IMPACT AS-
SESSMENT FOR THE LAW ENFORCEMENT INFO. DATA BASE (LEIDB)/ 
PATHFINDER 6 (2008), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/ 
privacy_pia_leidbpathfinder.pdf. 
 428. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., DHS/S&T/PIA-023, PRIVACY IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT FOR THE BIOMETRICS ACCESS CONTROL SYSTEM AT THE TRANS-
PORTATION SECURITY LAB 2 (2011), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/ 
assets/privacy/privacy-pia-st-tsl-bacs.pdf. 
 429. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA): Biometrics-Reviewer Web-
site/Database, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Dec. 21, 2004), http://www.fbi 
.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/biometrics [hereinafter FBI, Biometrics-
Reviewer]. 
 430. Id. 
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(facial recognition, fingerprints, etc.).431 The information, 
housed at a contractor facility, would be available to the Na-
tional Science & Technology Council’s Interagency Working 
Group on Biometrics.432
As aforementioned, a strong argument could be made that 
PIAs provide little by way of limits on the federal development 
of biometric programs. PIAs for the FBI’s Next Generation 
Identification program, for instance, are incomplete.
 
433
 
 431. Id. “Modality” refers to the application of biometric technologies to dif-
ferent physical attributes. NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL COMM. ON TECH. ET 
AL., PRIVACY AND BIOMETRICS: BUILDING A CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATION 12 
(2006), available at http://www.biometrics.gov/docs/privacy.pdf. Fingerprint, 
face, iris, voice, signature, and hand geometry are some examples of the differ-
ent types of modalities being developed. Id.  
 Thus 
far, it appears that only two PIAs have been issued specifically 
in relation to the program, which is designed with seven con-
 432. FBI, Biometrics-Reviewer, supra note 429. 
 433. Prior PIAs related to the FBI’s biometric technologies include: Privacy 
Impact Assessment: National Dental Image Repository, FED. BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION (2006), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/ndir 
(discussing the 2005 creation of the National Dental Image/Information Repos-
itory to facilitate the identification of missing, unidentified, and wanted per-
sons by drawing on dental records, photographs, and x-rays of the head and 
neck region); FBI, Biometrics-Reviewer, supra note 429; Privacy Impact As-
sessment: National DNA Index System (DNS), FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION (Feb. 24, 2004), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/dns 
(discussing CODIS and noting that, although a notice for the National DNA 
Index System had been published in the Federal Register in 1996, a PIA had 
not previously been submitted); Privacy Impact Assessment: Computer Aided 
Facial Recognition Project, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (Feb. 19, 2004), 
http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/facial-recognition (detail-
ing a study at the University of Sheffield in England and elsewhere on the sta-
tistics of facial landmark geometry); Privacy Impact Assessment: Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System National Security Enhance-
ments, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-
impact-assessments/iafis (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). An additional PIA listed 
on the FBI website lacks a date, but relates directly to biometric data. See Pri-
vacy Impact Assessment: DOJ/FBI-DHS Interim Data Sharing Model (iDSM), 
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-
assessments/idsm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (discussing pilot information-
sharing initiative between DHS and DOJ/FBI); see also Privacy Impact As-
sessment for the Fingerprint Identification Records System (FIRS) Integrated 
Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS) Outsourcing for Non-
criminal Justice Purposes–Channeling, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, (May 
5, 2008), http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/firs-iafis (discuss-
ing the use of biometric data for noncriminal justice purposes); Privacy Impact 
Assessment for the eGuardian Threat Tracking System, FED. BUREAU OF IN-
VESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/foia/privacy-impact-assessments/eguardian 
-threat (last visited Nov. 2, 2012) (discussing the use of suspicious activity re-
ports to determine which cases require investigative follow-up). 
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stituent parts and the incorporation of multiple new technolo-
gies in mind. 
The first PIA, released in June 2008, focused on the Inter-
state Photo System (NGI-IPS).434 The assessment highlighted 
enhancements to the existing system, such as the ability to re-
tain more photographic images, new opportunities for local, 
state, and federal agencies to submit photographs, and addi-
tional search capabilities, including automated searches using 
facial recognition technology.435 Although other government 
agencies claimed that additional public information they col-
lected would only be used to run against their existing data-
bases, and not kept for further data mining,436 the FBI’s PIA is 
written to include the retention and future use of such imag-
es—even in cases where direct identification from the images is 
not immediately possible.437
The PIA offers little to mitigate concern about the new sys-
tem beyond the FBI’s existing standards and policies.
  
438 At the 
same time, it recognizes significant gaps in protection of indi-
vidual privacy. Individuals may be unaware that their images 
have been recorded—much less stored.439 For information sub-
mitted by criminal agencies, individuals have no opportunity or 
right to refuse collection; for civil submissions, refusal to pro-
vide information may have an adverse impact on the govern-
ment benefit being requested.440 The PIA specifically notes that 
the FBI is not responsible for authenticating or correcting data 
in the system.441
 
 434. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifica-
tion (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 
 The Bureau’s clear aim, moreover, in adopting 
the system, is to allow the FBI to “provide additional function-
18. 
 435. Id. § 1.7. 
 436. See supra text accompanying notes 110–14. 
 437. Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifica-
tion (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18. 
 438. The PIA recognizes, for instance, that the FBI’s existing technology 
protections, vetting of system users, existing access policies, training require-
ments, and audit policies will be applied to the new system. Id. § 8.1–8.7. In 
turn, technologies to be incorporated into the IPS in the future will be “careful-
ly assessed and tested prior to implementation to ensure that is [sic] suffi-
ciently reliable to provide the desired benefits and minimize erroneous identi-
fications, coupled with only employing facial recognition technology as an 
investigative aid and not as a means of positive identification.” Id. § 9.3. 
 439. Id. § 6.1. 
 440. Id. § 6.2. 
 441. See id. § 7.4 (noting that, because the data on Identification Records is 
submitted by local, state and federal agencies, those agencies are responsible 
for authenticating and correcting that data). 
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ality to further law enforcement needs and keep pace with 
emerging technologies.”442
The second PIA, approved in January 2012, detailed the 
FBI’s deployment of the Repository for Individuals of Special 
Concern, one of the elements in AFIT (the revised IAFIS).
 It is therefore remarkable that the 
PIA itself fails to consider the many individual technologies 
currently involved in IPS in any detail—even as it merely rec-
ognizes that future technologies must simply be considered in 
terms of their level of accuracy, and not on their qualitative 
impact on knowledge generation. 
443 
This document similarly underscores the ineffectiveness of the 
Privacy Act. For instance, the PIA provides no detail on how bi-
ometric data obtained from local, state, federal, and foreign en-
tities will be analyzed to determine if it meets the various sub-
categories for inclusion in the RISC.444 It reports that infor-
mation is to be shared with a wide range of DOJ components, 
as well as external domestic and foreign agencies.445 The PIA 
notes that individuals will not generally have the opportunity 
or the right to decline to provide information—nor will their 
consent be required.446
 
 442. Id. § 9.3. 
 The PIA itself serves as notice to indi-
viduals that their information may be contained in the data-
 443. RISC PIA, supra note 201. During a meeting with the author, the FBI 
suggested that the PIA had been issued in July 2010. As of April 2012, howev-
er, no such document was publicly available. Following inquiries and formal 
requests for the PIA by the Georgetown Law Edward Bennett Library, in July 
2012, the FBI placed a PIA on its website, indicating that the document had 
been approved in January 2012. See id.; see also NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFI-
CATION, supra note 184, at 14 (indicating that the RISC PIA was under con-
sideration by the FBI’s Office of the General Counsel as of April 2009). 
 444. See RISC PIA, supra note 201, § 1.1 (“The RISC entails a specially col-
lated subset of existing records . . . of known or appropriately suspected terror-
ists, wanted persons, registered sexual offenders, and other special interest 
categories warranting more rapid biometric-based responses to inquiring users 
in time-critical situations . . . .”). 
 445. Within DOJ the primary recipients will be the FBI, the DEA, the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, the U. S. National Central Bureau (INTERPOL), and the United 
States Marshals Service (USMS). Id. § 4.1. It will be shared externally with 
various authorized federal, state, local, tribal, foreign, or international gov-
ernmental agencies. Id. § 5.1. 
 446. Id. § 6.2 (“Because the information in the RISC subset is collected in 
connection with law enforcement investigations and/or processing, individuals 
generally do not have the right or opportunity to object to the collection of this 
information by the source agencies, nor to the forwarding of the collected in-
formation for retention in the NGI and/or the NCIC, nor to the collation of the 
RISC subset from information in the NGI.”). 
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base.447 RISC-related information, moreover, is explicitly ex-
empted from individual access, accounting, and amendment 
provisions in the Privacy Act.448
No PIAs have been issued for the other NGI programs, 
such as Rap Back, the collection of palm prints, or the use of 
iris technologies. It is thus unclear, on the criminal side, 
whether the Rap Back program will focus on actual conviction 
for federal offenses or merely arrest. The civil component is 
equally undefined and apparently unlimited. Further, it is un-
clear whether the iris technologies incorporated in the program 
will be IBI-type iris scans or RBI-type scans. The use of such 
technologies in a remote manner shifts the discussion to one of 
investigation and intelligence gathering, raising issues more 
akin to FRT than to fingerprint or palm print biometrics. 
 
Beyond the above PIAs, it is not known publicly the degree 
to which the exemptions for classified, sensitive, or private in-
formation have prevented further notice of programs under-
way. In any event, the public’s ability to challenge any of the 
programs thus revealed or to gain further information about 
their operation is severely limited. 
Congress has thus provided the executive with extensive 
authority to gather personally identifiable information on indi-
viduals. Simultaneously, such limits as have been introduced 
on these authorities appear less than effective with regard to 
emerging biometric programs. But what about criminal stat-
utes, which regulate the collection of information on individuals 
in the context of investigation and prosecution—how do these 
treat emerging biometric programs? 
B. CRIMINAL LAW SURVEILLANCE 
Strict guidelines limit law enforcement’s access to personal 
information using electronic intercepts. The insertion of a judi-
cial check on the exercise of state authority prior to the collec-
tion of data grew directly from circumstances remarkably close 
to what is being recreated in the realm of RBI—i.e., concern 
about the use of new technologies to remotely obtain infor-
mation absent the target’s awareness. Existing statutes, how-
ever, fail to contemplate the type of technologies driving RBI. 
 
 447. Id. § 6.4. 
 448. Id. § 7.1. 
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1. Precursor to Title III: Katz, Berger, and the Federal 
Communications Act 
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets 
Act of 1968 governs aural surveillance.449 Congress enacted the 
statute in response to Katz v. United States and Berger v. New 
York, two landmark Fourth Amendment cases, as well as to 
perceived shortcomings in Section 605 of the Federal Commu-
nications Act.450
In Katz, the petitioner had been convicted of placing a bet 
from a telephone booth in Los Angeles to bookmakers in Miami 
and Boston, in violation of a federal statute.
 
451 At trial, the gov-
ernment introduced evidence derived from a listening device 
that had been attached to the outside of the phone booth.452 In a 
watershed decision authored by Justice Potter Stewart, the 
Court famously announced that “the Fourth Amendment pro-
tects people, not places.”453
 
 449. Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 
§§ 2510–2522 (2006). For judicial application of Title III to silent video surveil-
lance, see, for example, United States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 680 (8th Cir. 1994) 
(discussing application of Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 to silent video surveillance); United States v. Cuevas-
Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987) (same); United States v. Biasucci, 
786 F.2d 504, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1986) (discussing application of Title III and 
FISA to silent video surveillance); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 880–
81 (7th Cir. 1984). See also Roberto Iraola, Lights, Camera, Action!—
Surveillance Cameras, Facial Recognition Systems and the Constitution, 49 
LOY. L. REV. 773, 787 n.67 (2003) (“[W]hen the use of video camera surveil-
lance has involved circumstances protected by the Fourth Amendment, some 
courts have used Title III as a guide for the constitutional standard governing 
the application for a warrant.”); Denise Troy, Comment, Video Surveillance—
Big Brother May Be Watching You, 21 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 445, 449 (1989) (“Alt-
hough Title III and the 1986 Act do not include video surveillance, federal 
courts have borrowed the standards for audio surveillance when reviewing 
video surveillance orders.”). 
 In his concurrence, Justice Harlan 
laid out what has come to be known as the reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy test. The test incorporates a subjective element 
(i.e., that the individual in question exhibit an actual expecta-
tion of privacy), as well as an objective element (i.e., that the 
 450. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Berger v. New York, 388 
U.S. 41 (1967); see People v. Trief, 317 N.Y.S.2d 525, 529–30 n.5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1970), aff’d, 323 N.Y.S.2d 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). For a discussion of the 
shortcomings of the Federal Communications Act of 1934, see infra text ac-
companying notes 463–68. 
 451. Katz, 389 U.S. at 348. 
 452. Id. 
 453. Id. at 351. 
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expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as rea-
sonable).454
In the second case, Berger, the Supreme Court struck 
down
  
455 parts of a New York eavesdropping statute, which al-
lowed for the use of an electronic surveillance device for sixty 
days, with further extensions available without requiring a 
showing of probable cause.456
  The Fourth Amendment commands that a warrant issue not only 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, but also “par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized.” New York’s statute lacks this particulariza-
tion . . . . It lays down no requirement for particularity in the warrant 
as to what specific crime has been or is being committed, nor “the 
place to be searched,” or “the persons or things to be seized” as specif-
ically required by the Fourth Amendment.
 The Court explained: 
457
The statute in question failed to provide precise and discrimi-
nate requirements, making it possible to issue general war-
rants—instruments roundly rejected at the time of the found-
ing.
 
458 The New York statute omitted any requirement that the 
officer engaged in the surveillance believe that an offense had 
been, or was about to be, committed.459 It failed to require that 
the conversations, or property sought, be particularly de-
scribed.460 The statute lacked both notice and judicial supervi-
sion.461 This case, along with two cases decided immediately be-
fore Katz, underscored the importance of the warrant 
requirement in the Fourth Amendment.462
 
 454. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 
 455. Berger, 388 U.S. at 44. 
 456. Id. at 43 n.1. 
 457. Id. at 55–56. 
 458. Id. at 58 (“New York’s broadside authorization rather than being 
‘carefully circumscribed’ so as to prevent unauthorized invasions of privacy 
actually permits general searches by electronic devices, the truly offensive 
character of which was first condemned in Entick v. Carrington, 19 How. St. 
Tr. 1029, and which were then known as ‘general warrants.’ The use of the lat-
ter was a motivating factor behind the Declaration of Independence.”). 
 459. Id. at 56. 
 460. Id. 
 461. Id. at 60. 
 462. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 301 (1967) (contrasting the 
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement with the “indiscriminate, general 
authority” granted to searches in the Colonies); Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 
U.S. 523, 528–29 (1967) (“[O]ne governing principle [in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence] . . . has consistently been followed: except in certain carefully 
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 
“unreasonable” unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant.”); see 
also David A. Sklansky, Katz v. United States: The Limits of Aphorism, in 
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As with the current lack of a statutory regime in regard to 
RBI, the federal statutes in place at the time of Berger and 
Katz proved inadequate in addressing the use of new technolo-
gies. The Federal Communications Act provided that “no per-
son not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any 
communication and divulge or publish the existence, contents, 
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted 
communication to any person.”463 Within three years of the 
statute’s enactment, the Supreme Court fashioned an exclu-
sionary rule to prevent the introduction of illegal wiretap evi-
dence in federal court.464
Section 605 of the Federal Communications Act was sub-
ject to a number of limitations that significantly undermined 
its effectiveness. For instance, illegally obtained information 
could not be introduced into federal court, but it could be used 
in state proceedings.
  
465 The statute only applied, moreover, to 
information actually introduced into court—it did nothing to 
regulate the wider problem of wiretapping generally (and sub-
sequent use of such information outside of judicial proceed-
ings).466 Additionally, the statute only applied to wire communi-
cations, not to electronic bugs and other forms of 
eavesdropping.467 Attorney General Nicholas Katzenback con-
sidered it the “worst of all possible solutions.”468 General wire-
tapping could continue unabated, even as evidence obtained 
pursuant to probable cause was excluded from court.469
2. Title III/Title I 
 
Title III reached beyond Section 605 to govern federal and 
state officials, as well as private actors.470
 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE STORIES 223 (Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (describing the 
“combined effect” of Warden, Camara, and other cases). 
 It took the Supreme 
Court’s articulation of Fourth Amendment protections in Katz 
and Berger and inserted parallel provisions directly into the 
law. As originally drafted, however, Title III only applied to 
 463. Federal Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605, 48 
Stat. 1064, 1103 (1934) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 605 (2006)). 
 464. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 382 (1937). 
 465. DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL M. SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 
294 (3d ed. 2009). 
 466. Id. at 295. 
 467. Id. at 294. 
 468. Id. 
 469. Id. at 294–95. 
 470. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (2006). 
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wire and oral communications.471
ECPA understands “wire communications,” to which it 
gives the greatest degree of protection, as 
 Eighteen years after its intro-
duction, Congress extended it to apply to a third kind of com-
munication: electronic communications. This legislation, the 
1986 Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), con-
tained three parts which now form the statutory framework for 
intercepts: the Wiretap Act (Title I of the 1986 act, updating Ti-
tle III), the Stored Communications Act, and the Pen Register 
Act.  
any aural transfer made in whole or in part through the use of facili-
ties for the transmission of communications by the aid of wire, cable, 
or other like connection between the point of origin and the point of 
reception (including the use of such connection in a switching station) 
furnished or operated by any person engaged in providing or operat-
ing such facilities for the transmission of interstate or foreign com-
munications or communications affecting interstate or foreign com-
merce.472
An “aural transfer,” in turn, is understood as any communica-
tion, which, at any point, contains the human voice.
 
473 It does 
not need to be a major part of the communication, but merely 
present, in some form, at some point in the course of the com-
munication.474 Thus, communications that initially may have 
included a form of the human voice, but are subsequently 
translated into codes or tones, still count as aural transfers.475 
The aural transfer must take place, at some point, across a 
wire or similar medium, although it may be conveyed through 
air at some point as well.476
“Oral communication,” which receives slightly less protec-
tion, consists of communication “uttered by a person exhibiting 
an expectation that such communication is not subject to inter-
ception under circumstances justifying such expectation.”
 
477 
Such communications generally relate to the use of electronic 
recording devices, such as bugs.478
“Electronic communications” receive the lowest level of 
protection. They consist of all non-wire and non-oral communi-
 
 
 471. Id. § 2511. 
 472. Id. § 2510(1). 
 473. Id. § 2510(18). 
 474. Id.  
 475. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 465, at 297. 
 476. Id. 
 477. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (2006). 
 478. SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 465, at 297. 
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cations: i.e., “any transfer of signs, signals, writing, images, 
sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole 
or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectronic or 
photooptical system that affects interstate or foreign com-
merce.”479
With RBI generally, and FRT more specifically in mind, it 
is important to underscore again that the only types of commu-
nications explicitly covered include wire, oral, and electronic. 
Title III, as amended by Title I of the Electronic Communica-
tions Privacy Act, thus neither explicitly prohibits nor does it, 
on its face, overtly govern video surveillance.
 
480 The Senate Ju-
diciary Committee Report that accompanied the original stat-
ute, in reiterating Title III’s definition of “aural acquisition” 
took this one step further, stating “[o]ther forms of surveillance 
are not within the proposed legislation.”481
Some judges and legal scholars have suggested that, as a 
result, Title III/Title I are utterly irrelevant to consideration of 
video surveillance generally, much less the pairing of video 
surveillance with facial recognition systems, or the use of video 
in any sort of biometric identification. Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals thus asks,  
 
Does it really follow that, had Congress considered the matter direct-
ly, it would have treated video surveillance exactly the same as those 
methods it did consider? I find it more plausible to infer that by choos-
ing to exclude video surveillance from Title I Congress and the Presi-
dent were recognizing that it is different from wiretapping and should 
not be treated the same.482
In Judge Kozinski’s perspective, borrowing elements of Title 
III/Title I and applying it to video surveillance amounts to leg-
islative drafting—which the court should not be in the business 
of doing.
 
483 Instead, in Judge Kozinski’s view, the courts are 
driven back to a Fourth Amendment analysis, outside of statu-
tory considerations.484
Other judges, in contrast to Judge Kozinski, recognize the 
limitations in the statute and its apparent omission of video 
 
 
 479. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12). 
 480. See SOLOVE & SCHWARTZ, supra note 465, at 296 (discussing Title III 
of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968). 
 481. S. REP. NO. 90-1097, at 61 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
2112, 2178; see also United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 886 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 482. United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 545 n.4 (9th Cir. 1992) 
(Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 483. Id. at 542–45. 
 484. Id. at 542–51; see also discussion infra Part III (Fourth Amendment 
considerations). 
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surveillance, but then nevertheless apply it to this realm.485 
Central here are the statute’s procedural protections. In craft-
ing them, Congress drew from the Fourth Amendment discus-
sion in Katz and Berger.486
Under the Wiretap Act, to perform an intercept absent the 
subject’s consent, law enforcement officers must submit an ap-
plication to a judge detailing the facts relied upon that would 
justify an intercept order.
 
487 The officer must demonstrate: 
probable cause that the target has committed, is committing, or 
is about to commit an enumerated offense; particularity with 
regard to the type of crime, location, type of communication to 
be intercepted, and the identity of the target; necessity (other, 
less intrusive methods cannot provide the necessary infor-
mation); and minimization, so as to reduce the acquisition of ir-
relevant information.488
The statute also regulates both who can request the wire-
tap and how quickly it must be executed. For oral communica-
tions, the application must be made by a federal investigative 
or law enforcement officer with the approval of a high ranking 
official at the Department of Justice and subsequently signed 
by a federal judge.
 In light of the significant amount of in-
formation that can be obtained via technology, these 
requirements set a higher bar than is otherwise required for a 
standard search warrant. 
489 The order, in turn, must be executed with-
in thirty days (although an extension is possible).490
The statute gives aggrieved targets the ability to challenge 
the introduction of any wire or oral communication intercepted, 
or evidence derived therefrom, on the grounds that the commu-
nication was unlawfully intercepted, the warrant was insuffi-
cient on its face, or the interception was not made in conformity 
with the order of authorization.
 
491
 
 485. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 541–42. 
 In 1984, the Supreme Court 
carved out a good faith exception: where a law enforcement of-
ficer believed a warrant to be valid, the evidence would not be 
 486. See supra note 450 and accompanying text. 
 487. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(b) (2006). 
 488. Id. § 2518(3)(a) (probable cause); id. § 2518(3)(a), (b), (d),(4)(a)–(e) 
(particularity); id. § 2518(3)(c) (necessity); id. § 2518(5) (minimization). 
 489. Id. § 2518(11)(a)(i). Qualified individuals include the Attorney Gen-
eral, the Deputy Attorney General, the Associate Attorney General, an Assis-
tant Attorney General, or an acting Assistant Attorney General. Id. 
 490. Id. § 2518(5). 
 491. Id. § 2518(10)(a)(i)–(iii). 
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suppressed.492 In 1986, Congress amended the statute accord-
ingly.493 The exclusionary rule contained in the Wiretap Act 
does not apply to electronic communications. Wire or oral com-
munications that fall within the Wiretap Act are subject to ex-
clusion, but not when they come within the ambit of the Stored 
Communications Act (which does not have an exclusionary 
rule).494 Violations of the Wiretap Act may lead to up to five 
years imprisonment and a fine of up to $10,000 per violation.495
The Wiretap Act contains two important exceptions and a 
carve-out. First, consent immediately removes a subject from 
the statute’s protections.
 
496 An individual can therefore record 
his or her own conversations with others, even without inform-
ing others participating in the conversation—and can also al-
low law enforcement access to the conversation—without fall-
ing within the Wiretap Act requirements.497 A second exception 
contemplated by the Wiretap Act centers on information ob-
tained in the normal course of business. Communications ser-
vice providers are allowed “to intercept, disclose, or use” the 
communication in question “in the normal course of his em-
ployment while engaged in any activity which is a necessary in-
cident to the rendition of his service or to the protection of the 
rights or property of the provider of that service.”498 An addi-
tional carve-out limits the reach of the statute. Where criminal 
activity may be involved, a service provider is authorized to 
provide intercepted communications to the appropriate authori-
ties.499
In contrast to the Wiretap Act, the Stored Communications 
Act (SCA), as the name suggests, focuses on communications 
that are not being carried en route but, instead, are being 
 
 
 492. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922–23 (1984). 
 493. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 
§ 101(e), 100 Stat. 1848, 1853 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.§ 2518(10)(c)). 
 494. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2711 (2006). 
 495. Id. §§ 2511(4)(a), 2520(c)(2)(B). 
 496. Id. § 2511(2)(c). 
 497. It could be argued that the remote collection of biometric information 
does not involve consent. As is readily acknowledged by the federal agencies 
using RBI, targets in public spaces may be completely unaware that this in-
formation has been recorded, much less used in some way. See infra Part III 
(Fourth Amendment considerations). 
 498. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(i) (2006). 
 499. See id. § 2511(3)(b)(iv). 
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stored.500 This legislation makes it an offense to intentionally 
access a facility through which electronic communication ser-
vices are being provided, or access and obtain, alter, or prevent 
authorized access to wire or electronic communications.501 Elec-
tronic storage is understood in the same way as in the Wiretap 
Act, i.e., “any temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or elec-
tronic communication incidental to the electronic transmission 
thereof.”502 The violation does not apply to the individual or or-
ganization providing the wire or electronic service; however, 
disclosure of the contents of stored communications by service 
providers is forbidden.503 There are a few exceptions to the non-
disclosure requirement, one of which relates to providing the 
information to law enforcement in a criminal law context.504
The standards under the SCA are less rigorous than those 
applied under the Wiretap Act. Less severe criminal penalties 
apply.
  
505 There is no exclusionary rule for information illegally 
obtained.506 The judicial process, moreover, for obtaining access 
to stored communications, is less rigorous than the procedure 
adopted for intercepts under the Wiretap Act. Under the SCA, 
for information held less than 180 days, the government is re-
quired to obtain a warrant supported by probable cause.507 If 
the information has been held more than 180 days, the gov-
ernment must merely provide prior notice to the subscriber and 
obtain an administrative subpoena, a grand jury subpoena, a 
trial subpoena, or a court order.508
 
 500. Id. §§ 2701–2711. See generally Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the 
Stored Communications Act, and a Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1208 (2004) (explaining the basics of the SCA). 
 With subscriber notice, prob-
able cause is not required for the latter; instead, it requires on-
ly “specific and articulable facts showing that there are reason-
able grounds” to believe communications are relevant to a 
 501. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(a)(1)–(2) (2006). 
 502. Id. § 2510(17)(A). 
 503. Id. § 2702(a)(1)–(3). 
 504. Id. § 2702(b)(7). 
 505. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2707 (2006) (SCA penalties), with id. 
§§ 2511(4)(a), 2520(c)(2)(B) (Wiretap Act penalties). 
 506. But see id. § 2707 (setting forth a right to a civil action for equitable 
relief, damages, and attorney’s fees). 
 507. Id. § 2703(a). 
 508. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
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criminal investigation.509 Absent subscriber notice, however, the 
government is required to obtain a warrant.510
As aforementioned, neither Title III nor the 1986 Electron-
ic Communications Privacy Act specifically addresses video 
surveillance. A case could be made, however, that where the 
government intercepts a wire or electronic communication that 
includes video images, such as emailing a video clip from an 
iPhone or conducting a conversation by webcam, then the Wire-
tap Act applies. The storage of such information, moreover, 
would fall within the Stored Communications Act. But it is 
questionable the extent to which the statutory framework ap-
plies to RBI. The actual use of a surveillance camera mounted 
in a public space does not involve the interception of communi-
cations (as defined under the Wiretap Act, involving use of a 
cable or wire).
  
511 Nor is the act of surveillance indicative of 
stored communications or images. To the extent that RBI thus 
depends upon video surveillance for its execution (as, for in-
stance, in some cases of the application of FRT), it does not ap-
pear to necessarily come within this regime. To the extent that 
the surveillance involves the use of audio, it may fall within 
oral communications, and thus be subject to the Wiretap 
Act512
Importantly, every circuit to address silent video surveil-
lance has concluded that Title III/Title I does not apply.
—but here, a question presents itself as to whether indi-
viduals, by entering public space, are giving their consent to be 
observed. Silent video surveillance, in turn, does not appear to 
be covered. 
513
 
 509. Id. § 2703(d). Note that notice can be delayed up to ninety days. Id. 
§ 2705(a). 
 Nev-
ertheless, courts look to the standards laid out in Title III/Title 
I and borrow them for analysis. In other words, Title III/Title I 
 510. Id. § 2703(b). 
 511. Id. § 2510(i). 
 512. Id. § 2510(2). 
 513. United States v. Larios, 593 F.3d 82, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2010); United 
States v. Falls, 34 F.3d 674, 679–80 (8th Cir. 1994); United States v. 
Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 538–41 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Mesa-
Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436–37 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Cuevas-
Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir. 1987); United States v. Biasucci, 786 
F.2d 504, 508–09 (2d Cir. 1986); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 880–81 
(7th Cir. 1984); see United States v. Ianniello, 621 F. Supp. 1455, 1466–67 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Order Authorizing Interception of Oral Commc’ns & 
Videotape Surveillance, 513 F. Supp. 421, 422–23 (D. Mass. 1980); Sponick v. 
Detroit Police Dep’t, 211 N.W.2d 674, 690 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973); People v. 
Teicher, 422 N.E.2d 506, 513 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1981). 
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is seen as providing “guidance in implementing the [F]ourth 
[A]mendment” in an area514
(1) [T]he judge issuing the warrant must find that “normal investiga-
tive procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear 
to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous,” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2518(3)(c); (2) the warrant must contain “a particular description of 
the type of [activity] sought to be [videotaped], and a statement of the 
particular offense to which it relates,” id. § 2518(4)(c); (3) the warrant 
must not allow the period of [surveillance] to be “longer than is neces-
sary to achieve the objective of the authorization, []or in any event 
longer than thirty days” (though extensions are possible), id. 
§ 2518(5); and (4) the warrant must require that the [surveillance] “be 
conducted in such a way as to minimize the [videotaping] of [activity] 
not otherwise subject to [surveillance] . . .,” [sic] id.
 not specifically covered by Title 
I/Title III. Even in circuits where there is pressure not to adopt 
Title I as the standard, recourse to the statute ensues. The 
Ninth Circuit, for instance, declined to use every technical re-
quirement of Title I; yet it nevertheless insisted upon the pres-
ence of probable cause plus four of the statutory requirements 
in the Wiretap Act:  
515
These four requirements—those of the best alternative, partic-
ularization, limited duration, and minimization—for the Ninth 
Circuit, “comport with the demands of the Constitution, and 
guard against unreasonable video searches and seizures.”
 
516 
They also reflect the statutory framing put forward in the 
Wiretap Act.517
The statutory framing for criminal law thus fails to ac-
count for the types of technologies used in remote biometric 
identification. But what of the national security realm? Is there 
a better statutory construction here to which we could turn?  
 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY SURVEILLANCE 
The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act provides 
the principal framework for surveillance conducted under the 
guise of national security.518
 
 514. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d at 1438. 
 This statute, and rules subse-
 515. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d at 542 (additions and omissions in original) 
(quoting Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 252). 
 516. Id.  
 517. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(A)–(D), (4)(A)–(E), (5) (2006). 
 518. At the time of the reconciliation debates between the Senate and 
House bills, the House sought to include language making the Act the “exclu-
sive statutory” means for the Executive to conduct electronic surveillance—
implying that the President had inherent surveillance powers outside the 
statute. The Senate rejected this notion, saying that if the President were to 
engage in electronic surveillance outside the parameters of FISA, upon judicial 
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quently implemented by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, contemplates the use of a range of techniques.519
1. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act 
 It is un-
clear whether it covers the types of technologies used in remote 
biometric surveillance. Even if RBI is included as electronic 
surveillance within the meaning of the statute, restrictions 
placed on the collection of information within FISA would be 
difficult to maintain with regard to many of the technologies 
under development. 
At the most general level, FISA applies to surveillance 
conducted in the United States.520 (Surveillance conducted 
overseas falls within the President’s inherent constitutional au-
thority, as channeled through Executive Order 12333.)521 The 
threshold question for FISA thus turns on the Court’s Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence—i.e., whether the surveillance in 
question implicates a reasonable expectation of privacy in re-
gard to which a warrant would be required.522
 
review the Supreme Court should treat the President’s actions as consistent 
with category three of Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer: i.e., against the expressed intent of Congress. 343 U.S. 
579, 637–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). The Senate view carried. 124 
CONG. REC. 33,787 (1978). Note though that the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 
added a new exclusive means provision. See FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 102, 122 Stat. 2436, 2459 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1812). 
 Part III.B of this 
Article delves into this question—noting, in the process, that 
the Fourth Amendment standard applied in national security is 
significantly weaker than that adopted in the world of criminal 
law. Assuming, arguendo, that we are within the meaning of 
 519. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1)–(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 520. See 2008 FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-261, § 101, 
122 Stat. 2436, 2448 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1812). But see 50 U.S.C. 
§ 1801(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (amending FISA to apply to non-U.S. per-
sons outside the United States in some circumstances). 
 521. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941, 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981). In 
limiting FISA to domestic surveillance, Congress did not explicitly authorize 
the President to conduct surveillance overseas; it simply left the President’s 
consitutional authority unchecked, but also unsupported. See also NAT’L SEC. 
AGENCY, UNITED STATES SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE DIRECTIVE 18, § 4.1(d)(1) 
(1993) (outlining surveilance authorities relative to the National Security 
Agency). 
 522. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(4) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011) (“[T]he 
installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device in 
the United States for monitoring to acquire information, other than from a 
wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law 
enforcement purposes.”).  
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the Fourth Amendment, however, the central question is 
whether the techniques employed in remote biometric identifi-
cation fall within FISA. The answer is far from clear. 
FISA, as amended, authorizes the Executive Branch, sub-
ject to certain conditions, to collect information on foreign pow-
ers and agents of foreign powers, as well as groups “engaged in 
international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor.”523 
Its cornerstone is the definition it adopts of electronic surveil-
lance, understood in two distinct ways. First, as “the acquisi-
tion by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device 
of the contents of any wire or radio communication,”524
 
 523. Id. § 1801(a)(4). FISA has been amended and its temporary 
provisions extended by the following instruments: Cable Communications 
Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, § 6(3), 98 Stat. 2779, 2804; Intelligence 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, §§ 601–603, 112 
Stat. 2396, 2404–13 (1998); Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2001, Pub. L. No. 106-567, §§ 602–604, 114 Stat. 2831, 2851–53 (2000); USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, §§ 901, 1003, 115 Stat. 272, 387, 
392; Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-108, 
§ 314(a), 115 Stat. 1394, 1402 (2001); 21st Century Department of Justice 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 305(b), 116 Stat. 1758, 1782 (2002); 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 898, 116 Stat. 2135, 
2258 (2002); Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. 
L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638; USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, §§ 105–106, 120 Stat. 192, 
195–200 (2006); USA PATRIOT Act Additional Reauthorizing Amendments 
Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109-178, §§ 3–4, 120 Stat. 278, 278–81; Protect America 
Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, 121 Stat. 552; FISA Amendments Act of 2008, 
Pub. L. 110-261, 122 Stat. 2436 (2008); Department of Defense Appropriations 
Act, 2010, Pub. L. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409 (2009); An Act to Extend Expiring 
Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 
2005 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 until 
February 28, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-141, 124 Stat. 37 (2010); FISA Sunsets 
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5 (2011); PATRIOT Sunsets 
Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (2011) (extending the 
temporary provisions until June 1, 2015). 
 and sec-
ond, as “the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or 
other surveillance device in the United States for monitoring to 
acquire information, other than from a wire or radio communi-
 524. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(f)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011); see also id. § 1801(f)(2) 
(“[T]he acquisition by an electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of 
the contents of any wire communication to or from a person in the United 
States, without the consent of any party thereto, if such acquisition occurs in 
the United States, but does not include the acquisition of those communica-
tions of computer trespassers that would be permissible under section 
2511(2)(i) of title 18 . . . .”); id. § 1801(f)(3) (“[T]he intentional acquisition by an 
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio 
communication . . . .”). For the purpose of this discussion, I treat these three 
definitions under a similar category, as they all deal specifically with wire or 
radio communications. 
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cation.”525
Central to the concept of electronic surveillance in the first 
sense is the role of communication—that is, information “sent 
by or intended to be received by a particular” person.
 RBI technologies do not appear to fall within the first 
category; they may or may not be currently included in the sec-
ond.  
526 It thus 
requires the presence of a sender and a receiver. The statute 
further defines “wire communication” in terms of a common 
carrier.527
Remote biometric identification involves the recording of 
data—but not in the course of communication. Instead, it cre-
ates a record of an individual’s physical characteristics, or his 
or her presence in certain locations or in the proximity of other 
individuals.
  
528 It is not limited to communication across a wire, 
cable or like connection. Even where aural recording may occur 
in conjunction with biometric identification of two or more per-
sons, such recording takes place not by intercepting a commu-
nication while it is being carried by a wire, cable, or other like 
connection, but by merely recording an open-air conversation. 
There is no common carrier involved. RBI therefore does not 
appear to fall within the current understanding of electronic 
surveillance in the first sense.529
It may, however, fall within the statute’s second basic un-
derstanding—i.e., the installation or use of a surveillance de-
vice used to acquire information other than from a wire or radio 
communication. What is not clear is whether biometric technol-
 
 
 525. Id. § 1801(f)(4). 
 526. Id. § 1801(f)(1). 
 527. Id. § 1801(l) (“[A]ny communication while it is being carried by a wire, 
cable, or other like connection furnished or operated by any person engaged as 
a common carrier in providing or operating such facilities for the transmission 
of interstate or foreign communications.” (emphasis added)). The statute does 
not define “radio communication.” See id. 
 528. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(1) might be read as covering biometric information 
obtained from private entities. The statute addresses orders for “tangible 
things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items)” sought 
as part of an investigation “to obtain foreign intelligence information not con-
cerning a United States person or to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such investigation of a United 
States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of activities protected by 
the first amendment to the Constitution.” Id. Photographs, video, fingerprint, 
and other data could be considered tangible things under this definition. See 
also USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287 (2001) 
(replacing former §§ 501–503 in Title V of FISA with new §§ 501–502 of FISA). 
 529. Similar concerns plague criminal provisions meant to govern surveil-
lance. See discussion supra Part II.B. 
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ogies have been included within FISA’s remit. Within this 
broader framing, the statute itself does not limit the types of 
technologies used.530 But in 2010, Chief Judge John Bates of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court issued revised Rules of 
Procedure, which specifically addressed new and emerging 
technologies.531 The Court currently requires the government to 
submit a legal memorandum, prior to the use of any new sur-
veillance or search techniques which “(1) explains the tech-
nique; (2) describes the circumstances of the likely implementa-
tion of the technique; (3) discusses any legal issues apparently 
raised; and (4) describes the proposed minimization procedures 
to be applied.”532 The memo must accompany the government’s 
initial application. A separate memorandum must be submitted 
in support of the government’s position on each issue of first 
impression.533
Even if the collection of biometric information falls within 
the definition of electronic surveillance, a question exists as to 
whether FISA’s other requirements could be met by RBI. Con-
sider, for instance, the statute’s strictures with regard to (a) the 
target of surveillance, (b) the length of the warrant issued by 
the court, and (c) the statute’s minimization requirements.
 The most that could be said here is that it is not 
clear whether any legal memo has been provided with regard to 
technologies implicated in remote biometric identification. No 
information is publicly available one way or the other. 
534 In 
identifying the target of surveillance, FISA sharply distin-
guishes between U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons.535 To en-
gage in surveillance of a U.S. person, there must be probable 
cause not that the individual engaged, is engaged, or will en-
gage in illegal acts (i.e., the warrant requirement under Title 
III), but that the individual is a foreign power or an agent 
thereof.536
 
 530. 50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 Inclusion as an agent of a foreign power occurs where 
 531. U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT 11 (on file with 
author).  
 532. Id. 11(b). 
 533. Id. 11(d). 
 534. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a)(1) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 535. Id. § 1801(a). 
 536. Id. § 1802(a)(1). A “foreign power” may be:  
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not 
recognized by the United States; (2) a faction of a foreign nation or 
nations, not substantially composed of United States persons; (3) an 
entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or gov-
ernments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government or 
governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activi-
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one of two conditions hold: either the target is engaged in espi-
onage and clandestine intelligence activities; or the target is 
engaged in sabotage or international terrorism.537 For a non-
U.S. person to qualify as an agent of a foreign power, he or she 
must instead act in the United States as an officer or employee 
of a foreign power or member of an international terrorist 
group, conduct clandestine intelligence activities within domes-
tic bounds, or engage in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefor.538 The duration of the warrant similarly 
differs based on whether the target is a U.S. person or not. For 
the former, the period of surveillance is granted up to 90 
days.539 For the latter, the warrant can be extended for up to 
120 days, with renewal for a period of up to one year.540 Mini-
mization, moreover, is only required for information concerning 
U.S. persons.541
While the distinction between U.S. persons and non-U.S. 
persons, like the distinction between foreign powers and agents 
thereof, may be sustainable for IBI where the target is limited 
and specific, it is less applicable to RBI where the indiscrimi-
nate scanning of multiple individuals occurs. It may be impos-
sible to know, in a public space, which individuals are U.S. per-
sons and which individuals are not. FRT, iris recognition 
technology, and other remote technologies serve to identify 
multiple individuals in crowds—in the process, necessarily 
scanning out some people, even as they help to identify the tar-
get. The same difficulties evinced with regard to the target of 
the surveillance extend to the duration of an order. Admittedly, 
there is no limit to the number of times a FISA order may be 
renewed.
 
542
 
ties in preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organization, 
not substantially composed of United States persons; or (6) an entity 
that is directed and controlled by a foreign government or govern-
ments. 
 However, the fact that there is an order, and judi-
cial approval, underscores the distinction. Similarly, which 
Id. § 1801(a)(1)–(6). 
 537. A third category, less significant than the first two, includes persons 
who enter the United States under a false identity. Such U.S. persons must 
knowingly enter the country under a false identity “for or on behalf of a for-
eign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assume[] a false or 
fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power.” Id. § 1801(b)(2)(D). 
 538. Id. § 1801(b)(1). 
 539. Id. § 1805(e)(1). 
 540. Id. § 1805(e)(1)–(2). 
 541. Id. § 1801(h)(1). 
 542. See id. § 1805(d)(2). 
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minimization procedures need to be adopted depends upon be-
ing able to distinguish the target—a process that can occur (in 
the biometrics realm) only after multiple targets have been 
scanned. 
Other requirements in the statute similarly depend upon 
this distinction. Attorney General certification, for instance, al-
lows the Executive to bypass the Federal Intelligence Surveil-
lance Court (FISC), for one year, where electronic surveillance 
is directed at communications between foreign powers or from 
property under their control.543 In the process, the Attorney 
General must assert that “no substantial likelihood”544 exists 
that a U.S. person will be party to the communications and 
that every effort will be made to minimize the acquisition, re-
tention, and dissemination of information relating to U.S. per-
sons.545
At a more general level, it is worth recognizing that the 
very nature of RBI runs counter to the specificity that charac-
terizes FISA. The application to FISC for electronic surveil-
lance, for instance, must include either the identity of the tar-
get (if known) or a description of the target.
 In the case of RBI, it is unlikely that that this certifica-
tion would be sufficient. For information gleaned from public 
space—particularly within the United States—the likelihood 
that a U.S. person may be involved may be substantial. 
546 It must include a 
statement of facts supporting the claim that the target is a for-
eign power (or an agent thereof) and that the facilities to be 
monitored currently are, or are expected to be, used by a for-
eign power or its agent.547 The application must describe the 
“nature of the information sought and the type of communica-
tions or activities to be subjected to the surveillance.”548 A des-
ignated national security officer must certify that a significant 
purpose of the surveillance is to collect foreign intelligence and 
that “such information cannot reasonably be obtained by nor-
mal investigative techniques.”549 The application must specify 
how the surveillance is to be effected (including whether physi-
cal entry is required)550
 
 543. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 and include all previous applications 
 544. Id. § 1802(a)(1)(B). 
 545. Id. § 1801(h)(1). 
 546. Id. § 1804(a)(1)–(2). 
 547. Id. § 1804(a)(3)(A)–(B). 
 548. Id. § 1804(a)(5). 
 549. Id. § 1804(a)(6)(c). 
 550. Id. § 1804(a)(7). 
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involving the “persons, facilities, or places specified in the ap-
plication,” as well as actions taken by the court on these cas-
es.551 The document includes an estimate of time required for 
surveillance and requires an explanation why authority should 
not terminate at the end of the requested period.552
What these requirements have in common is that they are 
specific, targeted, and limited—characteristics more consistent 
with IBI than with RBI. The act of collecting and storing broad 
amounts of information on a number of individuals who do not 
fit the requirements laid out in FISA as targets of surveillance 
gives rise to concern about whether, and to what degree, re-
mote biometric identification systems could be structured to 
meet the approach adopted by Congress in passing the statute. 
  
To summarize the statutory inquiry then, Congress has 
granted the Executive broad authorities to obtain personally 
identifiable information. While the Privacy Act and the E-
Government Act regulate records systems, they contain excep-
tions within which biometrics systems appear to fall. In the 
criminal realm, Title III and Title I are looked to for instances 
of wire, oral, and electronic communications. Yet neither stat-
ute directly regulates or prohibits silent video surveillance un-
dertaken for domestic purposes, while questions of consent, an 
exception in the Wiretap statute, bedevil audio recordings. As 
for national security surveillance, FISA contemplates the use of 
electronic surveillance in two primary senses. RBI does not fall 
subject to the first; it may or may not currently be covered by 
the second. Even if biometric programs are governed by FISA, 
there are still significant hurdles to cross with regard to the 
statute’s reliance on distinguishing between U.S. persons and 
non-U.S. persons—to say nothing of the way in which the spe-
cific, limited, targeted nature of FISA runs directly contrary to 
the types of activities subsumed within RBI. We are thus driv-
en back upon constitutional considerations: specifically, the 
Fourth Amendment.553
 
 551. Id. § 1804(a)(8). 
 
 552. Id. § 1804(a)(9). 
 553. United States v. Koyomejian, 970 F.2d 536, 541–42 (9th Cir.1992); see 
also United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1436–37 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(“There must be probable cause supported by an oath or affirmation and a par-
ticular description of the place, persons, and things to be searched and 
seized.”); United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d 248, 251–52 (5th Cir. 
1987) (noting that since Title III does not include video surveillance tech-
niques, the court will turn to the Fourth Amendment for guidance); United 
States v. Biasucci, 786 F.2d 504, 510 (2d Cir. 1986) (“[T]he Torres court bor-
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III.  FOURTH AMENDMENT CONSIDERATIONS   
Despite the direct attack mounted by remote biometric 
technologies on the core of how we conceive of privacy, Fourth 
Amendment doctrine provides little by way of relief. Perhaps 
the most vivid example is the recent decision in United States 
v. Jones,554
Sharply increasing this concern are the myriad technolo-
gies that are under development but have not yet come of age. 
That is to say, this Article has thus far addressed what could be 
considered mainstream biometric technologies with RBI impli-
cations, such as facial recognition, iris scanning, fingerprinting, 
and audio signatures. But what happens when we move into 
future modalities, such as gait technologies, hormone sniffing, 
and other signature detection technologies? Hyperspectral im-
agery, for instance, initially developed for mining and geology, 
has evolved to encompass applications in both national security 
and disease surveillance.
 which emphasized the doctrine of trespass—a con-
cept irrelevant for the types of issues that arise with regard to 
RBI. The Court’s treatment of other remote technologies, such 
as aerial surveillance and thermal imaging, prove similarly in-
adequate in contemplating the challenge mounted by RBI. The 
blurring of the line between criminal law and national security, 
moreover, and the Court’s weaker standards in relation to the 
latter, give rise to further concern.  
555 Like facial recognition, the number 
of patents being granted in this realm steadily increases.556
 
rowed four provisions of Title III implementing the Fourth Amendment’s re-
quirements of particularity and minimization as a ‘measure of the govern-
ment’s constitutional obligation of particular description in using television 
surveillance to investigate crime.’” (quoting United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 
875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984)); Torres, 751 F.2d at 882–86 (stating that Title III has 
implemented the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement). 
 And 
 554. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012). 
 555. E.g., Method & Sys. for Detecting Anomalies in Multispectral and 
Hyperspectral Imagery Employing the Normal Copositional Model, U.S. Pa-
tent No. 7,263,226 col.1 l.30–45 (filed Dec. 4, 2006) (issued Aug. 28, 2007) 
(“Hyperspectral sensors are a new class of optical sensor that collect a spec-
trum from each point in a scene. They differ from multi-spectral sensors in 
that the number of bands is much higher (twenty or more), and the spectral 
bands are contiguous. For remote sensing applications, they are typically de-
ployed on either aircraft or satellites . . . . Hyperspectral sensors have a wide 
range of remote sensing applications including: terrain classification, envi-
ronmental monitoring, agricultural monitoring, geological exploration, and 
surveillance. They have also been used to create spectral images of biological 
material for the detection of disease and other applications.”).  
 556. E.g., Adaptive Wavelet Coding of Hyperspectral Imagery, U.S. Patent 
No. 6,539,122 (filed Mar. 30, 1998) (issued Mar. 25, 2003); Multispectral or 
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like the other forms of RBI contemplated in this Article, the 
Court’s current jurisprudence has yet to grapple with the con-
sequences, for RBI represents something different in kind—not 
degree—from what has come before. 
A. THE SHADOW MAJORITY IN UNITED STATES V. JONES  
The Fourth Amendment provides that “[t]he right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be vio-
lated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be 
seized.”557 In United States v. Jones, the Court concluded that 
the placement of a global positioning device constituted a 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.558 The 
majority opinion, written by Justice Scalia, zeroed in on the in-
stance of trespass that resulted from the placement of the de-
vice on the vehicle itself.559 Justice Sonia Sotomayor, in her con-
currence, did suggest that the Fourth Amendment was 
concerned with rather more than just “trespassory intrusions 
on property.”560 She explained, “even in the absence of a tres-
pass, ‘a Fourth Amendment search occurs when the govern-
ment violates a subjective expectation of privacy that society 
recognizes as reasonable.’”561 But, for Justice Sotomayor, “Katz’s 
reasonable-expectation-of-privacy test augmented, but did not 
displace or diminish, the common-law trespassory test that 
preceded it.”562
Setting aside the straightforward opinion and concurrence 
on which the case was decided, it is possible to read Jones as a 
split opinion, or as having what might be considered a shadow 
majority. Justices Scalia, John Roberts, Anthony Kennedy, 
Clarence Thomas, and Sotomayor applied the trespassory test 
 She thus joined the majority on what she con-
sidered to be narrower grounds—a sort of constitutional de 
minimis, which presented itself in the immediate case. 
 
Hyperspectral Imaging Sys. & Method for Tactical Reconnaissance, U.S. Pa-
tent No. 6,831,688 (filed Apr. 8, 2002) (issued Dec. 14, 2004); Sys. & Methods 
for Registering Reflectance and Fluorescence Hyperspectral Imagery, U.S. Pa-
tent No. 7,181,055 (filed Aug. 15, 2003) (issued Feb. 20, 2007). 
 557. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 558. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
 559. Id. at 949–54. 
 560. Id. at 954 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 561. Id. at 954–55 (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). 
 562. Id. at 955. 
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without rejecting the reasonable expectation of privacy test.563 
Justices Samuel Alito, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, 
and Elena Kagan, in turn, adopted a “mosaic” theory,564 similar 
to that which was put forward by the D.C. Circuit.565 Justice 
Sotomayor did not join Justice Alito’s concurrence, precisely be-
cause she considered the trespassory test, which established a 
constitutional minimum, sufficient.566 In her separate concur-
rence, however, she went on to endorse the mosaic theory 
adopted by Justice Alito.567 She actually went even further, 
suggesting that in future cases it might be applied more ag-
gressively to technologies not involving trespass.568
It could thus be argued that five justices have indicated 
that a mosaic theory could be applied to future cases involving 
non-trespassory intrusions. Nevertheless, there is only one true 
majority position that now forms part of the Court’s jurispru-
dence. This decision squarely centers on trespass. And here, 
while GPS chips form part of a broader class of surveillance de-
vices that must be physically attached to targets in order to 
track their movement through public space,
 
569
 
 563. Id. at 949–54. 
 not all surveil-
 564. See Orin Kerr, D.C. Circuit Introduces “Mosaic Theory” of Fourth 
Amendment, Holds GPS Monitoring a Fourth Amendment Search, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Aug. 6, 2010, 2:46 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/08/06/d-c 
-circuit-introduces-mosaic-theory-of-fourth-amendment-holds-gps-monitoring 
-a-fourth-amendment-search. 
 565. Compare United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 558–66 (D.C. Cir. 
2010) (arguing that the government’s constant GPS surveillance of defendant’s 
whereabouts for twenty-eight days amounted to a search under the Fourth 
Amendment), with Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring) (“In this case, 
for four weeks, law enforcement agents tracked every movement that respond-
ent made in the vehicle he was driving. We need not identify with precision 
the point at which the tracking of this vehicle became a search, for the line 
was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”). 
 566. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 954–55 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 567. See id. at 955 (expressing agreement with Justice Alito that long-term 
GPS surveillance violates reasonable expectations of privacy). 
 568. See discussion infra accompanying notes 731–33. 
 569. GPS, which originated as a network of twenty-four satellites, was 
launched by the U.S. Department of Defense for military applications. What Is 
GPS?, GARMIN, http://www8.garmin.com/aboutGPS (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
Since it was extended to civilian applications and updated to reflect new tech-
nological breakthroughs, GPS receivers use the satellites to triangulate their 
position on earth—some with an accuracy of within fifteen meters. Id. Also in-
cluded in this category are battery-operated devices (a.k.a. “beepers”) which 
emit signals that can be picked up via radio frequencies. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 2.7(e) (4th 
ed. 2011). Law enforcement uses of beepers, particularly in the realm of drug 
enforcement, involve attaching a device to individuals or goods and then using 
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lance devices involve the same element of contact.570 Factory-
installed devices in cars or GPS chips in cell phones may prove 
equally sufficient for transmitting the car’s whereabouts. As 
Justice Sotomayor noted, “In cases of electronic or other novel 
modes of surveillance that do not depend upon a physical inva-
sion on property, the majority opinion’s trespassory test may 
provide little guidance.”571 Biometric collection devices like 
cameras and video feeds enabled with facial recognition tech-
nology, or remote iris scanners, involve no physical touching.572 
For these, a more appropriate framing might therefore be the 
test developed under Katz. Indeed, this was the position Justice 
Sotomayor took in Jones.573
B. PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE SPACE: AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AND 
THERMAL IMAGING 
 Yet the application of this test in 
considering the advent of other remote technologies has yielded 
a body of jurisprudence that proves similarly inadequate for 
contemplating the challenges faced with regard to RBI. 
Remote biometrics represents a new and emerging field, 
which the Court has yet to confront. There are other technolo-
gies that give rise to parallel considerations. The Court has 
here applied the reasonable expectation of privacy test to areas 
such as aerial surveillance and thermal imaging, in the process 
drawing a distinction between public and private space. In this 
construction, however, looser standards apply to the former—
which is precisely the domain of interest with regard to RBI. 
Yet it is this sphere which gives rise to some of the greatest 
privacy concerns as RBI represents something different in 
kind—not degree—to what has come before. 
In United States v. Knotts, an opinion authored by (then) 
Justice William Rehnquist, the Court held that monitoring the 
signal of a beeper placed in a container of chemicals en route to 
a cabin did not invade the cabin owner’s legitimate expectation 
of privacy.574
 
a receiver to monitor the target’s movement. Id.  
 The Court grounded its decision in Katz: “A person 
traveling in an automobile on public thoroughfares has no rea-
 570. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); id. at 961 (Alito, 
J., concurring). 
 571. Id. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 572. Note, however, with regard to iris scans, an argument could be mar-
shaled that physical penetration of the body occurs. 
 573. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 955 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 574. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).  
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sonable expectation of privacy in his movements from one place 
to another.”575 The Court pointed to the diminished expectation 
of privacy that derived from the function of the object of sur-
veillance: i.e., transportation as opposed to one’s residence or 
“the repository of personal effects.”576
An automobile, the Court suggested, “has little capacity for 
escaping public scrutiny. It travels public thoroughfares where 
both its occupants and its contents are in plain view.”
  
577 Thus, 
while the respondent, as the owner of the cabin, had an expec-
tation of privacy within his dwelling place, “no such expectation 
extended to the visual observation of [his] car arriving on his 
premises after leaving the public highway”578—nor did it extend 
to the movement of the container of chemicals outside the cabin 
in the open fields.579 Similarly, again on the grounds of public 
versus private space, in United States v. Karo, the Court found 
that a beeper entering the home constituted a search within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.580
The Court has adopted a consistent approach in its treat-
ment of other, emerging remote technologies, such as aerial 
surveillance and thermal imaging. Consider first aerial surveil-
lance. The so-called naked eye doctrine suggests that flying a 
plane or a helicopter over an individual’s backyard does not 
constitute a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amend-
ment.
  
581 In California v. Ciraolo, the Court thus held that any 
member of the public flying 1000 feet above a home could ob-
serve the same information that any police officer could ob-
serve.582 Aerial observation of the curtilage, however, could be-
come invasive, “either due to physical intrusiveness or through 
modern technology which discloses to the senses those intimate 
associations, objects or activities otherwise imperceptible to po-
lice or fellow citizens.”583
 
 575. Id. at 281. 
 The Supreme Court subsequently con-
 576. Id. (quoting Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974)). 
 577. Id. 
 578. Id. at 282. 
 579. Id. Knotts centered on a combination of visual surveillance and limited 
electronic monitoring of a vehicle. It left open the warrantless, extensive use of 
a GPS chip to electronically monitor the totality of a target’s movements over 
time. See id. at 284–85. 
 580. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714–15 (1984). 
 581. California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986). 
 582. Id. at 215. 
 583. Id. at 215 n.3 (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 14–15, California v. 
Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986) (No. 84-1513)). 
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sidered a helicopter flying 400 feet above the ground. In Florida 
v. Riley, the Court held that neither the home over which the 
helicopter flew, nor the curtilage, was protected from an inspec-
tion that involved no physical invasion.584
Similarly, the Court has held that taking aerial photo-
graphs of an industrial complex does not constitute a search 
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
 Again, the public ver-
sus private distinction prevailed.  
585 In Dow 
Chemical Co. v. United States, the Court determined that man-
ufacturing plants were different in kind from what happens 
within the curtilage of a home.586 The industrial nature of the 
fixtures to be surveyed in this context more closely resembled 
an open field than the privacy of a dwelling.587 In Dow Chemi-
cal, moreover, a standard map-making camera had been used, 
a technology that could not see through walls.588 The Court was 
careful to note that the pictures did not reveal any identifiable 
human faces.589 The Court suggested, “[a]n electronic device to 
penetrate walls or windows so as to hear and record confiden-
tial discussions . . . would raise very different and far more se-
rious questions.”590
In United States v. Jackson, the Tenth Circuit later relied 
on Katz, Ciraolo, and Dow Chemical in holding that video cam-
eras installed on telephone poles, capable of observing “only 
what any passerby would easily have been able to observe,” did 
not fall within a Fourth Amendment definition of privacy.
  
591
From these cases, we can conclude that the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy depends, at the most general level, on the 
nature of the location under surveillance. That is, surveillance 
inside a home is given a much higher degree of protection than 
surveillance of public space. Indeed, in United States v. Nerber, 
a hidden video camera was used to film a narcotics transaction 
in a motel room.
 
592
 
 584. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1989). 
 After the informants left, the camera was 
left running, and over the next three hours, recorded illegal ac-
 585. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986). 
 586. Id.  
 587. Id. at 236–37. 
 588. Id. at 229. 
 589. Id. at 238 n.5. 
 590. Id. at 239. 
 591. United States v. Jackson, 213 F.3d 1269, 1281 (10th Cir. 2000), vacat-
ed, 531 U.S. 1033 (2000). 
 592. United States v. Nerber, 222 F.3d 597, 599 (9th Cir. 2000). 
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tivity.593 The government conceded, and the court agreed, that 
the audio surveillance conducted after they left the motel room 
was inadmissible under Title III.594 But as far as the silent vid-
eo recording was concerned, the court held that “considering 
the totality of the circumstances of this case, including but not 
limited to the nature of the governmental intrusion” the de-
fendants had a reasonable expectation of privacy that they 
would not be subject to video surveillance once the informants 
left.595
Other technologies have pressed this point even further.
 The expectation of privacy in a motel room was impacted 
by the nature of the intrusion. Both of these elements, the place 
and the nature of the intrusion, thus need to be taken into ac-
count.  
596 
Consider thermal imaging: even if physical intrusion within the 
home does not occur, and sensory enhancing technologies are 
used to glean information about what happens inside the home, 
the higher expectation of privacy that accompanies domestic 
dwellings may give rise to a search within the meaning of the 
Fourth Amendment. The key case here is Kyllo v. United 
States,597 which centered on detecting home-grown marijuana. 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia, 
held that the use of sense-enhancing technology to obtain in-
formation about the interior of the home, which could not have 
been obtained without physical intrusion into that protected 
area, constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment.598
In Kyllo, the fact that the thermal surveillance device was 
not in general public use was relevant.
  
599
 
 593. Id. 
 This suggests that the 
technology itself, and the ubiquitous nature of the technology, 
may have an effect on an individual’s expectation of privacy. If 
this is the test for RBI, though, then it is at least probative that 
the commercial sector is largely unregulated with regard to its 
use of biometric identification. It is, moreover, already taking 
concrete steps to yield a profit from its use and clearly interest-
 594. Id. at 604–05. 
 595. Id. at 600. 
 596. See, e.g., Kevin Gordon, Automatic License Plate Recognition, L. & 
ORD., May 2006, at 10, 10 (2006) (describing technology that scans license 
plates and automatically checks them against law enforcement databases).  
 597. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 598. Id. at 34–35. 
 599. Id. at 40.  
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ed in developing further in this direction. A few examples will 
suffice.  
PittPatt, developed at Carnegie Mellon (and subsequently 
bought by Google), is just one of many off-the-shelf technologies 
that can identify individuals in photographs, matching them 
with other images found online and then joining the images 
with other personally identifiable information found on the In-
ternet.600 Facebook operates similar software, called Face.com, 
which automatically identifies individuals in pictures uploaded 
to the site and inquires whether users would like to tag the 
photos accordingly.601 Viewdle’s Social Camera, in turn, uses 
advanced technology to detect and tag photos.602 Currently in 
its beta version, the application (developed for Android phones) 
tags pictures based on FRT and then allows them to be synced 
and shared through Facebook, Flickr, MMS, or e-mail, auto-
matically tying the images to individual contact information al-
ready stored in the phone.603 In 2010, Apple acquired Polar 
Rose, a company specializing in FRT.604 RecognizeMe is an  
iPhone app that allows for phones to be unlocked by facial 
scanning.605
Private use of FRT, paired with video technology extends 
into public space. The Venetian hotel in Las Vegas, for in-
stance, has now rolled out billboards that draw on the technol-
ogy to advertise bars, clubs, and restaurants appropriate for 
  
 
 600. John Paul Titlow, As Facial Recognition Improves, New Privacy Con-
troversies Await, READWRITEWEB (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.readwriteweb 
.com/archives/facial_recognition_privacy_concerns.php. Somewhat disconcert-
ingly, this technology may allow users to predict individuals’ Social Security 
numbers using Facebook profile information such as date of birth. Mello, su-
pra note 265. 
 601. Titlow, supra note 600; see also Daniela Minicucci, Face and Iris 
Recognition Apps Both Thrilling and Threatening, GLOBAL NEWS, Sept. 28, 
2011, http://www.globalnews.ca/technology/6442491279/story.html. 
 602. Minicucci, supra note 601. 
 603. Id. 
 604. Titlow, supra note 600. 
 605. This app was billed as “[t]he ONLY Facial Recognition app on App 
Store,” “[t]he Most Popular & Astonishing app,” and “[o]ne of the TOP Apps of 
2011.” Recognize Me 1.0, QARCHIVE, http://recognize-me.by-best-apps-and 
-games.qarchive.org (last visited Nov. 2, 2012); see also Oliver Haslam, 
RecognizeMe Brings Biometric Facial Recognition Security for Unlocking iPh-
one [Cydia Tweak], REDMOND PIE, May 18, 2011, http://www.redmondpie 
.com/recognizeme-brings-biometric-facial-recognition-security-for-unlocking 
-iphone-cydia-tweak. 
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the demographic identified.606 In Chicago, a startup called 
SceneTap, links FRT to cameras located in dance clubs and 
bars, allowing users to determine the best male to female ratios 
before choosing their destinations.607 Adidas and Intel are work-
ing together to install digital walls in stores, with plans to tar-
get passers-by with shoe displays appropriate to their age and 
gender.608 In 2011, Kraft demonstrated a “Meal Planning Solu-
tion” kiosk at the National Retail Federation Show, featuring 
the use of FRT to determine which products to advertise to con-
sumers as they peruse the aisles in grocery stores.609 Privacy 
advocates worry not just about such FRT usages, but the pair-
ing of it to Facebook. In such instances, there would be sub-
stantially less guesswork: instead of assuming, for instance, 
that women between certain ages were more likely to have 
children at home, it could simply check the user’s Facebook ac-
count and find out precisely what ages the children were and 
what their interests might be.610
C. ELIMINATION OF THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN CRIMINAL LAW 
AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
 This would allow companies 
like Kraft to market their products directly to consumers as 
they enter into stores—based on remote biometric technologies. 
A further consideration in the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is its traditional reliance on the distinction be-
tween criminal law and national security. Two observations 
here are of note: first, the standards applied to the latter are 
considerably weaker than those adopted in the former realm. 
 
 606. John Eggerton, Rockefeller Seeks FTC Report on Face Recognition and 
Privacy, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 19, 2011, 5:06 PM, http://www.broad 
castingcable.com/article/475505-Rockefeller_Seeks_FTC_Report_On_Face_ 
Recognition_And_Privacy.php; Shan Li & David Sarno, Advertisers Start Us-
ing Facial Recognition to Tailor Pitches, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, http:// 
articles.latimes.com/2011/aug/21/business/la-fi-facial-recognition-20110821. 
 607. Mello, supra note 265. 
 608. Li & Sarno, supra note 606. 
 609. Julia Carpenter, Matching Moms with Macaroni: New Kraft Kiosks 
Scan Your Face to Recommend Recipes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Jan. 18, 2011, 
http://articles.nydailynews.com/2011-01-18/news/27087917_1_kiosk-new-kraft 
-recipe-ideas; Linda Tischler, Kraft Store Kiosk Scans Your Face Then Knows 
What to Feed It [Video], FAST COMPANY (Jan. 14, 2011), http://www 
.fastcompany.com/1716684/kraft-store-kiosk-scans-your-face-then-knows-what 
-feed-it-video.  
 610. Kashmir Hill, Kraft to Use Facial Recognition Software to Give You 
Macaroni Recipes, FORBES (Sept. 1, 2011, 11:14 AM), http://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/kashmirhill/2011/09/01/kraft-to-use-facial-recognition-technology-to-give 
-you-macaroni-recipes. 
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Second, as a matter of both law and policy, the lines between 
these areas are becoming increasingly blurred.  
1. Fourth Amendment Standards with Regard to National 
Security 
In 1967, Katz dealt with the attachment of a device to the 
outside of a telephone booth.611 The Court, considering new 
technologies in the context of electronic surveillance, adopted a 
doctrine based on the reasonable expectation of privacy for 
criminal activity—but it did not settle the question of what to 
do when national security matters were on the line.612 Justice 
Byron White, in his concurrence, emphasized that the pre-
sumption against warrantless searches could be overcome by 
pressing need: “We should not require the warrant procedure 
and the magistrate’s judgment if the President of the United 
States or his chief legal officer, the Attorney General, has con-
sidered the requirements of national security and authorized 
electronic surveillance as reasonable.”613
Justice William Douglas, joined by Justice William Bren-
nan, strongly objected to Justice White’s assertion and pointed 
out a certain conflict of interest: “Neither the President nor the 
Attorney General is a magistrate. In matters where they be-
lieve national security may be involved they are not detached, 
disinterested, and neutral as a court or magistrate must be.”
 Justice White’s words 
pointed to a different set of rules: under some circumstances, 
requirements otherwise applicable within criminal law might 
alter. 
614 
The constitutional responsibility of the Executive is to “vigor-
ously investigate and prevent breaches of national security and 
prosecute those who violate the pertinent federal laws.”615
Since spies and saboteurs are as entitled to the protection of the 
Fourth Amendment as suspected gamblers like petitioner, I cannot 
agree that where spies and saboteurs are involved adequate protec-
tion of Fourth Amendment rights is assured when the President and 
Attorney General assume both the position of adversary-and-
prosecutor and disinterested, neutral magistrate.
 Jus-
tice Douglas concluded,  
616
 
 611. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 348 (1967). 
 
 612. Id. at 358 n.23. 
 613. Id. at 364 (White, J., concurring). 
 614. Id. at 359 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 615. Id. at 359–60. 
 616. Id. at 360. 
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The national security issue proved contentious, and a de facto 
double standard evolved. Physical surveillance and electronic 
bugging became subject to the reasonable expectation of priva-
cy test, discussed above. But wiretapping, and surveillance 
where national security might be involved, constituted a differ-
ent sort of a question because, there, looser considerations 
might satisfy constitutional demands. President Lyndon 
Johnson explained in his 1967 State of the Union: “We should 
protect what Justice Brandeis called the ‘right most valued by 
civilized men’—the right to privacy. We should outlaw all 
wiretapping—public and private—wherever and whenever it 
occurs, except when the security of this Nation itself is at 
stake . . . .”617
The Executive thus carved out a special sphere for national 
security surveillance, independent of criminal law standards 
with regard to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Title III, 
introduced the following year, focused on criminal law. In 
enacting the statute, Congress specifically exempted national 
security—leaving such investigations in the hands of the 
executive branch.
  
618
In 1972, a landmark decision further addressed the ques-
tion of the Fourth Amendment in the context of national securi-
ty. In United States v. U.S. District Court (Keith), the Supreme 
Court held 8-0 that Title III did not authorize the Executive to 
engage in electronic surveillance for national security purposes; 
  
 
 617. President Lyndon Johnson, State of the Union Address (Jan. 10, 1967) 
(emphasis added), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index 
.php?pid=28338. 
 618. Omnibus Crime Control Act and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 
90-351, § 802, 82 Stat. 197, 212 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3)) 
(“Nothing contained in this chapter or in section 605 of the Communications 
Act of 1934 (48 Stat. 1143; 47 U.S.C. 605) shall limit the constitutional power 
of the President to take such measures as he deems necessary to protect the 
Nation against actual or potential attack or other hostile acts of a foreign pow-
er, to obtain foreign intelligence information deemed essential to the security 
of the United States, or to protect national security information against for-
eign intelligence activities. Nor shall anything contained in this chapter be 
deemed to limit the constitutional power of the President to take such measures 
as he deems necessary to protect the United States against the overthrow of the 
Government by force or other unlawful means, or against any other clear and 
present danger to the structure or existence of the Government. The contents of 
any wire or oral communication intercepted by authority of the President in 
the exercise of the foregoing powers may be received in evidence in any trial 
hearing, or other proceeding only where such interception was reasonable, and 
shall not be otherwise used or disclosed except as is necessary to implement 
that power.” (emphasis added)). 
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rather, it simply reflected congressional neutrality.619 For the 
Court, warrantless domestic wiretapping for national security 
did not fall exclusively within the constitutional remit of the 
Executive.620 While the duty of the state to protect itself has to 
be weighed against “the potential danger posed by unreasona-
ble surveillance to individual privacy,”621 such “Fourth Amend-
ment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic secu-
rity surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion 
of the Executive Branch.”622
Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority, recognized 
that executive officers could hardly be regarded as neutral and 
disinterested: “Their duty and responsibility are to enforce the 
laws, to investigate, and to prosecute. . . . [T]hose charged with 
this . . . duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize 
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”
 
623 He 
highlighted the dangers: “[U]nreviewed executive discretion 
may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating evi-
dence and overlook potential invasions of privacy and protected 
speech.”624 Domestic security surveillance thus did not fall un-
der one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement under the 
Fourth Amendment.625 Justice Powell rejected the government’s 
suggestion that national security matters are “too subtle and 
complex for judicial evaluation.”626 Nor did he accept that “prior 
judicial approval will fracture the secrecy essential to official 
intelligence gathering.”627
The Executive Branch largely ignored this decision.
 The former would suggest that such 
surveillance might not be warranted in the first place; the se-
cond had long been an aspect of ordinary criminal activity. 
628
 
 619. 407 U.S. 297, 308 (1972). This case is known as Keith, in accordance 
with the name of the district court judge who initially ordered the government 
to release a number of illegally-obtained conversations. 
 Un-
der the guise of national security, the FBI, National Security 
Agency (NSA), CIA, and DoD continued to operate domestic 
 620. See id. at 316 (stating that “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot 
properly be guaranteed if domestic security surveillances may be conducted 
solely within the discretion of the Executive Branch”). 
 621. Id. at 314–15. 
 622. Id. at 316–17.  
 623. Id. at 317 (citation omitted). 
 624. Id. 
 625. Id. at 320. 
 626. Id. 
 627. Id.  
 628. See LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM 222 
(2008). 
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surveillance programs, many of which came to light in the 
course of the Church Hearings.629 Like many of the biometric 
programs discussed in Part I, above, each of these surveillance 
efforts began as a limited inquiry but “gradually extended to 
capture more information from a broader range of individuals 
and organizations.”630
The Executive responded to the public outcry that followed 
the Church Committee’s findings with a series of actions to 
curb surveillance in the national security realm. In 1976, Pres-
ident Gerald Ford banned the NSA from intercepting tele-
graphs and forbade the CIA from conducting electronic or phys-
ical surveillance of U.S. citizens.
 
631 Clarence Kelly, whom 
President Richard Nixon had nominated to take over the FBI 
following J. Edgar Hoover’s death in 1972, publicly apologized 
for the Hoover era.632 Significant gaps, however, continued to 
exist. For example, while the Privacy Act ostensibly regulated 
the collection, maintenance, use, and dissemination of citizens’ 
personal data,633 as discussed in Part II supra, it also provided 
certain exemptions for the CIA.634 National security infor-
mation held by any agency came to be exempted from certain 
requirements.635
Congress thus came to the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Sur-
veillance Act with the aim of addressing national security sur-
veillance. The law, as discussed in Part II supra, limits the 
statute to foreign powers and to agents of foreign powers—
including groups “engaged in international terrorism or activi-
ties in preparation therefor.”
 
636
 
 629. See id. 
 While the previous discussion of 
FISA focused on the type of surveillance being undertaken, the 
relationship of the statute to the Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is no less probative of the failure of the 
legislature or the judiciary to take account of the unique 
challenges of RBI.  
 630. Id. at 223. 
 631. GEOFFREY R. STONE, PERILOUS TIMES: FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 
1798 TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM 496 (2004). 
 632. Id. 
 633. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006). 
 634. GINA MARIE STEVENS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 31730, PRIVACY: 
TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS PROGRAMS AND RELATED INFORMATION 
ACCESS, COLLECTION, AND PROTECTION LAWS 6 (2003). 
 635. Id.  
 636. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(a)(4) (2006). 
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The reasonable expectation of privacy test is built directly 
into FISA’s definition of electronic surveillance.637 The level of 
probable cause needed, however, for an order to issue departs 
from that required for a warrant within criminal law.638 This 
change reflected Justice Powell’s position in Keith:639
  Given . . . potential distinctions between Title III criminal surveil-
lances and those involving the domestic security, Congress may wish 
to consider protective standards for the latter which differ from those 
already prescribed for specified crimes in Title III. Different stand-
ards may be compatible with the Fourth Amendment if they are rea-
sonable both in relation to the legitimate need of Government for intel-
ligence information and the protected rights of our citizens. For the 
warrant application may vary according to the governmental interest 
to be enforced and the nature of citizen rights deserving protection.
 
640
Under Title III, the court must find “on the basis of the facts 
submitted by the applicant that . . . there is probable cause for 
belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is 
about to commit” an enumerated offense.
 
641
 
 637. See id. § 1801(f)(1), (3), (4) (“(1) [T]he acquisition by an electronic, me-
chanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any wire or radio 
communication sent by or intended to be received by a particular, known 
United States person who is in the United States, if the contents are acquired 
by intentionally targeting that United States person, under circumstances in 
which a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be 
required for law enforcement purposes . . . (3) the intentional acquisition by an 
electronic, mechanical, or other surveillance device of the contents of any radio 
communication, under circumstances in which a person has a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy and a warrant would be required for law enforcement pur-
poses . . . (4) the installation or use of an electronic, mechanical, or other sur-
veillance device in the United States for monitoring to acquire information, 
other than from a wire or radio communication, under circumstances in which 
a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy and a warrant would be re-
quired for law enforcement purposes.” (emphasis added)). 
 In contrast, FISA 
 638. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 318–19 
(1972). 
 639. Note that while the Court in Keith emphasized that the case related to 
domestic security, rather than foreign security, the distinction quickly fell by 
the wayside. 
 640. Keith, 407 U.S. at 322–23 (emphasis added). Justice Powell continued:  
It may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the applica-
tion and affidavit showing probable cause need not follow the exact 
requirements of § 2518 but should allege other circumstances more 
appropriate to domestic security cases; that the request for prior court 
authorization could, in sensitive cases, be made to any member of a 
specially designated court . . . and that the time and reporting re-
quirements need not be so strict as those in § 2518. 
Id. at 323. 
 641. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2006). For wire and oral communications (e.g., 
telephone and microphone interceptions), § 2516(1) enumerates a long list of 
predicate offenses that range from bank fraud, see id. § 1344, to unlawful pos-
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does not always require a showing of an imminent crime, or the 
elements of a specific offense. Instead, it requires the court to 
find “on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant” that 
“there is probable cause to believe that . . . the target of the 
electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a for-
eign power.”642
FISA defines the phrases “foreign power” and “agent of a 
foreign power” in a manner that may (or may not) require a 
showing of criminal conduct. Five of its seven definitions of 
criminal conduct can be satisfied without any showing of crimi-
nal activity.
  
643 The fourth definition, which refers to “interna-
tional terrorism,” does require some level of criminal conduct. 
The term incorporates, inter alia, “activities that . . . involve vi-
olent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation 
of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that 
would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States or any State.”644 An organization may 
be a “foreign power” under the fourth definition when it engag-
es in “activities in preparation” for international terrorism—a 
standard which may (or may not) be more expansive than crim-
inal law, in which a substantial step towards completing the 
crime generally constitutes attempt.645
For a U.S. person to be included as an agent of a foreign 
power,
  
646
 
session of a firearm, see id. § 922(g), and including espionage, see, e.g., id. 
§ 794 (2006), assassination, see, e.g., id. §§ 351, 1751, sabotage, e.g., id. § 2155, 
terrorism, see e.g., id. § 2332, and aircraft piracy, see 49 U.S.C. § 46502. 18 
U.S.C. § 2518(1). For electronic communications (e.g., electronic mail or fac-
simile messages under Title III), any federal felony may serve as a predicate. 
Id. § 2516(3) (2006). 
 in turn, one of two conditions must hold: either the 
 642. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (2006 & Supp. III 2008); see also id. § 1805(b) 
(requiring probable cause that the facilities to are to be used by a foreign pow-
er or an agent thereof). 
 643. See id. § 1801(a) (defining foreign power as (1) a foreign government 
or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States; (2) 
a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially composed of United 
States persons; (3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign govern-
ment or governments to be directed and controlled by such foreign government 
or governments; (4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities in 
preparation therefor; (5) a foreign-based political organization, not substan-
tially composed of United States persons; (6) an entity that is directed and 
controlled by a foreign government or governments; (7) an entity not substan-
tially composed of United States persons that is engaged in the international 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction).  
 644. Id. § 1801(c). 
 645. See id. § 1801(a)(4). 
 646. The statute defines “agent of a foreign power” as  
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target is engaged in espionage and clandestine intelligence ac-
tivities or the target is engaged in sabotage or international 
terrorism.647 (A third category, less significant than the first 
two, includes persons who enter the United States under a 
false identity.)648 For the first of these categories, an individual 
engaged in clandestine intelligence activities on behalf of a for-
eign power may qualify as an agent only where such actions 
“involve,” “may involve” or “are about to involve” a “violation of 
the criminal statutes of the United States.”649
In other words, special rules apply for national security. 
Clandestine intelligence activities require something less than 
probable cause for evidence of criminal activity.
 This standard 
falls short of what would otherwise be constitutionally required 
in criminal law.  
650 For sabotage 
or international terrorism, the standard is closer to the crimi-
nal norm.651 For foreign powers, no criminal standard applies.652
The Court has roundly rejected efforts to challenge the 
constitutional sufficiency of FISA’s provisions on Fourth 
 
 
any person who—(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence 
gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power, which activi-
ties involve or may involve a violation of the criminal statutes of the 
United States; (B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service 
or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages in any other clan-
destine intelligence activities for or on behalf of such foreign power, 
which activities involve or are about to involve a violation of the crim-
inal statutes of the United States; (C) knowingly engages in sabotage 
or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation there-
for, for or on behalf of a foreign power; (D) knowingly enters the Unit-
ed States under a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a for-
eign power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false 
or fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign power; or (E) know-
ingly aids or abets any person in the conduct of activities described in 
subparagraph (A), (B), or (C) or knowingly conspires with any person 
to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or (C). 
Id. § 1801(b)(2). 
 647. Compare id. (establishing the definition of “agent of a foreign power” 
that applies to all persons), with id. § 1801(b)(1) (establishing the definition of 
“agent of a foreign power” that applies to any person other than a United 
States person). 
 648. For fraudulent identity, a U.S. person must knowingly enter the coun-
try under a false identity “for or on behalf of a foreign power or, while in the 
United States, knowingly assume[] a false or fraudulent identity for or on be-
half of a foreign power.” Id. § 1801(b)(2)(D). As a practical matter, it could be 
argued that some crime will occur in conjunction with such designation, but 
probable cause does not need to be demonstrated up front.  
 649. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A). 
 650. See id. 
 651. See id. § 1801(b)(2)(C). 
 652. See id. § 1801(a). 
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Amendment grounds (as well as Fifth Amendment due process 
grounds) because of the purpose for which the statute was cre-
ated: securing foreign intelligence information.653
It is true . . . that the [FISA] application need not state that the sur-
veillance is likely to uncover evidence of a crime; but as the purpose of 
the surveillance is not to ferret out criminal activity but rather to 
gather intelligence, such a requirement would be illogical. See United 
States District Court, 407 U.S. at 322 . . . (recognizing distinction be-
tween surveillance for national security purposes and surveillance of 
“‘ordinary crime’”) . . . . [T]here is no merit to the contention that he is 
entitled to suppression simply because evidence of his criminal con-
duct was discovered incidentally as the result of an intelligence sur-
veillance not supported by probable cause of criminal activity.
 That is to say, 
the lesser probable cause standards in FISA meet the require-
ments of the Fourth Amendment, precisely because of the aims 
of the statute itself. In United States v. Cavanagh, the Ninth 
Circuit explained, 
654
In Keith, Justice Powell suggested that the legislative branch 
could make finer distinctions than the judiciary in the context 
of national security.
 
655 The Supreme Court has since endorsed 
this approach by rejecting petitions for certiorari challenging 
FISA.656
The electronic surveillance provisions of FISA that might 
apply to the acquisition of RBI have not remained static. The 
2008 FISA Amendments Act (FAA) broadened the risk of inter-
 And the Executive has made considerable use of its au-
thorities under the statute. Thus, the three branches appear to 
have reached agreement: a different constitutional standard 
applies in the realm of national security. 
 
 653. See, e.g., United States v. Badia, 827 F.2d 1458, 1464 (11th Cir. 1987); 
United States v. Ott, 827 F.2d 473, 476–77 (9th Cir. 1987); United States v. 
Megahey, 553 F. Supp. 1180, 1185–93 (E.D.N.Y. 1982), aff’d without opinion, 
729 F.2d 1444 (2d Cir. 1983), re-aff’d post-trial sub nom. United States v. Dug-
gan, 743 F.2d 59 (2d Cir. 1984), superseded by statute, USA PATRIOT Act, 
Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 271, as recognized in United States v. Abu-
Jihaad, 630 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 654. United States v. Cavanagh, 807 F.2d 787, 790–91 (9th Cir. 1987). 
 655. See United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 323–24 
(1972). 
 656. See, e.g., United States v. Squillacote, 532 U.S. 971, 971 (2001) (deny-
ing certiorari). The government purportedly subjected the petitioners to 550 
consecutive days of round-the-clock telephone and physical surveillance under 
FISA, in the course of which the government intercepted/transcribed several 
psychotherapy suggestions, later using the information to “exploit” one of the 
petitioner’s psychiatric vulnerabilities. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, 
Squillacote, 532 U.S. 971 (No. 00-969). The court of appeals found that the 
government had made a sufficient showing to warrant FISA surveillance 
without, though, giving the defense counsel any opportunity to examine or 
challenge the government’s submissions in support of its FISA authority. Id. 
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ception, lowering the government’s burden for demonstrating 
probable cause and reducing FISC’s oversight abilities.657
Prior to the FAA, the statute required the government to 
identify the specific targets of surveillance.
 The 
Court has yet to determine the constitutionality of these weak-
er standards under the Fourth Amendment. 
658 The court then 
had to find probable cause that the target was a foreign power 
or agent thereof and using (or about to use) the facility to be 
monitored.659 Under the FAA, FISC now need only determine 
that the general procedures to be followed comply with the sub-
sections of the statute and with the Fourth Amendment—
meaning that the probable cause determination is no longer 
particularized for non-U.S. persons believed to be outside the 
United States.660 The legislation absolves the Attorney General 
and Director of National Intelligence of providing the identity 
of specific targets; instead, they must simply submit a written 
document, certifying that the targets are not within domestic 
bounds.661 FISC’s analysis must only consider the government’s 
general procedures.662
Following enactment of the statute, the ACLU filed a suit 
challenging the FAA on both Fourth and First Amendment 
grounds. The Southern District of New York dismissed the 
claim on the grounds that the plaintiff could not demonstrate 
standing.
 
663 In March 2011, a three-judge panel of the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously reversed the case, allow-
ing it to proceed.664 An effort to send the case for rehearing en 
banc failed in September 2011, allowing the challenge to move 
forward.665
 
 657. See Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 125–26 (2d Cir. 
2011). 
 The case, formerly Amnesty v. McConnell, then Am-
nesty v. Blair, and now Amnesty v. Clapper (in keeping with 
successive Directors of National Intelligence), challenged the 
 658. See id. 
 659. See id. at 126. 
 660. See 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(i)(3)(A) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 661. See id. § 1881a(g)(2)(A)(i)(I). 
 662. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 166 (2d Cir. 2011) 
(Lynch, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en banc). 
 663. Amnesty Int’l USA v. McConnell, 646 F. Supp. 2d 633, 635 (S.D.N.Y. 
2009), vacated sub nom. Amnesty Int’l USA v. Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 150 (2d 
Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc denied, Amnesty Int’l USA, 667 F.3d at 164. 
 664. Amnesty Int’l USA, 638 F.3d 118 (2d Cir. 2011) reh’g en banc denied, 
667 F.3d at 164. 
 665. Amnesty Int’l USA, 667 F.3d at 164. 
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constitutionality of the new sections of the statute, which au-
thorized “the targeting of persons reasonably believed to be lo-
cated outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence 
information.”666 In February 2012, the Obama Administration 
filed a petition for certiorari, which the Court granted.667 Ar-
gument was heard on October 29, 2012.668
 
 666. 50 U.S.C. § 1881(a) (2006 & Supp. IV 2011). 
 
 667. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, No. 11-
1025 (filed Feb. 2012). 
 668. Docket No. 11-1025, SUP. CT. U.S., http://www.supremecourt.gov/ 
Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/11-1025.htm (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). It 
is worth noting here that the question of whether litigants have standing is an 
important one for consideration of surveillance programs generally and, as 
such, one that inevitably accompanies the use of RBI for national security 
purposes. Efforts to bring suit in similar contexts, based on a generalized chal-
lenge to gathering intelligence, have fallen rather short. In United Presbyteri-
an Church v. Reagan, for example, the D.C. Circuit considered a suit lodged 
against the President and the heads of various agencies, questioning the legal-
ity of Executive Order 12333. 738 F.2d 1375, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1984); see U.S. 
Intelligence Activities, Exec. Order No. 12333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 
1981), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C. § 401 (2006). Appellants challenged 
the instrument on Fourth Amendment grounds (protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures), as well as the First and Fifth Amendments. Unit-
ed Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1377. The claim cited the immediate threat of be-
ing targeted for surveillance as depriving the appellants of their legal rights. 
Id. The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit found the alleged grievances  
insufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact standing requirement imposed 
by Article III of the Constitution. “[A]t an irreducible minimum, Art. 
III requires the party who invokes the court’s authority to ‘show that 
he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a re-
sult of the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant.’” Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472, (1982), quoting Gladstone, Realtors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979). The injury or threat must 
be “distinct and palpable,” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975), 
“concrete,” Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208, 221 (1974), “direct,” O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 
(1974), quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923), 
and “both ‘real and immediate,’ not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical,’” id., 
quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 109–10 (1969), and United 
Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90 (1947). 
United Presbyterian, 738 F.2d at 1378.  
A similar challenge emerged in American Civil Liberties Union v. Nation-
al Security Agency, which addressed the constitutionality of the National Se-
curity Agency’s warrantless wiretap program, believed at the time to be tar-
geting individuals understood to be in contact with al Qaeda. 493 F.3d 644, 
648–49 (6th Cir. 2007). The plaintiffs in the case included the ACLU, the 
Council on American-Islamic Relations, the National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, and Greenpeace, along with five authors and journalists, all 
of whom had previously communicated with people in or from the Middle East. 
District Court Judge Anna Diggs Taylor, the first to encounter the case, con-
sidered the program to be a violation of the Fourth Amendment. According to 
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2. Blurring of the Lines 
The weaker Fourth Amendment standards that apply in 
the realm of national security become more pressing when one 
considers the gradual breakdown of the distinction between 
criminal law and national security. Dual-use authorities, dual-
use institutions, and new institutional relationships are con-
tributing to this phenomenon, in the process transgressing im-
portant barriers. 
Consider FISA. Post-9/11, Congress amended the legisla-
tion to allow it to be applied, under certain circumstances, to 
criminal investigations. The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court of Review initially embraced the alterations, suggesting 
broad agreement between all three branches of government. 
What these changes suggest is that, at times, biometric surveil-
lance used for criminal purposes may fall within a less rights-
protective, national security framing. 
Prior to the 9/11 attacks, a wall had been erected between 
intelligence and law enforcement. The USA PATRIOT Act, 
however, changed the gathering of foreign intelligence from 
 
the judge, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was precisely “to assure that 
Executive abuses of the power to search would not continue in our new na-
tion.” Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 774 
(E.D. Mich. 2006), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007). Judge Taylor quoted 
Justice Stewart’s opinion in Katz v. United States: “‘Over and again this Court 
has emphasized that the mandate of the (Fourth) Amendment requires adher-
ence to judicial processes’ (citation omitted) and that searches conducted out-
side the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are 
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few spe-
cifically established and well-delineated exceptions.” Id. at 774–75 (quoting 
Katz v. United States 389, U.S. 347, 357 (1967)). Keith, Judge Taylor noted, 
recognized that the clause did not assume executive officers were neutral and 
disinterested parties to disputes. Id. at 775 (citing United States v. Dist. Court 
(Keith), 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972)). According to Judge Taylor, the Fourth 
Amendment “requires reasonableness in all searches. It also requires prior 
warrants for any reasonable search, based upon prior-existing probable cause, 
as well as particularity as to persons, places, and things, and the interposition 
of a neutral magistrate between Executive branch enforcement officers and 
citizens.” Id. However much Congress conceded to the Executive in enacting 
FISA (such as allowing for delayed warrant applications in exigent circum-
stances, providing for a single, specialized court, or extending the duration of 
approved wiretaps from 30 days (under Title III) to 90 days), the Executive 
had overstepped its authority in running the warrantless program and, in the 
process, had violated the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 781–82. The Sixth Circuit 
Court of Appeals overturned Judge Taylor’s decision. The ruling turned on 
standing. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 493 F.3d at 648. In February 2008, the 
Supreme Court denied certiorari, ending any chance of the lawsuit moving 
forward. Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, 552 U.S. 1179, 1179 
(2008) (denying certiorari). 
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“the” sole reason for surveillance, to merely a “significant” pur-
pose.669 Attorney General John Ashcroft quickly seized on this 
power and issued guidelines that said such authorization could 
be sought even if the primary ends of the surveillance related 
to ordinary crime.670
Although the FISC had functioned secretly for nearly three 
decades, in May 2002 it published an opinion for the first time 
to protest the guidelines.
 These guidelines collapsed the wall be-
tween the FBI’s prosecution and intelligence functions. 
671 The court required that the wall be 
re-built. FISC centered its directive on the statutory minimiza-
tion requirement and raised concerns about abuse.672 The court 
recognized the reasons a wall had been placed between intelli-
gence gathering and criminal investigations and suggested that 
“[t]he 2002 procedures appear to be designed to . . . substitute 
the FISA for Title III electronic surveillances and Rule 41 
searches.”673
criminal prosecutors will tell the FBI when to use FISA (perhaps 
when they lack probable cause for a Title III electronic surveillance), 
what techniques to use, what information to look for, what infor-
mation to keep as evidence and when use of FISA can cease because 
there is enough evidence to arrest and prosecute.
 By removing the wall, 
674
Such measures did not appear to be reasonably designed “to ob-
tain, produce, or disseminate foreign intelligence infor-
mation.”
 
675
For the first time in the history of FISC, the government 
appealed.
 And so, the court imposed conditions. 
676
 
 669. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 218, 115 Stat. 272, 291 
(2001); see also id. § 201, 115 Stat. at 278 (expanding the Attorney General’s 
authority to conduct wire taps to obtain information about terrorism-related 
crimes); id. § 207, 115 Stat. at 282 (expanding FISA authority with respect to 
duration of surveillance orders). 
 The Executive argued that Congress’s intent in 
 670. Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., to Dir. of the Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation; Assistant Attorney Gen., Criminal Div., Counsel for 
Intelligence Policy & U.S. Attorneys (Mar. 6, 2002), available at http://www 
.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/ag030602.html (“[The USA PATRIOT Act] allows 
FISA to be used primarily for a law enforcement purpose, as long as a 
significant foreign intelligence purpose remains.” (emphasis in original)). 
 671. In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 621 (FISA Ct. 2002). 
 672. It noted, for instance, that in September 2000, the government had 
admitted that it had made “misstatements and omissions of material facts” in 
seventy-five of its FISA applications. Id. at 620. 
 673. Id. at 623. 
 674. Id. at 624. 
 675. Id. at 625 (quoting 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801(h)(1); 1821(4)(A)). 
 676. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). 
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changing the wording from “the” to “a significant” purpose was, 
precisely, to eliminate the wall between intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies.677 The attempt to impose minimization 
standards was so intrusive as to “exceed the constitutional au-
thority of Article III judges.”678
Six months later, a three-judge appellate court, appointed 
by Chief Justice William Rehnquist, issued its first opinion re-
versing the lower court’s ruling.
 
679 The appellate court suggest-
ed that FISA was never meant to apply only to foreign intelli-
gence information relative to national security, but that it could 
also be used for ordinary criminal cases.680 The court went even 
further: it interpreted the USA PATRIOT Act to mean that the 
primary purpose of the investigation could, indeed, be criminal 
investigations, “[s]o long as the government entertains a realis-
tic option of dealing with the agent other than through criminal 
prosecution.”681 Stopping a conspiracy, for instance, would suf-
fice.682
This change suggests that for the collection of biometric 
data as an aspect of foreign intelligence surveillance, at least 
insofar as RBI uses new and emerging technologies (such as 
FRT) to track individuals through public space, a FISA fram-
ing—with weaker standards than apply in criminal law—might 
apply, even when the primary aim of the investigation is crimi-
nal in nature. 
  
Paralleling the shift to dual-use authorities is the creation 
and expansion of dual-use institutions which are responsible 
for matters related to criminal law and national security. The 
 
 677. Id. at 732. 
 678. Id. at 722. 
 679. Id. at 746. 
 680. Id. at 727. 
 681. Id. at 735. 
 682. Id. To reach this conclusion, the appellate court rejected the Fourth 
Circuit court’s finding in United States v. Truong, 629 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 
1980), a case that rejected warrantless search and surveillance once a case 
crossed into a criminal investigation. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 725–26. 
The Fourth Circuit held that the “Executive Branch need not always obtain a 
warrant for foreign intelligence surveillance,” but that the Executive should be 
excused from obtaining a warrant only where surveillance was conducted 
“primarily” for foreign intelligence purposes. Truong, 629 F.2d at 913. This 
became the “primary purpose” test for FISA, which has since been followed by 
other courts of appeals. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 726. The appeals 
court suggested that Truong may even have been at fault for contributing “to 
the FBI missing opportunities to anticipate the September 11, 2001 attacks,” 
and added that “special needs” may provide further justification for departing 
from constitutional limits. Id. at 744–45. 
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FBI, for instance, functions as both a law enforcement organi-
zation and an intelligence agency.683 Over the past decade, 
there have been increasing efforts to construct procedures with-
in the FBI which, as an operational matter, run the gamut. In 
September 2008, for example, Attorney General Mukasey is-
sued new rules for domestic FBI operations.684 The goal was to 
standardize criminal, national security, and foreign intelligence 
investigative activities—i.e., to ensure the same approval, noti-
fication, and reporting requirements.685
 
 683. It is the lead agency for the investigation of all crimes for which DOJ 
has primary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve terrorism within the 
United States’ statutory jurisdiction. See, e.g., FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGA-
TION, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC OPERATIONS 5 
(Sept. 2008) [hereinafter AGG-DOM], available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/ 
readingroom/guidelines.pdf. Terrorism is defined as “the unlawful use of force 
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a government, 
the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in furtherance of political or 
social objectives.” 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l) (2012). Similarly, the term “[f]ederal 
crime of terrorism” is defined as an offense (1) “calculated to influence or affect 
the conduct of government by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against 
government conduct,” 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5)(A) (2006), and (2) is a violation 
of federal statutes related to, among others, the “destruction of aircraft or air-
craft facilities,” id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); see id. § 32, “violence at international 
airports,” id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); see id. § 37, or “arson within special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction” of the United States, id. § 2332b(g)(5)(B)(i); see id. 
§ 81.  
 The new rules recog-
nized four broad authorities granted to the FBI: (1) to collect 
domestic and foreign intelligence and conduct investigations to 
detect, obtain information about, and prevent and protect 
against federal crimes and threats to the national security; (2) 
 684. AGG-DOM, supra note 683. The document replaced previous guide-
lines, which had been introduced between 1976 and 2006. The AGG-DOM re-
placed: (1) The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering 
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations (May 30, 2002); (2) The At-
torney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and For-
eign Intelligence Collection (Oct. 31, 2003); (3) The Attorney General’s Supple-
mental Guidelines for Collection, Retention, and Dissemination of Foreign 
Intelligence (Nov. 29, 2006); (4) The Attorney General Procedure for Reporting 
and Use of Information Concerning Violations of Law and Authorization for 
Participation in Otherwise Illegal Activity in FBI Foreign Intelligence, Coun-
terintelligence or International Terrorism Intelligence Investigations (Aug. 8, 
1988); and (5) The Attorney General’s Guidelines for Reporting on Civil Disor-
ders and Demonstrations Involving a Federal Interest (Apr. 5, 1976). AGG-
DOM, supra note 683, at 14; see also FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DO-
MESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS GUIDE xi (Dec. 16, 2008) [hereinaf-
ter DIOG], available at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/FBI_ 
guidelines/domestic_investigations_and_operations_guide_part1.pdf (revising 
the FBI’s internal policies to implement the AGG-DOM). 
 685. DIOG, supra note 684, at 1; see also AGG-DOM, supra note 683, at 5–
11. 
  
528 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:407 
 
to provide investigative assistance to other federal, state, local, 
or tribal agencies, and certain foreign agencies; (3) to conduct 
intelligence analysis and planning; and (4) to retain and share 
information.686
DHS and other agencies, like the FBI, consider their re-
sponsibilities to extend from criminal law to national securi-
ty.
  
687 Such institutional emphases similarly reflect in dual-use 
programs and systems. The FBI’s Next Generation Identifica-
tion, for instance, incorporates databases that extend from pe-
dophiles to “known or suspected terrorists.”688
New institutional relationships further contribute to the 
breakdown of barriers between criminal law and national secu-
rity. Interoperability, in turn, is beginning to alter traditional 
institutional relationships, with federal—and federalist—
implications. Efforts to create common platforms, to ensure 
consistent collection of information, and to allow agencies ac-
cess to other agencies’ data erodes important protections—
which is, of course, the aim. Such initiatives may take the form 
of common standards, memoranda of understanding, the crea-
tion of new (joint biometrics) agencies and institutions, or the 
formation of new networks (such as the Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces).
  
689 Each of these allows agencies to gain access to in-
formation to which it would not otherwise be privy, either be-
cause of bureaucratic divisions at the federal level, or because 
of local/state primacy in regard to criminal law. To the extent 
that data procurement and analysis reaches into intelligence 
gathering, the blending of these worlds carry Fourth Amend-
ment implications, lowering the standards that might other-
wise be applied in criminal law.690
 
 686. DIOG, supra note 
 
684, at 3 (also noting that each of these must be 
conducted consistent with the DIOG, as well as the AGG-DOM). 
 687. See GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-715T, HOMELAND SECU-
RITY: INFORMATION SHARING RESPONSIBILITIES, CHALLENGES, AND KEY MAN-
AGEMENT ISSUES 1–2 (2003), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/110/ 
109951.pdf. 
 688. NEXT GENERATION IDENTIFICATION, supra note 201. 
 689. Protecting America from Terrorist Attack: Our Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, http://www.fbi.gov/about-us/investi 
gate/terrorism/terrorism_jttfs (last visited Nov. 2, 2012). 
 690. An additional consideration not addressed in the text is the point at 
which analysis becomes a search. That is, the collection of information may be 
understood as falling outside of the contours of that search, but the analysis of 
this same information may then move the discussion into the search domain. 
Similarly, the collection of urine may not itself be a search, but urinalysis may 
then be deemed to fall within its contours. See generally Nat’l Treasury Emps. 
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D. DEGREE OF INTRUSIVENESS  
Why does it matter? Why should the Executive’s sudden 
expansion into this realm, the lack of a statutory framing, and 
the inadequacy of Fourth Amendment doctrine in the face of 
remote biometric identification give us pause? The reason is be-
cause the technologies at issue in RBI present a unique chal-
lenge to liberty. The level of intrusiveness represents some-
thing different in kind—not degree—from what has come 
before. It alters the type of surveillance that can occur. It al-
lows for prolonged surveillance to an extent not previously con-
templated. And it carries significantly fewer resource limita-
tions than might otherwise accompany individual search or 
identification, allowing for significantly greater occurrence of 
both. 
1. Type and Kind of Surveillance 
Since the onset of the digital revolution, courts have recog-
nized the considerable power derived from the use of electronic 
technologies. In the 1973 case of United States v. King, for in-
stance, the Ninth Circuit recognized that Title III’s procedures 
“were designed to protect the general public from abuse of the 
awesome power of electronic surveillance.”691 In Torres, the 
Seventh Circuit suggested that “[t]elevision surveillance is 
identical in its indiscriminate character to wiretapping and 
bugging. It is even more invasive of privacy, just as a strip 
search is more invasive than a pat-down search.”692 The Tenth 
Circuit agreed that “video surveillance can be vastly more in-
trusive” than audio surveillance.693
As different technologies combine, the level of intrusive-
ness may significantly deepen. Thus, Judge Richard Posner 
recognized in Torres, “[w]e think it is . . . unarguable that tele-
vision surveillance is exceedingly intrusive, especially in com-
bination . . . with audio surveillance, and inherently indiscrim-
  
 
Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989) (holding that the urinalysis test 
required as part of the U.S. Customs’ Service drug-screening program consti-
tutes a search and is therefore subject to Fourth Amendment analysis); Skin-
ner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 617 (1988) (holding that state-
compelled collection and testing of urine constitutes a search under the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 691. United States v. King, 478 F.2d 494, 505 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 692. United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875, 885 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 693. United States v. Mesa-Rincon, 911 F.2d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1990). 
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inate, and that it could be grossly abused—to eliminate person-
al privacy as understood in modern Western nations.”694
Adding biometric recognition technology presumably takes 
us further down the path. No longer are we discussing merely 
audio or video surveillance. Nor is the information gleaned lim-
ited to physical movement of vehicles through space. Instead, 
we are considering personally identifiable information, the loss 
of anonymity, social association, the attribution of actions to 
individuals, and the possibility of serializing this information to 
generate new knowledge in the process. The difference is not 
merely one of degree—which is how, thus far, the Court has 
been considering parallel technologies. 
  
Consider here continual surveillance using GPS devices—a 
realm at least comparable to video surveillance paired with fa-
cial recognition in the tracking thereby made possible. In 
Knotts, Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, suggested that 
the augmentation of human sensory faculties by science and 
technology does not create a new category in terms of Fourth 
Amendment protections. “Nothing in the Fourth Amendment 
prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties be-
stowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science 
and technology afforded them in this case.”695 Following a car 
through public space using a beeper, therefore, did not consti-
tute a search.696
To the extent that beepers or GPS merely augment law en-
forcement’s senses, creating a more efficient system, the differ-
ence may indeed be, more narrowly, one of degree.
  
697
 
 694. Torres, 751 F.2d at 882. 
 According-
ly, Judge Posner argued in United States v. Garcia that the 
only difference between the police following a car around and 
 695. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282 (1983). 
 696. Id. at 278, 285. The Court left open whether the act of installing a de-
vice in a vehicle converts the tracking into a search. Id. at 279 n.*. See also 
United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 713–14 (1984) (noting that monitoring a 
beeper is “less intrusive than a full-scale search,” but that it allows the Gov-
ernment to obtain information it could not have otherwise learned without a 
warrant); United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 996–97 (7th Cir. 2007) (not-
ing that the courts of appeals have been divided on the question of whether 
installing a beeper turned a tracking into a search).  
 697. See, e.g., United States v. Hufford, 539 F.2d 32, 34 (9th Cir. 1976), 
partially overruled by Jones v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012), as recog-
nized in United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2012); Unit-
ed States v. Frazier, 538 F.2d 1322, 1326 (8th Cir. 1976) (Ross, J., concurring); 
Dunivant v. State, 273 S.E.2d 621, 625 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (comparing binocu-
lars to beepers). 
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observing the car’s movements via cameras mounted on lamp-
posts or satellite imaging was one of technology, with no mean-
ingful Fourth Amendment implications.698 For Judge Posner, 
GPS devices, technologically on the side of surveillance camer-
as or satellite imagery, do not constitute a search under the 
Fourth Amendment.699
Not everyone agrees. On the other side stands the argu-
ment that, even in relation to GPS, the reason for using the 
technology in the first place is because it allows law enforce-
ment to do something that it otherwise could not accomplish. 
Such technologies therefore represent something different in 
kind, not merely degree, from physical surveillance.
 
700
  Use of a beeper to monitor a vehicle involves something more . . . 
than magnification of the observer’s senses as in the use of a helicop-
ter, binoculars, radar, or the like. Whether or not the beeper is legally 
implanted by use of stealth or attached by a technical trespass to the 
vehicle, it transforms the vehicle, unknown to its owner, into a mes-
senger in the service of those watching it. While a driver has no claim 
to be free from observation while driving in public, he properly can 
expect not to be carrying around an uninvited device that continuous-
ly signals his presence.
 The First 
Circuit explained: 
701
What amounted to efficiency, then, for Judge Posner, added up 
to a significant increase in the intrusiveness of the surveillance 
for the First Circuit. 
 
Judge Posner did recognize that there were limits to his 
position. One significant difference for him, between the police 
officer following the car around and using video, satellite, or 
GPS technologies, was the potential for “wholesale surveil-
lance.”702
It would be premature to rule that such a program of mass surveil-
lance could not possibly raise a question under the Fourth Amend-
ment—that it could not be a search because it would merely be an ef-
ficient alternative to hiring another 10 million police officers to tail 
every vehicle on the nation’s roads.
 He wrote: 
703
Efficiency halted at the doorstep of mass surveillance. The Gar-
cia case did not address the precise contours of where such a 
 
 
 698. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997–98. 
 699. Id. at 997.  
 700. United States v. Holmes, 521 F.2d 859, 866 n.13 (5th Cir. 1975), aff’d 
en banc, 537 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1976) (“If this be true . . . then there is no need 
for the device in the first place. Its value lies in its ability to convey infor-
mation not otherwise available to the government.”). 
 701. United States v. Moore, 562 F.2d 106, 112 (1st Cir. 1977). 
 702. Garcia, 474 F.3d at 997–98. 
 703. Id. at 998. 
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line might be drawn. Nor did Judge Posner consider whether 
and what type of restrictions might be constitutionally re-
quired. 
Applied to RBI, one could convincingly argue that bio-
metric technologies so change the parameters as to make the 
use of this technology different in kind.704 As Christopher Milli-
gan observes, most people do not expect that their actions in 
public will be randomly observed, with a host of private data 
simultaneously linked to them.705 This suggests an expectation 
of anonymity and personal privacy, even when standing in a 
crowd in the public sphere. Consistent with this view, courts 
have recognized the right to various forms of anonymity, sug-
gesting the existence of, at a minimum a “quasi-right” in ano-
nymity—protected in some cases, but not in others.706
The absence of individualized suspicion in particular 
changes the context. Suspicionless searches have been accepted 
by the courts in other areas. In National Treasury Employees 
Union v. Von Raab, for instance, the Court allowed for federal 
employees as a whole to be scanned for drug use, even when no 
individual was directly suspected of using drugs.
 To the 
extent that RBI technology takes this away, it is different in 
kind than the sort of targeted identification activity contem-
plated by fingerprint and palm biometrics.  
707
 
 704. See, e.g., Marc Jonathan Blitz, Video Surveillance and the Constitu-
tion of Public Space: Fitting the Fourth Amendment to a World that Tracks 
Image and Identity, 82 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1392–98 (2004); John J. Brogan, 
Facing the Music: The Dubious Constitutionality of Facial Recognition Tech-
nology, 25 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 65, 81–82 (2002); Max Guirguis, Elec-
tronic Visual Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy, 9 J. 
TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 168–71 (2004); Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial 
Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. 
L.J. 295, 319–20 (1999); Carla Scherr, Note, You Better Watch Out, You Better 
Not Frown, New Video Surveillance Techniques are Already in Town (and 
Other Public Spaces), 3 I/S: J. L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 499, 500 (2008); 
Robert H. Thornburg, Note, Face Recognition Technology: The Potential Orwel-
lian Implications and Constitutionality of Current Uses Under the Fourth 
Amendment, 20 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 321, 330–31 (2002). 
 Similarly, 
Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz allowed 
 705. Milligan, supra note 704, at 318–19. 
 706. Alexander T. Nguyen, Note, Here’s Looking at You, Kid: Has Face-
Recognition Technology Completely Outflanked the Fourth Amendment?, 7 VA. 
J.L. & TECH. 2, para. 52 (2002) (citing Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 
497 U.S. 502 (1990); Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Hazelwood Sch. 
Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); United States v. Brown, 250 F.3d 907 
(5th Cir. 2001); Roe v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678 (11th 
Cir. 2001)). 
 707. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989). 
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suspicionless searches for DUI-related checkpoints.708
First, massive amounts of contextual data would be cap-
tured. Carla Scherr explains:  
 But in 
the realm of RBI, suspicionless searches would result in at 
least four significant changes that shift the nature of what is 
being considered.  
  Unlike the beat cop, automated video surveillance sees every-
thing, forgets nothing, and never gets tired or distracted. It captures 
digital images that can be viewed at any time, from any place, as 
many times as desired, and can be modified and used well beyond the 
original intent of either the image collector or the subject. The ex-
treme zoom capabilities of today’s cameras allow them to be so distant 
from the subject that the subject is likely to be unaware and unsus-
pecting that surveillance might be present, and the camera can cap-
ture a subject’s image at a level of intimacy that would be totally un-
acceptable if the image were observed in person. Not even the cover of 
darkness provides protection; images can be captured in very low 
lighting and can capture information, such as the subject’s tempera-
ture, that is not apparent to the naked eye.709
Second, the incident would re-create the conditions of a consen-
sual encounter—without carrying any of the consensuality oth-
erwise involved. Third, the information thus obtained could be 
linked with other data, generating new knowledge in the pro-
cess. Fourth, such data could retroactively implicate individu-
als in a way significantly different from immediate drug testing 
might reveal. There is something at least odd about having the 
definition of a search depend upon information not available at 
the time the search occurs. 
 
2. Length of Surveillance 
Along with a shift in the type and kind of surveillance un-
der consideration, the expansion to RBI introduces the poten-
tial for prolonged surveillance. In Maynard, as aforementioned, 
the District of Columbia Circuit Court examined the question 
left open in Knotts: whether extended surveillance using a GPS 
device to track an individual constituted a search within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.710
 
 708. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990). 
 The court found that 
“unlike one’s movements during a single journey, the whole of 
 709. Scherr, supra note 704, at 505–06 (citations omitted). 
 710. United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 563–64 (D.C. Cir. 2010), aff’d 
sub nom., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); see also United States 
v. Marquez, 605 F.3d 604, 609–10 (8th Cir. 2010); United States v. Pineda-
Moreno, 591 F.3d 1212, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. Garcia, 474 
F.3d 994, 996–98 (7th Cir. 2007) (expressly reserving the question of whether 
wholesale or mass electronic surveillance requires a warrant). 
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one’s movements over the course of a month is not actually ex-
posed to the public because the likelihood anyone will observe 
all of those movements is effectively nil.”711 In considering 
whether something was exposed to the public, the question for 
the court is not what another person could physically or lawful-
ly do, but rather what a reasonable person would expect others 
to do.712
This approach reflected the Court’s jurisprudence in simi-
lar contexts. In Florida v. Riley, for instance, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor, whose concurrence was integral to the judg-
ment, noted: 
  
Ciraolo’s expectation of privacy was unreasonable not because the 
airplane was operating where it had a “right to be,” but because pub-
lic air travel at 1,000 feet is a sufficiently routine part of modern life 
that it is unreasonable for persons on the ground to expect that their 
curtilage will not be observed from the air at that altitude.713
In Bond v. United States, the Supreme Court reaffirmed this 
approach.
 
714 The Court did not focus on what the passengers 
could have done but instead on what a reasonable passenger 
would expect.715 Kyllo picked up on this line of reasoning as 
well, where the question became whether the technology in 
question was in general use.716
It is one thing for a passerby to observe or even to follow someone 
during a single journey as he goes to the market or returns home from 
work. It is another thing entirely for that stranger to pick up the 
scent again the next day and the day after that, week in and week 
out, dogging his prey until he has identified all the places, people, 
amusements, and chores that make up that person’s hitherto private 
routine.
 In Maynard, the court ex-
plained: 
717
Although the government did not argue that constructive expo-
sure derived from the fact that the individual’s movements at 
the time were in full public view, the court nevertheless ad-
dressed it: “When it comes to privacy . . . precedent suggests 
that the whole may be more revealing than the parts. Applying 
that precedent to the circumstances of this case, we hold the in-
formation the police discovered using the GPS device was not 
 
 
 711. Maynard, 615 F.3d at 558. 
 712. Id. at 559.  
 713. Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 453 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 714. Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000). 
 715. Id. at 338–39. 
 716. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001). 
 717. 615 F.3d at 560. 
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constructively exposed.”718 The court recognized that, similar to 
the mosaic theory applied in the state’s secrets realm, bits of 
information that may initially appear unimportant change in 
quality when given a broader context.719
Prolonged surveillance, for the court, thus revealed a dif-
ferent sort of information than that obtained by short-term 
surveillance. Repeatedly going to the gym or attending a syna-
gogue tells a different story than just visiting those places one 
time. Such sequences reveal more information. Thus, a single 
trip to an OBGYN is simply one data point. But followed a 
week later by a visit to Babies“R”Us, a different picture may 
emerge.
  
720 The court noted that a reasonable person does not 
expect that everything she does will be recorded.721 Instead, 
there is a basic expectation of anonymity.722 The court thus con-
cluded that the object of the prolonged surveillance in the case, 
Jones, not only had an expectation of privacy, but that it was 
reasonable.723
The court of appeals denied a petition for rehearing en 
banc.
 
724 Chief Judge David Sentelle, joined by Judges Karen 
Henderson, Janice Rogers Brown, and Brett Kavanaugh, dis-
sented.725 Judge Sentelle, offering a different-in-kind analysis, 
pointed out that the GPS device merely enhanced human sens-
es.726 The case was therefore undistinguishable from Knotts.727
 
 718. Id. at 560–61; see also id. at 562 (“The difference is not one of degree 
but of kind, for no single journey reveals the habits and patterns that mark 
the distinction between a day in the life and a way of life, nor the departure 
from a routine that, like the dog that did not bark in the Sherlock Holmes sto-
ry, may reveal even more.”). 
 
The volume of information obtained, over time, mattered not at 
all: “The fact that no particular individual sees . . . all [an indi-
vidual does over the course of a month] does not make the 
 719. Id. at 562. 
 720. Id. 
 721. Id. at 563. 
 722. Id. 
 723. Id. at 566. (“This case does not require us to, and therefore we do not, 
decide whether a hypothetical instance of prolonged visual surveillance would 
be a search subject to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 724. United States v. Jones, 625 F.3d 766, 767 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
 725. Id. 
 726. Id. at 768. 
 727. He stated, “There is no material difference between tracking the 
movements of the Knotts defendant with a beeper and tracking [respondent] 
with a GPS.” Id. at 768. 
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movements any less public.”728 He flatly rejected the argument 
“that [the] whole reveals more . . . than does the sum of its 
parts.”729 As the court concluded in Knotts, “[t]he reasonable 
expectation of privacy as to a person’s movements on the high-
way is . . . zero. The sum of an infinite number of zero-value 
parts is also zero.”730
In United States v. Jones, even as she joined the majority 
on grounds of trespass, Justice Sotomayor picked up on this 
line of reasoning, suggesting that “[i]n cases involving even 
short-term monitoring, some unique attributes of GPS surveil-
lance relevant to the Katz analysis will require particular at-
tention.”
 
731
GPS monitoring generates a precise, comprehensive record of a per-
son’s public movements that reflects a wealth of detail about her fa-
milial, political, professional, religious, and sexual associations. See, 
[sic] e.g., People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y. 3d 433, 441–42, 909 N.E. 2d 1195, 
1199 (2009) (“Disclosed in [GPS] data. . . will be trips the indisputably 
private nature of which takes little imagination to conjure: trips to 
the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS 
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the 
by-the-hour motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or 
church, the gay bar and on and on”). The Government can store such 
records and efficiently mine them for information years into the fu-
ture. And because GPS monitoring is cheap in comparison to conven-
tional surveillance techniques and, by design, proceeds surreptitious-
ly, it evades the ordinary checks that constrain abusive law 
enforcement practices. . . .
 She continued, 
732
Justice Sotomayor’s words suggested perhaps an even more ag-
gressive posture than that adopted by Justice Alito in his con-
currence.
 
733
What animates these judicial decisions is a growing uneas-
iness about whether the information generated by certain 
forms of surveillance is different in kind, or merely degree, 
from what could otherwise be gleaned. The prolonged nature of 
the surveillance, along with its perfect recall, here plays an im-
portant role. Even where these arguments have surfaced, the 
technologies in question have been less intrusive than that 
which marks the biometric realm. A GPS chip may reveal 
  
 
 728. Id.  
 729. Id. at 769.  
 730. Id. 
 731. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 955 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., con-
curring). 
 732. Id. at 955–56 (citation omitted). 
 733. See id. at 961 (Alito, J., concurring) (discussing the problems of long-
term GPS surveillance). 
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where the car goes, but the verification of personally identifia-
ble information, which is at issue in remote biometric identifi-
cation, is more invasive in its direct and personal link to a spe-
cific individual. 
To the extent that the information gleaned is understood 
as third party data, the Court’s jurisprudence presents further 
difficulties. The Supreme Court has made it clear that infor-
mation voluntarily provided to third parties does not fall sub-
ject to any reasonable expectation of privacy.734 The federal 
government, however, is designing systems specifically to gath-
er third party biometric data, such as pictures from social net-
working sites, CCTV footage, and images provided by friends 
and relatives.735 This information can then be paired with bio-
graphic information—i.e., hard data about what an individual 
does or says, where they live, what they buy, and with whom 
they associate. In the aggregate, such information could pro-
vide a staggering amount of insight into a target’s life. As Jus-
tice Sotomayor notes in Jones, the third party data protections 
otherwise afforded by the Court are “ill suited to the digital 
age, in which people reveal a great deal of information about 
themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mun-
dane tasks.”736
3. Resource Limitations and Frequency of Occurrence 
 To the extent that the facial images, video foot-
age, or other biometric data is obtained from third parties, a 
function for which the FBI’s Next Generation Identification 
system is actually designed, and paired with biographic infor-
mation, under the Court’s current jurisprudence, such infor-
mation would not constitute a search or be subject to Fourth 
Amendment protections. 
In United States v. Garcia, Judge Posner suggested that 
certain forms of technological progress may pose a threat to 
privacy by enabling surveillance to an extent that in earlier 
times would have been prohibitively expensive.737
 
 734. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); United 
States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). 
 Assuming, 
arguendo, that remote biometric identification is not a full 
search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment (i.e., that 
it is something less than a full search), one question might be 
 735. See Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA) for the Next Generation Identifi-
cation (NGI) Interstate Photo System (IPS), supra note 18. 
 736. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 737. United States v. Garcia, 474 F.3d 994, 998 (7th Cir. 2007). 
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whether it falls within an area similar to that carved out under 
Terry v. Ohio.738
In Terry, the Court held that the police could stop and frisk 
a passerby based on reasonable suspicion.
 Here, Judge Posner’s warning about lifting re-
source restrictions proves particularly prescient. 
739 The idea was that, 
in justifying the search, the police officer must be able to point 
to specific and articulable facts, which, taken together with 
reasonable inferences from those facts, warrant the intrusion.740 
Those facts have to be judged against an objective standard: 
whether the information available at that time would justify a 
person in taking such action.741 Terry dealt with a physical pat 
down on the outside of the clothes.742 In 2004, the Court ad-
dressed whether merely asking someone their name, in the 
course of a Terry stop, raised a Fourth Amendment issue.743 In 
a 5-4 decision, the Court held Nevada’s “stop and identify” 
statute constitutional.744
The reasonableness of a search entails balancing the indi-
vidual’s interest in privacy against the government’s interest in 
the specific intrusion.
  
745 The Supreme Court recognized in Terry 
that the Fourth Amendment requires that courts assume the 
responsibility of guarding against police conduct that is over-
bearing or harassing.746 Noted Fourth Amendment scholar 
Wayne LaFave reads this as suggesting that “harassment-by-
surveillance, at least when there is ‘harassment bordering on 
arrest,’ therefore should be viewed as a violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.”747
Do biometric identification devices accomplish by technolo-
gy what constant stops would do if executed by officers of the 
law? It seems to me that the answer to this is yes. Just as fre-
quent stops of pedestrians and the manual recording of that in-
formation would create a record of movement in public space, 
  
 
 738. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 
 739. Id. at 30. 
 740. Id. at 21. 
 741. Id. 
 742. Id. at 7. 
 743. Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 184–85 (2004). 
 744. Id. at 178 (“The Court is now of the view that Terry principles permit 
a State to require a suspect to disclose his name in the course of a Terry 
stop.”). 
 745. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976); 
United States v. Klein, 522 F.2d 296, 300–01 (1st Cir. 1975). 
 746. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1968). 
 747. LAFAVE, supra note 569, § 2.7 at 778–79 (footnotes omitted). 
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so too might the use of biometric identification devices. In fact, 
it could create not just frequent records of individuals’ move-
ments, but constant records of the same. This appears to be 
something different than what is contemplated by the Court’s 
jurisprudence in relation to a Terry stop. It is a difference that 
is enabled by the loosening of resource limitations. 
It could be argued in response that just because RBI per-
forms a similar function to a Terry stop does not mean that it 
does so in a harassing manner. One could convincingly claim 
that the level of harassment involved in RBI is actually negli-
gible. In the course of a Terry stop, an individual is forced to 
suspend one’s activities. Movement is limited, resulting in a 
loss of physical and personal freedom. But simply having this 
information recorded as one passes through space does not (on 
the surface) appear to entail any physical limitation. Admitted-
ly, this argument assumes that individuals under such surveil-
lance do not alter their movements or behavior because of it. 
But in such circumstances, the level of harassment may be so 
small as to be non-existent. Further, even denying the underly-
ing assumption and granting that individuals may change their 
behavior, surely it would be a convoluted reading of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, to connect this to the physical limitation of a 
face-to-face encounter. 
The problem with this line of argument is that it still as-
sumes a framing based on degree, not kind—i.e., that the level 
of harassment in RBI is less than the level of harassment in a 
face-to-face encounter, while the level of monitoring is higher 
than the level of monitoring in the same. It also rather misses 
the point, which is the level of information obtained by a relax-
ation of the resource constraint. 
IV.  FURTHER POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHALLENGES   
Privacy concerns are not the only potential constitutional 
challenge. Fifth Amendment protections against self-
incrimination, First Amendment assurance of the right to 
speech and assembly, and Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment 
due process concerns similarly present themselves. Yet the as-
sociated jurisprudence in each of these areas proves inadequate 
to address the phenomenon of remote biometric identification. 
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A. FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION  
Consider the Fifth Amendment, which provides that “[n]o 
person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself.”748
A practical example will suffice. A government-owned cam-
era using remote biometric identification may be directed at 
public space in a neighborhood. It seems odd to think of the in-
dividual entering that space as being compelled by the govern-
ment to do so. Similarly, a closed circuit television in a grocery 
store such as Safeway—owned by a private company—hardly 
amounts to government compulsion to enter the store. In both 
instances, the decision to enter the space under surveillance, 
whence facial recognition or iris scans could be used to ascer-
tain identity, appears to be voluntary. To the extent that either 
of these decisions is not voluntary (e.g., the need to leave one’s 
home and travel through the neighborhood to get to work, or 
the need to enter the grocery store in order to buy milk for one’s 
infant), it is not government action that compels it, but rather 
sheer day-to-day living necessity. It is not just the entering of 
one or two areas under surveillance, moreover, that an individ-
ual encounters in the course of daily life. British studies have 
noted, for instance, that the average Londoner is caught on 
camera, in public space, some 300 times per day.
 This provision is rooted in protections 
against being forced by the government to engage in certain 
behavior—not (as with the Fourth Amendment), efforts to limit 
what the government can do directly to an individual. Thus, at 
the broadest level, the way remote biometric identification pre-
sents seems not to implicate the Fifth Amendment.  
749
The result of entering into public space, then, where re-
mote biometric technologies can then identify and track one’s 
movements, results in a sort of caveat civis—citizens beware. If 
one is travelling in public, there is a sort of de facto notice that 
the information could be captured, recorded, and shared. Most 
of the time, it is not the government demanding that individu-
als enter public space. Necessity or personal desire—such as 
wanting to see friends, pursue an education, or find new 
clothes—may be the driving force. It is thus perhaps unsurpris-
ing that no cases have yet to consider FRT, much less FRT 
  
 
 748. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 749. See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 
2321, 2324 (2007). 
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paired with video surveillance, in the context of the Fifth 
Amendment.  
But what about the mere provision of the information it-
self? Could a case be made that the point at which FRT and 
video technologies narrowly, or RBI more broadly, become 
communicative or testimonial, such information falls within 
Fifth Amendment protections? That is, the government may 
not be forcing you to enter public space, but it is forcing you, 
once you are in public space, to reveal personal information—
such as who you are dating, whether you are pregnant, or 
whether you were routinely go to topless bars. To the extent 
that such information becomes testimonial, or communicative, 
could it fall within the protections of the Fifth Amendment? 
In 1966, the Supreme Court addressed questions raised by 
biometric identification.750 Schmerber v. California dealt with 
the collection of a blood sample taken involuntarily from a hos-
pitalized patient who had been arrested for driving under the 
influence.751 The Warren Court unanimously found that the 
Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination only 
applies to evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature.752 
Justice Brennan admitted that requiring the petitioner to sub-
mit to the withdrawal and chemical analysis of blood amounted 
to government compulsion.753 But while the Fifth Amendment 
might reach one’s testimony or communications, it stopped 
short of protecting against compelling individuals “to submit to 
fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or 
speak for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume 
a stance, to walk, or to make a particular gesture.”754 Compel-
ling biometric data that “makes a suspect or accused the source 
of ‘real or physical evidence’” thus fell short of Fifth Amend-
ment protections.755
 
 750. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 759 (1966). 
 The Court noted that the distinction be-
 751. Id. 
 752. Id. at 761 (“We hold that the privilege protects an accused only from 
being compelled to testify against himself, or otherwise provide the State with 
evidence of a testimonial or communicative nature, and that the withdrawal of 
blood and use of the analysis in question in this case did not involve compul-
sion to these ends.” (footnote omitted)). 
 753. Id. 
 754. Id. at 764 (footnote omitted). 
 755. Id. (emphasis added). This holding was consistent with the Court’s 
earlier ruling in Holt v. United States, in which the question turned on wheth-
er requiring a defendant to put on a blouse—to prove that it was owned by the 
defendant—amounted to compelled testimonial evidence. 218 U.S. 245, 252–53 
(1910). 
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tween physical information and testimonial or communicative 
interactions may not always be so clear.756 The key was whether 
the information provided substituted for evidence for use in 
criminal proceedings, or whether it could give rise to infor-
mation that could later be used as evidence.757
Successive cases adopted a similar approach. The year af-
ter Schmerber, in Gilbert v. California, the Court extended its 
reasoning to include handwriting samples, holding that “[a] 
mere handwriting exemplar, in contrast to the content of what 
is written, like the voice or body itself, is an identifying physi-
cal characteristic outside [the Fifth Amendment’s] protec-
tion.”
 
758 That same year, the Court addressed identification pro-
cedures in the context of a lineup. Several weeks after he had 
been indicted for bank robbery, the respondent in United States 
v. Wade had been placed in a lineup and required to repeat 
words similar to those allegedly spoken by the robber, at which 
point two employees made a positive identification.759 The 
Court held that “[n]either the lineup itself nor anything shown 
by this record that Wade was required to do in the lineup vio-
lated his privilege against self-incrimination.”760
We have no doubt that compelling the accused merely to exhibit his 
person for observation by a prosecution witness prior to trial involves 
no compulsion of the accused to give evidence having testimonial sig-
nificance. It is compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical char-
acteristics, not compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have. 
It is no different from compelling Schmerber to provide a blood sam-
ple or Holt to wear the blouse, and, as in those instances, is not with-
in the cover of the privilege.
 The Court ex-
plained, 
761
The use of his visage or his voice merely as an identifying phys-
ical characteristic did not speak to his guilt. In 1973, the Court 
took a similar line in considering whether the compelled pro-
duction of voice exemplars violated the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege against compulsory self-incrimination.
 
762
 
 756. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 764. 
 In 1988, the 
Court further consolidated its jurisprudence in Doe v. United 
States, a case in which the target of a federal grand jury inves-
tigation pled the Fifth Amendment to avoid turning over fur-
 757. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972). 
 758. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263, 266–67 (1967). 
 759. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 222 (1967). 
 760. Id. at 221. 
 761. Id. at 222. 
 762. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1973). 
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ther information about the existence or location of bank rec-
ords.763 In order for evidence to be testimonial, “an accused’s 
communication must itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a fac-
tual assertion or disclose information. Only then is a person 
compelled to be a ‘witness’ against himself.”764
These cases all addressed the question of immediate identi-
fication: individuals asked, on a specific occasion, to provide in-
formation that served to identify themselves. To this extent, 
they replicated the conditions laid out, above, in relation to 
immediate biometric identification, or IBI: i.e., situations fo-
cused on (1) a single person; (2) in close proximity; (3) in rela-
tion to custodial detention; (4) in a manner involving notice; 
and (5) as a one-time occurrence. In these circumstances, the 
target individuals were being compelled to take steps to provide 
the data being sought.  
 Certain acts 
(such as being compelled to furnish a blood sample, provide a 
handwriting or voice exemplar, stand in a lineup, or wear par-
ticular clothing) may thus be incriminating, but still fall out-
side the privilege. 
RBI, in contrast, identifies (1) multiple individuals; (2) at a 
distance; (3) moving through public space; (4) absent notice and 
consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going manner. Such 
targets provide evidentiary data simply by moving through 
public space. The problem is that Fifth Amendment jurispru-
dence, to the extent that it contemplates the provision of evi-
dence from biometric technologies, does so in the context of 
IBI—not remote biometric identification. 
B. FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND ASSOCIATION 
What about the second constitutional consideration—First 
Amendment protections?765
 
 763. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201, 202 (1988). 
 It is at least theoretically possible 
for RBI to be subject to challenge on First Amendment grounds, 
particularly where harm to political or religious speech or asso-
ciation can be demonstrated, or a connection between the tar-
get of RBI and the compelling government interest can be sev-
ered. Yet, here as well, the doctrine proves inadequate as a 
meaningful framework. 
 764. Id. at 210 (footnote omitted). 
 765. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, 
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition 
the Government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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Under the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence, the 
government is prevented from regulating speech directly be-
cause of its message.766 It can, however, regulate actions for 
reasons not having to do with any expressive message it might 
entail.767 The key question is whether such law (a) is within the 
constitutional power of the government, (b) whether it furthers 
an important or substantial government interest, (c) whether 
this interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, 
and (d) whether the incidental restriction on First Amendment 
freedoms is “no greater than is essential to the furtherance” of 
the targeted interest.768 The Court considers expressive public 
conduct or speech-related public association as falling within 
the protections of the First Amendment, thus requiring the 
government to justify its actions on a meaningful law enforce-
ment ground.769
In the context of the McCarthy era and rapidly expanding 
oath and affirmation requirements, the Court found in a num-
ber of cases that constitutional violations could arise from the 
chilling effect of governmental regulations.
 
770 The Court ex-
plained that in such circumstances, a heavy burden lies on the 
government to demonstrate that the inquiry is necessary to 
protect a legitimate state interest.771 Early cases in this area fo-
cused on instances in which the target had incurred a direct 
penalty.772 They left open the problem of the more generalized 
harm caused by the individual knowing that they were being 
subject to surveillance—or the “concomitant fear that, armed 
with the fruits of those activities, the agency might in the fu-
ture take some other and additional action detrimental to that 
individual.”773
In 1972, the Court addressed this question in a challenge 
to the Department of the Army’s surveillance of domestic civil-
ian activity.
 
774
 
 766. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 In a program strikingly close to the capacity rep-
 767. See id. 
 768. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). 
 769. Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public 
Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L.J. 213, 257–58 (2002). 
 770. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar of Ariz., 401 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1971); Keyishian 
v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of the State of N.Y., 385 U.S. 589, 592 (1967); 
Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of the U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 305 (1965). 
 771. Baird, 401 U.S. at 6–7. 
 772. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972). 
 773. Id.  
 774. Id. at 2. 
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resented by RBI, the Army had initiated a data-gathering sys-
tem in which it began monitoring public space.775 Information 
was derived from the news media, publications, intelligence 
agents in attendance at public meetings, and civilian law en-
forcement agencies.776 In light of growing civil rights agitation, 
the military cited in support of the programs its statutory au-
thority to make use of the armed forces to quell insurrection 
and to respond to domestic violence.777 The Court ruled in favor 
of the government: the burden lay on the target to establish the 
immediate danger of direct injury.778 The risk, for the Court, 
would be to limit broad scale investigations while arming civil-
ians with judicial weapons to allow them to penetrate into clas-
sified government programs.779 It was not for the judiciary to 
second guess the political branches.780
Applied to RBI, a strong argument could be marshaled that 
under Tatum, any claim as to a generalized chilling of speech 
or association would be insufficient to overcome First Amend-
ment obstacles: the government need only demonstrate a suffi-
cient government interest to overcome any objection. Law en-
forcement, now so tightly interwoven with pressing national 
security concerns, would appear to meet this test. Indeed, cases 
following Tatum underscored that efforts to claim that the 
threat of surveillance undermined political speech would hence-
forward be foreclosed.
 
781 Whether fear constituted a cognizable 
harm was irrelevant.782 Tatum here was “clear and categorical”: 
allegations of a subjective chilling effect were simply inade-
quate.783
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed whether the 
chilling effect claimed with regard to speech extends to photo-
 
 
 775. Id. at 6. 
 776. Id. 
 777. 10 U.S.C. § 331 (2006) (“Whenever there is an insurrection in any 
State against its government, the President may, upon the request of its legis-
lature or of its governor if the legislature cannot be convened, call into Federal 
service such of the militia of the other States, in the number requested by that 
State, and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to suppress 
the insurrection.”). 
 778. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 15–16. 
 779. Id. at 14–15. 
 780. Id. at 15. 
 781. United Presbyterian Church v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1377–79 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
 782. Id. 
 783. Id. (citing Tatum, 408 U.S. at 13–14). 
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graphs or video recording of individuals at demonstrations or 
public meetings. Two lower court decisions, however, have.  
In 1975, the Third Circuit considered police surveillance of 
public meetings, in Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Religious 
Society of Friends v. Tate.784 The Philadelphia Police Depart-
ment, through its Political Disobedience Unit, had compiled 
about 18,000 files on individuals and groups, as distinct from 
the department’s interrogation and investigation records.785 The 
files included information about the targets’ political views, as-
sociations, personal life, and habits.786 Some targets were una-
ware that such files had been compiled.787 In June 1970, the po-
lice went on television, discussed system, and publicly named 
some of the targets.788 Four individuals and two organizations 
thus named brought suit alleging (1) that the practices lacked a 
nexus to legitimate police purposes and deprived plaintiffs of 
their right to anonymity in the conduct of their political activity 
and associations; (2) that the intelligence gathering chilled and 
deterred plaintiffs in their free exercise of speech and assembly; 
and (3) that the practices unconstitutionally interfered with the 
plaintiffs’ ability to form lawful political associations focused on 
unpopular views.789
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds 
of Tatum: the mere fact of an investigation was insufficient to 
find a chilling effect on speech.
 
790 The Court of Appeals reversed 
the lower court in part and affirmed in part.791 Chief Judge Col-
lins Seitz, writing for the court, determined that the complaints 
of police surveillance and the sharing of information between 
law enforcement agencies fell short of demonstrating a viola-
tion of constitutional rights; however, the allegations regarding 
sharing information with non-law enforcement parties and dis-
closing the parties’ names on national television provided suffi-
cient basis to state a cause of action.792
 
 784. Phila. Yearly Meeting of Religious Soc’y of Friends v. Tate, 519 F.2d 
1335, 1337–38 (3d Cir. 1975). 
 “[M]ere police photo-
graphing and data gathering at public meetings” was legally 
unobjectionable, creating 
 785. Id. at 1336. 
 786. Id. at 1336–37. 
 787. Id. at 1337. 
 788. Id. 
 789. Id. 
 790. Id. 
 791. Id. at 1339 (footnote omitted). 
 792. Id. 
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at best a so-called subjective chill which the Supreme Court has said 
is not a substitute for a claim of specific present harm or a threat of 
specific future harm. Nor does the sharing of this information with 
other agencies of government having a legitimate law enforcement 
function give rise to a constitutional violation.793
In contrast, dispensing the information to non-law en-
forcement agencies, as well as to the public, created an entirely 
different purpose.
 
794 “It cannot be doubted that disclosure on 
nationwide television that certain named persons or organiza-
tions are subjects of police intelligence files has a potential for a 
substantial adverse impact on such persons and organizations 
even though tangible evidence of the impact may be difficult, if 
not impossible, to obtain.”795
It could be argued that the distinction drawn in Philadel-
phia Yearly, between information collection and information 
sharing, rests on tenuous grounds. At a minimum, it seems odd 
to have a rule governing the legality of a search in which ac-
tions that take place long after the initial search end up deter-
mining its legality. Philadelphia Yearly, moreover, could be 
said to overread Tatum. Whereas the former case suggested 
that the mere presence of cameras, alone, were insufficient to 
establish a chilling effect, it could be contended that Tatum left 
open the possibility that the target of such surveillance could 
demonstrate (a) that the surveillance had occurred and (b) that 
the individual, in turn, curbed their activities—thus establish-
ing both an objective and subjective chilling of speech. Either 
way, however, the compelling government interest in ensuring 
national security would play a role.  
 
The Fourth Circuit has also considered the chilling effect of 
taking photographs of individuals at public meetings and 
demonstrations in the context of the First Amendment.796 The 
police in Richmond, Virginia at the time maintained a uni-
formed presence at such gatherings, took photos, and made 
such records available to other law enforcement agencies.797 In 
Donohoe v. Duling, the 2-1 panel found the case controlled by 
Tatum.798
 
 793. Id. at 1337–38. 
 Judge Harrison Winter, however, dissented from the 
majority, finding that the plaintiffs had both standing to sue 
and had demonstrated a cause of action entitling them to re-
 794. Id. at 1338–39. 
 795. Id. at 1339. 
 796. Donohoe v. Duling, 465 F.2d 196, 197–98 (4th Cir. 1972). 
 797. Id. 
 798. Id. at 201. 
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lief.799 For him, Tatum was decided by a majority of the Court 
“on the premise that none of the plaintiffs alleged or tendered 
any proof to show any harm to himself or any violation of his 
constitutional rights.”800 In contrast, in the immediate case, 
three witnesses had been photographed by law enforcement of-
ficers, “without their permission and inferably against their 
will, while they were engaged in the peaceful exercise of their 
first amendment right to assemble and . . . to petition their 
government for a redress of their grievances.”801 Other protest-
ers had refused to take part in the meetings once they had been 
photographed.802 Whereas Tatum considered the fear of the 
consequences of surveillance, this case contemplated actual 
harm and an actual violation of rights.803 The question thus be-
came not whether a chilling effect had occurred, but the degree 
of such chill in light of the surrounding circumstances.804 This 
pushed the court to the O’Brien test.805
Applying this case to RBI, it appears that the question of 
the harm suffered could change depending upon the location 
and targets of the surveillance in question. As a threshold mat-
ter, whether there is a First Amendment question at all rests to 
some extent on whether an action has an expressive element—
certainly a context-specific inquiry. Much of the activity in 
which individuals engage while in public may simply not fall 
into this category. In Donohoe, the Fourth Circuit considered 
more narrowly the collection of photographs at political and re-
ligious gatherings. If the FBI were to focus RBI on public space 
outside of mosques or churches, where preachers might other-
wise address crowds, perhaps a stronger case of deterrence, as 
recognized by Judge Winter, could be made. But, again, to the 
extent that the government demonstrates a compelling gov-
ernmental interest, such objections could be overcome. There 
would still need to be a substantial relationship between the 
target of the surveillance and the overriding government inter-
est—this suggests a specificity which, depending on the con-
text, may be lacking with regard to RBI. However, the broad 
range of threats now considered within the national security 
 
 
 799. Id. at 202 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
 800. Id. at 204. 
 801. Id. 
 802. Id. 
 803. Id. at 204–05. 
 804. Id. at 205. 
 805. Id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
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domain, and the innumerable sources of such threats, suggests 
that such a category may be rather broadly devised.806
Another point to draw out in this context is whether there 
may be a less intrusive means to conduct such surveillance. 
Minimization techniques here deserve notice.
 
807
In Donohue, Judge Winter drew attention to this prong of 
the O’Brien test.
 Surely it is not 
necessary for the government to collect all information about 
all individuals in public space in an effort to prevent crime. 
This stance assumes that the realistic aim of the law is and 
ought to be the elimination of all crime, for which complete and 
perfect information may be necessary. 
808 He noted that gathering information about 
an entire crowd went beyond what was necessary for the object 
at hand.809
If it is assumed that there is a legitimate reason for recording the 
identity and likeness of those who lead others in the peaceful exercise 
of their first amendment rights, there is no reason why police must 
engage in wholesale photographing of a demonstration in order to ob-
tain pictures of its leaders. In most instances the leaders are known, 
if not by the fact that they have applied for a permit for the demon-
stration, then by the fact that they are at the front of the crowd or 
giving a speech. Moreover, their identity is usually readily ascertain-
able from the local news media. I conclude that there is no justifica-
tion for intimidating all the participants in a demonstration in order 
to obtain pictures of its leaders.
 The passage, in its application to RBI, is worth quot-
ing at length: 
810
Judge Winter rejected as preposterous the idea that the po-
lice would be using photographs to identify unknown people in 
a crowd: “I cannot suppose that every time a picture is taken of 
 
 
 806. See Laura K. Donohue, The Limits of National Security, 48 AM. CRIM. 
L. REV. 1573, 1722 (2011). 
 807. Cf. Donohue, 465 F.2d at 206 (Winter, J., dissenting) (suggesting that 
the police objectives could have been achieved “with less interference to first 
amendment rights”). 
 808. Id. at 205–06 (“In dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint, the district court 
justified the practice of the police on the grounds that it (1) allows the police to 
identify demonstration leaders; (2) permits the police to identify unknown per-
sons from outside the Richmond area who are participating in the demonstra-
tion and who have records of being dangerous; (3) deters violence and vandal-
ism; and (4) serves to protect the demonstrators from counter-demonstrators. I 
am not persuaded that these objectives are furthered by the present police 
practice or, if they are, that the same results cannot be obtained with less in-
terference to first amendment rights.”). 
 809. Id. at 206. 
 810. Id.  
  
550 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [97:407 
 
an unknown person it is sent to the FBI in order to determine 
whether that person is dangerous.”811
Forty years later, this is precisely the aim of NGI and the 
type of use for which RBI is envisioned by DoD, DHS, and oth-
ers.
  
812 Judge Winter considered and rejected the possibility that 
photography might be used in this way—efforts to do so “would 
appear to be a useless tool in controlling the crowd on the day 
of the demonstration.”813 Central to his claim was the time it 
would take to develop the photographs and to disseminate 
them—considerations that appear almost quaint in light of 
modern technology. The current return time for photograph, 
iris, and fingerprint identification is a matter of seconds, leav-
ing more than enough time for the police to take steps in the 
course of a meeting or gathering.814
Judge Winter raised the question of whether any constitu-
tional limits applied to the gathering of such data on targets 
who themselves were not suspected of any wrongdoing.
 
815 In 
such cases, he surmised, law enforcement agencies could cer-
tainly take and exchange pictures.816 As for whether such pho-
tographs deterred violence and vandalism, Judge Winter point-
ed out that the presence of the police would perform an 
equivalent function—and one significantly different than moni-
toring and recording all activities that take place at a demon-
stration.817 For Judge Winter, then, “indiscriminate photo-
graphing . . . would have little value in deterring crime or 
apprehending a criminal.”818 Other, less intrusive means could 
be sought in order to avoid “injecting fear into persons who are 
peacefully exercising their first amendment rights.”819
Both Title III and the minimization requirement embedded 
in FISA recognize the importance of ensuring the least intru-
  
 
 811. Id. 
 812. See generally BIOMETRICS TASK FORCE., supra note 25 (discussing how 
DoD’s data system retrieves information on people in the system). 
 813. Donohue, 465 F.2d at 206 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
 814. See generally Press Release, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., New Biometric 
Technology Improves Security and Facilitates U.S. Entry Process for Interna-
tional Travelers 1 (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/ 
usvisit/usvisit_edu_10-fingerprint_consumer_friendly_content_1400_words.pdf 
(stating that fingerprint technology allows DHS officials to identify criminals 
and immigration violators in the time that it takes them to stand in line). 
 815. Donohue, 465 F.2d at 206 (Winter, J., dissenting). 
 816. See id. 
 817. Id. 
 818. Id. 
 819. Id. 
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sive means possible.820
C. FIFTH AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS 
PROTECTIONS 
 What would minimization procedures 
look like, however, with regard to RBI? Consider FRT and sur-
veillance cameras. Absent a specific target, the generalized use 
of the technology and collection of data does seem to place a ra-
ther heavy burden on the public at large, with a broad impact 
on numerous individuals who are not at the time to have been 
suspected of any wrongdoing. One could argue that the use of 
mounted cameras on poles is in fact not intrusive—they sit, si-
lent, and do not physically interrupt or interfere with efforts to 
convey a message. But this argument, as well as its counter, 
quickly descends into a subjective argument.  
The third potential constitutional grounding (outside of the 
Fourth Amendment) for considering RBI lies in the realm of 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due process concerns.821 The 
central issue here with regard to RBI is the accuracy of the in-
formation obtained and the manner in which it is maintained. 
Perhaps the most authoritative public source on the accuracy of 
FRT is a report co-authored by Professors Lucas Introna and 
Helen Nissenbaum and published by New York University’s 
Center for Catastrophe Preparedness and Response.822 The re-
searchers found that while FRT may prove effective “with rela-
tively small populations in controlled environments, for the ver-
ification of identity claims,” the effort to use it in more complex 
settings, where individuals “do not voluntarily self-identify”—
i.e., the “face in the crowd” scenario, means that it “[i]s unlikely 
to become an operational reality for the foreseeable future.”823
This does not mean that the former is without challenges: 
where an individual’s face is pre-submitted to the system, the 
quality of the image (as well as the quality of the subsequent 
 
The researchers’ findings suggest that the technology support-
ing IBI is more sophisticated—and more accurate—than that 
undergirding RBI.  
 
 820. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(5); U.S. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE 
COURT 11(b) (on file with author). 
 821. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 822. LUCAS D. INTRONA AND HELEN NISSENBAUM, N.Y.U. CTR. FOR CATAS-
TROPHE PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE, FACIAL RECOGNITION TECHNOLOGY: A 
SURVEY OF POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES (2010), available at http:// 
eprints.lancs.ac.uk/49012/1/Document.pdf. 
 823. Id. at 3. 
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image submitted for matching) appear to have a significant im-
pact on overall performance.824 Various other factors could un-
dermine accuracy, such as the environmental conditions in 
which the image was taken, the time that had elapsed between 
the images submitted for comparison, the similarity of the 
cameras used to capture the images, and the size of the gal-
lery.825 But it does suggest that accuracy could be a problem for 
the way that DOJ/FBI, DHS, and DoD envision their use of re-
mote identification technologies.826
  In the scenario that we have called “the grand prize,” an FRS [fa-
cial recognition system] would pick out targeted individuals in a 
crowd. Such are the hopes for FRS serving purposes of law enforce-
ment, national security, and counterterrorism. Potentially connected 
to video surveillance systems (CCTV) already monitoring outdoor 
public spaces like town centers, the systems would alert authorities to 
the presence of known or suspected terrorists or criminals whose im-
ages are already enrolled in a system’s gallery, or could also be used 
for tracking down lost children or other missing persons. This is 
among the most ambitious application scenarios given the current 
state of technology. Poor quality probe images due to unpredictable 
light and shadows in outdoor scenes, unpredictable facial orientation, 
and “noise” from cluttered backgrounds make it difficult for an FRS in 
the first place to even pick out faces in the images. Challenges posed 
by the lack of control inherent in most scenarios of this kind are exac-
erbated by the likelihood of uncooperative subjects. Additionally 
CCTV cameras are generally mounted high (for protection of the cam-
era itself), looking down into the viewing space, thus imposing a pose 
angle from above which has been shown to have a strong negative 
impact on recognition and operate at a distance for which obtaining 
adequate (90 pixel) interoccular resolution is difficult.
 The authors explain: 
827
Difficult, though, does not mean impossible. The authors point 
out, for instance, that the problems associated with scanning 
crowds could be overcome by forcing traffic through portals, 
where more of the “complicating factors” could be controlled.
 
828
As a constitutional matter, then, it is possible that the reli-
ability of the technologies involved in RBI could give rise to due 
process concerns. Numerous drug-testing cases in the 1980s, 
for instance, overturned employee dismissals on the grounds 
that the urinalysis on which the dismissals were based only 
provided ninety-five to ninety-nine percent accuracy.
 
829
 
 824. Id. 
 The 
 825. Id. 
 826. The report itself was made possible through a grant from the Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. Id. at 2. 
 827. Id. at 20. 
 828. Id. 
 829. Kenneth P. Nuger, Biometric Applications: Legal and Societal Consid-
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numbers for many of the technologies involved in RBI are sig-
nificantly lower, ranging, in some cases, from thirty to sixty 
percent830 In the drug testing cases, a cognizable harm directly 
followed from the use of (potentially inaccurate) tests. To the 
extent that RBI becomes the basis for criminal conviction, a 
similar argument could be made. But one need not even go this 
far. Where biometric devices, for instance, are used for authen-
tication purposes, the denial of permission for a commercial 
driver to cross state lines may itself result in a due process vio-
lation claim.831
It is important here to recognize that such claims may only 
be relevant for a limited time and, as such, should not be relied 
on as a basis for framing the problem. Not only do estimates 
vary widely, depending on the technology involved, the system 
under consideration, and who is doing the testing, but the 
technology is rapidly improving.
 
832 Professors Alessandro 
Acquisti, Ralph Gross, and Fred Stutzman, for instance, of 
Carnegie Mellon University, recently conducted a study on the 
use of off-the-shelf FRT software for matching Facebook pro-
files to students walking across a U.S. college campus.833 The 
researchers found that based solely on information provided on 
the social network site, they could positively identify thirty per-
cent of the students passing through public space. Further ex-
periment led to associating sensitive information (such as the 
students’ personal interests, Social Security numbers, and oth-
er information) simply by combining face recognition, data min-
ing algorithms, and statistical re-identification techniques.834
 
erations, http://www.engr.sjsu.edu/biometrics/publications_consideration.html 
(last visited Nov. 2, 2012).  
 
 830. See generally ANIL K. JAIN & AJAY KUMAR, BIOMETRICS OF NEXT 
GENERATION: AN OVERVIEW 12 (2010), available at http://biometrics.cse 
.msu.edu/Publications/GeneralBiometrics/JainKumarNextGenBiometrics_ 
BookChap10.pdf (showing that in some conditions recognition accuracy falls to 
forty-seven percent). 
 831. Id. 
 832. INTRONA & NISSENBAUM, supra note 822, at 26. 
 833. See ALESSANDRO ACQUISTI, RALPH GROSS, & FRED STUTZMAN, PRIVA-
CY IN THE AGE OF AUGMENTED REALITY 9 (2012), available at http://www 
.heinz.cmu.edu/~acquisti/face-recognition-study-FAQ/acquisti-faces-BLACK 
HAT-draft.pdf; see also What Facial Recognition Technology Means for Privacy 
and Civil Liberties: Hearing Before the S. Comm on the Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Privacy, Technology and the Law (2012) (statement of Professor Ales-
sandro Acquisti, Heinz College and CyLab, Carnegie Mellon University), 
available at http://www.judiciary.senate.gov/pdf/12-7-18AcquistiTestimony 
.pdf. 
 834. ACQUISTI, GROSS & STUTZMAN, supra note 833, at 1. 
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The researchers noted that as of 1997, the best FRT program at 
DoD scored an error rate of some 0.54; but by 2006, the false re-
ject rate had plummeted by two orders of magnitude. At the 
same time, the amount of information publicly available that 
could be used to correlate identification efforts had skyrocket-
ed.835
The authors of the New York University study reached a 
similar conclusion about the evolutionary rate of technology. 
They explained: “There is no doubt that FRT is developing very 
rapidly. Face Recognition Vendor Test (FVRT) 2006 indicated 
that FRT could, under certain conditions, outperform hu-
mans.”
 
836 The report went on to contemplate the use of FRT in 
the “grand prize.”837 In the interim, a ready solution stood at 
hand: systems making use of multi-modal biometric sys-
tems838
The FBI explained in a press release: 
—a solution which, it turns out, is precisely the route be-
ing followed by government agencies.  
The NGI System will expand on the FBI Criminal Justice Information 
Services (CJIS) Division’s current Integrated Automated Fingerprint 
Identification System (IAFIS), which is primarily a fingerprint-based 
identification system operated and maintained in Clarksburg, West 
Virginia. The NGI System will provide improvements to current ser-
vices and new functionality for the criminal justice, national security, 
and civil communities . . . .839
In sum, even as the technology is rapidly gaining ground, mul-
ti-modal biometric systems further enhance the accuracy of 
RBI technologies. This significantly undermines the potential 
for due process challenges under the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 
 
One further consideration with regard to due process and 
accuracy stems from the role of state and local government in 
obtaining biometric information. To the extent that state and 
local governments increasingly occupy the RBI realm and, in-
deed, act as the handmaidens of federal agencies, Fourteenth 
Amendment concerns become increasingly relevant. Statutory 
authorization for the collection of personally identifiable infor-
 
 835. Id. 
 836. INTRONA & NISSENBAUM, supra note 822, at 42. 
 837. Id. at 43. 
 838. Id. at 47. 
 839. Press Release, Fed. Bureau of Investigation, FBI Announces Contract 
Award for Next Generation Identification System (Feb. 12, 2008), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/pressrel/press-releases/fbi-announces-contract-award 
-for-next-generation-identification-system. 
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mation (discussed in Part II), creates a federal right for gov-
ernment agencies to accumulate significant amounts of data. 
With such statutory authorities, however, also comes the con-
comitant duty to protect against mistakes, tampering, or un-
warranted disclosure. The Privacy Act thus requires agencies 
to allow for targets to challenge PII held about them. The stat-
ute, however, also creates a massive loophole in this require-
ment, allowing information collected for either law enforcement 
or national security purposes (and, assumedly, both), to be ex-
empted from individual challenge. 
One is thus driven back upon a potential constitutional du-
ty that requires government agencies to maintain information 
in an accurate manner, with access to such information only 
provided to the appropriate authorities. A similar question has 
come before the courts. In 1977, the Supreme Court considered 
a challenge to the constitutionality of New York statutes re-
quiring the state to be given a copy of each drug prescription 
and creating security measures for the storage of such infor-
mation by the state. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for a 
unanimous court, held the statutes to be a reasonable exercise 
of New York’s broad police powers.840 He noted that there were 
no grounds to assume that the security provisions incorporated 
into the statute would be inadequate or improperly adminis-
tered.841
We therefore need not, and do not, decide any question which might 
be presented by the unwarranted disclosure of accumulated private 
data—whether intentional or unintentional—or by a system that did 
not contain comparable security provisions. We simply hold that this 
record does not establish an invasion of any right or liberty protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.
 Such a provision clearly showed an interest in the pro-
tection of individual privacy. 
842
The responsible treatment of the data included in the biometric 
repositories, particularly when entered by state and local gov-
ernments, thus gives rise to a potential Fourteenth Amend-
ment challenge—one which has not been foreclosed by the 
Court. Failure to adequately protect such databases against 
improper use may thus run afoul of constitutional con-
straints.
 
843
 
 840. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977). 
 The problem of pursuing this line of jurisprudence 
 841. Id. at 601–02. 
 842. Id. at 605–06. 
 843. See Steven Goldberg, Enhancing the Senses: How Technological Ad-
vances Shape Our View of the Law, 109 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 13–14 (2006) (argu-
ing that “a governmental biometric database with inadequate safeguards 
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with regard to RBI stems, again, from the overlapping law en-
forcement and national security concerns. Citizens’ efforts to 
obtain information about database processes runs into the im-
mediate wall of government privilege. Exceptions in FOIA for 
national security matters, paired with state secrets doctrine, 
may make such information nearly impossible to obtain.844
V.  REMOTE BIOMETRIC IDENTIFICATION COMES OF 
AGE   
 
The past decade has witnessed a sudden explosion in re-
mote biometric identification. Congress, however, even as it has 
required the Executive to develop and use these technologies, 
has not placed meaningful limits on the use of such powers. 
Gaps in the 1974 Privacy Act and its progeny, as well as the 
1990 Computer Act, in conjunction with explicit exemptions in 
the Privacy Act and the 2002 E-Government Act, remove most 
biometric systems from the statutes’ remit. As a matter of crim-
inal law, Title III of the 1968 Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act and Title I of the 1986 Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act say nothing about RBI. In the national security 
statutory realm, it is unclear whether remote biometric tech-
nologies are currently included within the 1978 Foreign Intelli-
gence Surveillance Act’s definition of electronic surveillance. 
The statute’s dependence, moreover, on the distinction between 
U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons presents a direct challenge 
to the way in which RBI operates. At the same time, principles 
enshrined in the statute appear inapplicable to the RBI con-
text. Recourse to constitutional challenge provides little by way 
of respite: Fourth Amendment jurisprudence fails to address 
the implications of RBI. Fifth Amendment rights against self-
incrimination, First Amendment protections on the right to free 
speech and free assembly, and Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ment due process concerns similarly fall short. 
Why is it that the legislature and the courts have been so 
slow to recognize the challenges posed by these new technolo-
gies—and how ought we to think about the questions raised by 
remote biometric identification?  
Part of the problem may be an over-reliance on liberal po-
litical thought. Indeed, the entire surveillance debate is domi-
 
could be challenged by an individual in that database on the theory that the 
government had violated his rights”). 
 844. H.R. 5164, 98th Cong. (1984) (enacted) (exempting the Privacy Act 
from FOIA restrictions). 
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nated by an emphasis on personally identifiable information. 
On one side of the equation, proponents look to grant agencies 
the power to collect information on individuals; on the other, 
opponents attempt to create protections against abuse of the 
same. As Professor Julie Cohen recognizes, regardless of which 
position one adopts, the underlying framework rests on liberal 
theory: individual rights act as entitlements held by autono-
mous individuals within society, who themselves have the ca-
pacity for rational thought.845 The liberal political tradition thus 
understands privacy within a broader scheme of legal rights 
and obligations.846 Cohen argues that within this rights-based 
world privacy has become a kind of second class citizen, which 
in turn has generated debate about whether it is a fundamental 
right, or whether it is merely socially constructed.847
Perhaps one solution, then, would be to begin to think 
about privacy in a constitutive sense, i.e., as a building block of 
self and social interaction.
 
848 The central question thus shifts 
from “What pre-existing political rights are held by individu-
als?” to “What role does privacy play in human development?” 
It gives rise to further inquiry, such as “How does privacy in-
fluence the social structure of society?” and “How does it affect 
the relationship between individuals and the state?” These 
types of questions include, but go beyond what Cohen refers to 
as “human flourishing.”849
 
 845. JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, 
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 16–17 (2012) (discussing also the prin-
cipal attributes of the legal subject in liberal political thought). 
 It is a conversation driven by indi-
vidual experience and social and political construction.  
 846. See id. (discussing the abstract rights possessed by autonomous indi-
viduals). 
 847. Id. at 19. 
 848. Professor Helen Nissenbaum, for instance, who argues (as a descrip-
tive matter) for co-existent, alternative theories of privacy, embraces both lib-
eral, rights-based theory and approaches that emphasize the social context 
within which information exchange occurs. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN 
CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 67–104 
(2010). In her view, social norms and values may play a central role in our 
conception of privacy, with consequences for the broader construction of socie-
ty. Id. Professor Daniel Solove, in turn, argues that technology has driven the 
concept of privacy beyond recognition. He offers an alternative theory in which 
overlapping concepts of privacy accompany culturally-dependent social norms. 
DANIEL J. SOLOVE, UNDERSTANDING PRIVACY 9 (2008). The value, therefore, of 
privacy depends not on individual rights but on the importance of the concept 
to society. Id. at 10. See COHEN, supra note 845, at 20. 
 849. COHEN, supra note 845, at 14–16. 
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One of Cohen’s most important insights, and one shared by 
other constructive theorists, is that privacy plays a more cen-
tral role in human experience than liberal political theory 
acknowledges. Boundary management, which gives breathing 
space for subjectivity—and critical subjectivity in particular—
depends upon privacy not as an individual right, but as a social 
good. Cohen notes, “A society that wishes to foster critical sub-
jectivity must cabin the informational and spatial logics of sur-
veillance.”850
At a minimum, much more work on this front, specifically 
in regard to how we think about privacy as a constitutive prin-
ciple in regard to information recording, access and manage-
ment—and particularly as it relates to new identification tech-
nologies—needs to occur. This approach rests not on simply 
adapting the existing frameworks, but on re-conceiving the 
place of privacy for self and society. 
 Other norms, such as mobility, access to 
knowledge, and discontinuity, may prove equally important in 
development of the self and society. There is a broader danger 
in reducing the self to binary code. 
What makes this inquiry so pressing is that the federal 
government, to date, has been so eager to take advantage of the 
new technologies that constitute RBI. At one level, this makes 
a great deal of sense. To the extent that technology makes offi-
cials more efficient, utilizes resources more effectively, and 
helps to accomplish the aims of government agencies, strong 
support would naturally follow. This is a rationale adopted by 
all three branches of government, as illustrated by, e.g., legisla-
tive directives to the executive branch to move swiftly to ex-
plore biometric technologies (Part I, above), initiatives taken by 
the Executive branch post-9/11 to develop new systems (Part I, 
above), and judicial decisions that rest upon the assumption 
that the new technologies merely do what a single police officer 
could do by tailing and individual—but more efficiently (Part 
III, above).  
The problem with this approach is that the underlying as-
sumption is wrong. This technology is not simply more efficient. 
It is different in kind—not degree—to what has come before. 
These are not just incremental changes to the status quo, 
which ought to be treated in a manner consistent with tradi-
tional framings. Cameras in public space capture significantly 
more than the naked eye outside the curtilage of the home 
 
 850. Id. at 31. 
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might learn. They record, with perfect recall, entire contexts, 
which may, in conjunction with other biometric and biographic 
data, reveal new insights into citizens’ lives and social net-
works. The kind of surveillance in question, the length of the 
surveillance, and the radical reduction in resource limitations 
all differ.  
It is time for Congress—and the courts—to recognize this 
new form of surveillance. Towards these ends, I have proposed 
five guidelines to distinguish RBI technologies from those more 
common in immediate biometric identification. Specifically, 
RBI allows the government to ascertain the identity (1) of mul-
tiple people; (2) at a distance; (3) in public space; (4) absent no-
tice and consent; and (5) in a continuous and on-going man-
ner.851
 
 851. There are a range of tools that could be contemplated, as a practical 
matter, to address the challenges of RBI (e.g., notice, the opportunity to cor-
rect misinformation, judicial review, public reporting and accountability, feed-
back about the effectiveness of analysis, training, security clearances for those 
with access to information, limitations on data entered into different systems, 
the length of time it is kept, and the conditions under which analysis may be 
performed, remedies, and intermediary liability). But exactly how to craft such 
instruments and what approach to take heavily depends upon the theoretical 
underpinnings of how to think about privacy and the manner in which new 
technologies are evaluated and implemented. 
 The stakes could not be higher for subjecting 
technologies that fall into this category to more rigorous scruti-
ny. For what we now face are questions about human develop-
ment, social construction, and the role of government in the 
lives of citizens—questions that go well beyond individual 
rights.  
